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 “Word of Mouth” divulges the dynamic relationship between gossip and 
twentieth-century verse, placing particular emphasis on the queer sensibilities 
expressed and engendered by a lyric negotiation of gossip’s risks and pleasures.  Over 
the course of an introduction and three chapters I examine what I call lyric gossip—a 
subgenre of lyric poetry, modeled on the discourse of gossip—primarily as it appears 
in the work of Gertrude Stein, Frank O’Hara, and James Merrill.  At first blush, 
gossip’s ostensibly frivolous talk about others would seem at odds with a lyric poetry 
commonly understood as serious, subjective, solitary expression.  Yet the poets I 
consider make significant use of the often-disavowed gossip that circulates about them 
and their work, turning to the rhetorical strategies of what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
describes as the “precious, devalued arts of gossip” in part to address shifting 
conceptions of privacy and publicity, self and community, and talk and technology, 
and in part to illuminate and reinvigorate lyric precepts and practice.  More than 
simply mapping a curious poetic mode, I find in their lyric gossip a peculiarly rich 
vantage from which to spy twentieth-century poetry more broadly, including larger 
questions of agency and relationality that inform figures of poetic address, voice, 
speaker, and tone.  Throughout “Word of Mouth,” such questions arise especially from 
queer cultural contexts in which the vexed issues of sexuality and style coalesce 
around both the idiom and figure of the gossip.  Of course, not all gossip is queer, but 
all gossip, by virtue of its motivating interest in the non-normative, potentially entails 
 queer effects.  The poets in my study pursue such effects, exploring how phobic sexual 
suspicion can paradoxically limn queer possibility—how repressive gossip can 
become a vehicle for the performance of alternative sexualities and concomitant 
meditations on alternative modes of lyric practice.   
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“GOSSIP IS MORE INTERESTING THAN POETRY” 
  
 Ours is an age of gossip.  Buzz, chatter, dish, gab, hearsay, schmooze, tittle-
tattle: proliferating social scientific research on idle talk has ensured we have it on 
good authority that such various species of gossip account for at least two thirds of 
everyday conversation.1  And certainly gossip’s voracious presence in daily life only 
grows if, in addition to face-to-face interaction, one considers mobile phone calls and 
text messages, email exchanges, social networking sites, and the unprecedented 
transfer of information across global, online communities, mobilized in part by 
computer networking protocols known as “gossip networks” (whose design mimics 
the exchange of gossip).  Over a century after Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis 
famously worried about the fate of privacy when “numerous mechanical devices 
threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be 
proclaimed from the house-tops,’” modern culture—from the talk of the town to the 
gossip column, from the telephone to Twitter—has been marked by an extraordinary 
and increasing ability, and desire, to spread gossip rapidly and widely.2 
 Thus to announce in a study of twentieth-century verse that “gossip is more 
interesting than poetry” must appear either a lament or a provocation.  Yet I intend it 
as neither; rather, I mean to highlight and question the persistently posited opposition 
between gossip and what we might think of as “the closet” or inner room of lyric 
poetry and its definitive effects of deep subjectivity.  For most commentators it has 
                                                
1 See Nicholas Emler, “Gossip, Reputation, Adaptation,” in Good Gossip, eds. Robert F. Goodman and 
Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 131. The finding that “about two 
thirds of our conversation time” is devoted to gossip has been, as Kate Fox writes, “consistently 
repeated across a wide range of settings, ages, and social backgrounds.”  See Kate Fox, “Evolution, 
Alienation and Gossip,” Social Issues Research Centre, 2001, web.  
2 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4 (December 
1890), 193.  Warren and Brandeis here quote the biblical New Testament, Luke 12.3.   
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seemed that an interest in gossip disrupts or even precludes a legitimate interest in 
poetry, as if the lyric’s hushed tones can only be drowned out by gossip’s din.  From 
among the abundant anecdotal evidence of this view, consider the following passage 
from a May 2009 article in The Daily Telegraph, appearing in the midst of the scandal 
surrounding the election for Oxford University’s prestigious chair in poetry: 
 
Byron: womanizer.  Coleridge: drug fiend.  Pound: fascist sympathizer.  Yeats: 
snob.  Crane: alcoholic.  Keats: smackhead.  Kipling: imperialist.  Hughes: 
another womanizer.  Poe: married a 13 year-old.  Verlaine: jailed for shooting 
one of his friends.  Lawrence: pervert.  Betjeman: had a bit of a temper on him, 
apparently.  And don’t let’s get started on John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester. The 
booze, the sexually transmitted diseases, the mistresses, the page boys . . .3 
This article, entitled “An Oxford Poet Slayed by Gossip,” emerges from its ellipsis’ 
gossipy swoon to bemoan the violence done to poetry in the name of gossip: “All of 
these men, our anonymous epistolary guardians might grudgingly concede, knew a 
thing or two about putting words together, chopping them into lines and all that carry-
on.”4  Yet none of them, the author wagers, would be able to overcome the talk that 
would today find them unsuitable for the Oxford position, even though such gossip, it 
seems, has nothing to tell us about “all that carry-on” that is poetry.  This common 
stance is not without reason.  But don’t let’s get started on how, beneath the disdainful 
tone, the article itself revels in the poetry world gossip it ostensibly critiques, 
muddying the very line it seeks to establish between improper dish and proper verse.   
 Nearly fifty years earlier, in his 1962 introduction to the second edition of the 
influential anthology New Poets of England and America, Robert Pack similarly 
grumbles that an American poet proves “interesting to the public . . . if he drinks 
himself to death, if he undresses at a poetry reading, or if he takes part in a presidential 
                                                
3 Michael Deacon, “An Oxford Poet Slayed by Gossip,” The Daily Telegraph 15 May 2009. 
4 Ibid. 
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inauguration, but not for what his poems say or for their quality.”5  Complaining that 
the American public’s shift in attention “from the poem to the personality of the poet” 
reflects the troubling “assumption . . . that gossip is more interesting than poetry,” 
Pack himself assumes that one could neatly distinguish between the two—at precisely 
the historical moment when not only many of the poets his introduction critiques but 
also those it valorizes are busy calling such distinctions into question.6   
 Given how gossip, at first blush, indeed appears anti-lyrical, to propose an 
affirmative relationship between gossip and poetry might seem a dubious effort: 
ostensibly frivolous talk about others sits uneasily next to a lyric poetry commonly 
understood as serious, intensely subjective expression.  Whereas gossip revels in its 
many voices—as it spreads it accumulates voices, suggesting an increasingly untidy, 
increasingly collaborative authorship—the lyric poet is most often seen as going it 
alone, as in John Stuart Mill’s influential assertion, “All poetry is of the nature of 
soliloquy.”7  Perhaps for these reasons, scholars interested in gossip’s relationship to 
literary language have turned predominantly to the novel, a more obviously social 
genre.8  But none of this has stopped readers or poets from casually thinking of poems 
as gossipy.  “Gossip exalts in poetry,” declares Robert Frost.9  “All art is based on 
gossip,” avers W. H. Auden.10  And in Frank O’Hara’s poems art-world gossip, or 
                                                
5 Robert Pack, introduction, New Poets of England and America, 2nd ed., eds. Donald Hall and Robert 
Pack (New York: Meridian Books, 1962), 177. 
6 Ibid. 
7 John Stuart Mill, “Thoughts on Poetry and its Varieties” (1833), in Autobiography and Literary 
Essays, eds. John M. Robson and Jack Stillinger (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1981), 349. 
8 Patricia Meyer Spacks’ Gossip (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), for instance, the definitive work 
on gossip’s relationship to literary language, tellingly omits poetry from its survey of gossip and the 
novel, drama, published letters, and biography. 
9 Frost’s remark is from a 1956 lecture, as qtd. in Stanley Burnshaw, Robert Frost Himself (New York: 
G. Braziller, 1986), 253. 
10 W. H. Auden, “In Defence of Gossip,” in Prose and Travel Books in Prose and Verse, Volume 1, 
1926-1938, ed. Edward Mendelson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 427. 
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what he calls “dishing art,” blurs into poetry, “the dish that’s art.”11  As the chapters 
that follow show, the stubborn critical desire to rescue poetry from gossip—a desire 
that in some cases entails an attempt to save poetry from itself—seldom asks how 
poets might engage gossip in their poems as a prevalent competing discourse, a 
rhetorical model, or a source of inspiration for lyric meditations on private and public, 
self and community, talk and technology, and the subjectivities that emerge from the 
charged intersections of these concepts. 
 Such questions about the productive role played by idle talk in poetic making 
motivate my study of the significant relationship between the art of gossip and the 
twentieth-century American lyric poem.  Over three chapters placing particular 
emphasis on the queer sensibilities expressed and engendered by a lyric negotiation of 
gossip’s risks and pleasures, I examine what I call lyric gossip—a subgenre of lyric 
poetry, modeled on the discourse of gossip—as it appears in the work of Gertrude 
Stein, Frank O’Hara, and James Merrill.  Rather than simply experiencing their 
respective cultures’ gossip as a threat to lyric decorum, these poets make use of the 
often-disavowed dish that circulates about them and their work, turning to the 
rhetorical strategies of what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick describes as the “precious, 
devalued arts of gossip” in part to address shifting conceptions of privacy and 
publicity, and self and community, and in part to illuminate and reinvigorate lyric 
precepts and practice.12   
 Stein, O’Hara, and Merrill each want to inhabit and reimagine—without 
rejecting—the lyric mode, and many of the texts I examine under the label lyric gossip 
can accordingly seem to push the boundaries of what we might see as lyric.  Each poet 
                                                
11 Frank O’Hara, “Brothers,” The Collected Poems of Frank O’Hara, ed. Donald Allen (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995), 75. 
12 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: The University of California Press), 
1990, 23. 
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exploits gossip’s ability to destabilize normative categories, and the categories of 
literary genre are no exception.  Stein’s writing notoriously explodes generic 
classifications; O’Hara antagonized the poetry world with his seemingly anti-poetic 
poems; and Merrill begins his poetic trilogy The Changing Light at Sandover by self-
reflexively worrying his decision to cast his project in verse: “Admittedly I err by 
undertaking / This in its present form.”13  For these authors the poetic engagement 
with gossip occasions meditations on the lyric genre, such that lyric gossip entails 
gossip about the potential queerness of lyric.  My first chapter, for example, 
demonstrates how Stein’s long, difficult poem Stanzas in Meditation reworks lyric 
address by cultivating surprising affinities between gossip’s objectifying “They” and 
lyric’s paradigmatic, overhearing auditors.  Chapter Two explores how O’Hara 
complicates mid-century confessional poetics and the critical ideal of a poetic speaker 
by advancing instead a poetics of gossip and a lyric talker.  And my final chapter 
argues that in The Changing Light at Sandover gossip provides Merrill with a method 
and motivation for his poem’s provocative sounding of the problem of tone and the 
queer possibilities, as much as limits, of lyric interiority.  More than simply mapping a 
curious poetic mode, then, I find in lyric gossip a peculiarly rich vantage from which 
to spy twentieth-century poetry more broadly, including questions of agency and 
relationality that inform figures of poetic address, voice, speaker, and tone.  Engaging 
as a modern mode of self-fashioning the gossip so often seen as damaging to 
autonomous selfhood, Stein, O’Hara, and Merrill share an interest in the cultivation 
and circulation of subjectivities based not in the constitutive self-expression 
commonly associated with the lyric, but instead in the fraught pleasures and uncertain 
agency of gossip’s objectifying talk about others, and the vivifying anticipation of in 
turn becoming the object of gossip oneself.  
                                                
13 James Merrill, The Changing Light at Sandover (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 3. 
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 Focusing on these poets’ gossip, specifically, brings into relief the implications 
of such objectification—both negative and less expectedly positive.  Stein’s, O’Hara’s, 
and Merrill’s poetic gossip, as I will show, typically has been subsumed within 
broader discussions of talk, dialogue, or conversation.  But a prevailing critical 
emphasis on conversational mutuality, respect, and manners effaces both the 
difficulties and the pleasures of gossip’s unauthorized appropriations, exclusions, and 
use of others, often imagining a stabilizing parity for talk in fact characterized by rapid 
shifts and disparities in agency.  All gossip is a form of conversation, but not all 
conversation is gossip.  Unlike the ideals of decorum and mutuality that govern 
conversation, gossip depends on an absent other whose necessary exclusion from the 
scene of gossip enables its intimacies.  Gossip—can we think of it as conversation’s 
rowdy younger sibling?—thrives on its (often charmingly) bad manners and 
hierarchical play; its authority obtains in speaking of as much as to others.  Yet 
conversely, for the poets I consider gossip’s objectifying talk also strangely animates 
its objects’ agency, as if to be for these poets is first to be gossiped about.  Throughout 
their gossipy poems they anticipate becoming gossip themselves; their poems’ lyric 
“I” flirts with the third-person, looking forward to a reception context in which their 
lyric gossip will itself become the stuff of gossip.  
 Bringing the insights of queer and lyric theory to bear in historically situated 
readings of these poets’ work, I argue that the idea and practice of gossip can reframe 
understandings of the poetics and politics of lyric personhood.  Each of my chapters 
thus presents a case study of a poetic project that approaches the lyric as a potentially 
queer space of both subjectivity and sociality.  Departing from the critical tendency to 
organize the study of American poetry principally in relation to schools of verse, my 
emphasis on gossip constellates twentieth-century American poetry anew by telling 
tales out of school, as it were—establishing, if not quite an alternative genealogy of 
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American poetry, a network of more modest but no less significant queer affinities 
among poets of disparate styles and movements.  While individually the chapters enter 
into the critical discussion about the part played by talk in the work of the poet at 
hand, together they survey key moments in an ongoing poetic conversation with and 
through gossip’s multi-voiced discourse, one that has fueled innovations in lyric form.   
 This poetic conversation with gossip is not exclusive to America, nor to the 
twentieth century—although my account of lyric gossip is delimited by century and 
nation, it is not so by necessity.  But neither is my framework arbitrary: gossip’s 
checkered history in twentieth-century America provides a particularly rich context for 
exploring the relationship between modern understandings of the lyric and modern 
forms of sexuality.  The formal questions with which the chapters that follow are 
occupied arise from queer cultural contexts in which the vexed issues of reputation, 
sexual identity, and style coalesce around both the idiom and figure of the gossip.  If 
the first half of the last century presents a parallel history of poetry’s uneasy 
codification as lyric and of the uneasy codification of modern sexual identities, gossip 
suggestively blurs these two histories, most evidently, as I will detail in my second 
and third chapters, in the McCarthy era’s gossipy conflation of the queer, the un-
American, and the artist.  Of the work I consider, only O’Hara’s is composed in the 
midst of the postwar culture of heightened suspicion surrounding sexual and artistic 
identity.  Yet Stanzas in Meditation, written in 1932, and The Changing Light at 
Sandover, the first installment of which was not published until 1976, are each also 
indelibly marked by this period in American history toward which they reach—
whether forwards or backwards.  The source material for Sandover, like the queer 
experience it narrates, dates from 1953, and Merrill’s lyric gossip challenges and finds 
pleasure within the gossip-laden, Cold War unease that haunts his poem.  Stein’s 
Stanzas, meanwhile, is not published until 1956, when its reception by poets like John 
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Ashbery draws out its interest in how homophobic suspicion can paradoxically limn 
queer possibility—how repressive gossip can become, for the queer poet, a vehicle for 
the performance of alternative sexualities and for meditations on alternative modes of 
lyric practice.  Compare Stanzas’ opening lines— 
 
I caught a bird which made a ball 
And they thought better of it. 
But it is all of which they taught 
That they were in a hurry yet 
In a kind of way they meant it best14 
—with those of Ashbery’s pronoun-filled poem about gossip, homosexuality, and the 
McCarthy era, “The Grapevine”:   
 
Of who we and all they are 
 You all now know.  But you know 
 After they began to find us out we grew 
 Before they died thinking us the causes 
 
 Of their acts. . . . 15  
Read through the anachronistic lens of Ashbery’s mid-century grapevine (a “word-of-
mouth network of ‘fruits,’” as John Shoptaw puts it16), Stanzas becomes a central text 
for the lyric gossip that flourishes in American poetry during the 1950s and 1960s and 
its queer interest in, as Stein asks, what happens “If I name names if I name names 
with them.”17 
 By queer I mean not so much the expression or representation of lesbian or gay 
identity as the baffling of sexual or gendered identity categories and of normative 
categorization more broadly.   The “rich, unsystematic resources” of what Sedgwick 
calls the “nonce-taxonomic work represented by gossip” hold out precisely this 
                                                
14 Gertrude Stein, Stanzas in Meditation, in The Yale Gertrude Stein, ed. Richard Kostelanetz (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 316. 
15 John Ashbery, “The Grapevine,” in The Mooring of Starting Out: The First Five Books of Poetry 
(Hopewell, NJ: The Ecco Press, 1997), 11. 
16 John Shoptaw, On the Outside Looking Out: John Ashbery’s Poetry (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1994), 21. 
17 Stein, Stanzas in Meditation, 322. 
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potential for a more nuanced account of gender, sexuality, and desire than identity 
categories tend to offer, and in this sense gossip enables the queer energies of Stein’s, 
O’Hara’s, and Merrill’s lyric gossip and its challenges to social and poetic 
convention.18  Of course, not all gossip is queer, but all gossip, by virtue of its 
constitutive interest in the non-normative, potentially entails queer effects.  Many of 
these effects—of, for instance, fleeting, unauthorized spaces and subjectivities—
derive from gossip’s status as both a performance in the theatrical sense and as 
performative in the sense of speech act theory and the theories of performativity drawn 
from it.  Numerous theorists of gossip point out that it involves a kind of theatrical 
performance: “think of it as drama,” Patricia Meyer Spacks writes.  “Two characters  
. . . speaking the language of shared experience, revealing themselves as they talk of 
others, constructing a joint narrative—a narrative that conjures up yet other actors, 
offstage, playing out their own private dramas.”19  Gossip is also performative, its 
language often depicted as self-actualizing, setting in motion what it ostensibly 
describes.  Its characterization as autonomous language out of control garners 
generally poor reviews (think of the World War Two slogans warning against gossip: 
“careless talk costs lives” and “loose lips sink ships”), but from another perspective, 
gossip’s ability to meld saying and doing suggests a vital source of transformative, 
anti-normative energy. 
 The idea of gossip as both queer performance and performativity informs my 
analysis of lyric gossip as a mode of aesthetic self-fashioning, and in the pages that 
follow I read in Stein’s, O’Hara’s, and Merrill’s work a performance of sexuality that 
takes place at the level of poetic style.  Wayne Koestenbaum emphasizes gossip’s 
queer performativity and the way it can loosen more fixed gender or sexual identities 
                                                
18 Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, 23. 
19 Spacks, Gossip, 3. 
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when he writes that “Gossip, hardly trivial, is as central to gay culture as it is to female 
cultures.  From skeins of hearsay, I weave an inner life, I build queerness . . . .”20  If by 
queerness one means primarily the avoidance or dismantling of normative identity 
categories, to “build queerness” might seem a paradox.  Indeed, if we consider the 
concept of “nonce taxonomy” Sedgwick advances in Epistemology of the Closet, it 
might seem an appropriate one.  In a passage to which my study will recur, Sedgwick 
introduces gossip as her primary example of nonce taxonomy, a project which seeks to 
create “space for asking or thinking in detail about the multiple, unstable ways in 
which people may be like or different from each other.”  She writes,  
 
[P]robably everybody who survives at all has reasonably rich, unsystematic 
resources of nonce taxonomy for mapping out the possibilities, dangers, and 
stimulations of their human social landscape.  It is probably people with the 
experience of oppression or subordination who have most need to know [how 
“people may be like or different from each other”]; and I take the precious, 
devalued arts of gossip, immemorially associated in European thought with 
servants, with effeminate and gay men, with all women, to have to do not even 
so much with the transmission of necessary news as with the refinement of 
necessary skills for making, testing, and using unrationalized and provisional 
hypotheses about what kinds of people there are to be found in one’s world.21 
Sedgwick is careful to note that gossip is not an essentially female or gay discourse, 
although historically women and gay men have been “peculiarly disserved by its 
devaluation.”22  Instead gossip, for Sedgwick, represents a way of “build[ing] 
queerness” in all its one-time-only nuance, of meeting “one’s descriptive requirements 
that the piercing bouquet of a given friend’s particularity be done some justice.”23 
  Sedgwick’s nonce taxonomy shares deep affinities with Roland Barthes’ 
concept of the Neutral, which emerges throughout his body of work but most 
extensively in the series of lectures he gave at the Collège de France in 1977-1978.  
                                                
20 Wayne Koestenbaum, The Queen’s Throat: Opera, Homosexuality, and the Mystery of Desire (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1993), 84-85. 
21 Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, 23. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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Barthes sees the elaboration of the Neutral as an aesthetic and “ethical project” which, 
like Sedgwick’s anti-homophobic inquiry, proposes a manner of eluding the binary 
thinking that limits what counts as knowledge in Western discourse.  Like Sedgwick, 
he declares: “I want to live according to nuance.”24  The Neutral, that which 
“outplays” and “baffles the paradigm,” is his way of doing so, his “style of being 
present to the struggles of my time.”25  This ethics of style offers “the nonviolent 
refusal of reduction, the parrying of generality by inventive, unexpected, 
nonparadigmatizable behavior, the elegant and discreet flight in the face of 
dogmatism.”26  Yet gossip, for Barthes, would seem to be the anti-Neutral.  In Roland 
Barthes by Roland Barthes he writes, “saying ‘he’ about someone, I always envision a 
kind of murder by language, whose entire scene, sometimes sumptuous, even 
ceremonial, is gossip.”27  Sedgwick’s gossip conjures “the piercing bouquet of a given 
friend’s particularity”; Barthes’ gossip fits its subjects into pre-determined categories, 
enacting “murder by language.”  In a fragment entitled “Gossip” in A Lover’s 
Discourse, Barthes writes further that gossip “takes possession of my other and 
restores that other to me in the bloodless form of a universal substitute.”28  So much 
for nuance!  
 In Sedgwick and Barthes we find versions of the two typical views of gossip’s 
ethics.  Gossip as nonce taxonomy recalls the view that (as Robert F. Goodman puts it) 
“the sort of moral judgments made by gossipers cannot be separated from the specifics 
of particular cases.  So enmeshed are such moral determinations in detail that they 
                                                
24 Roland Barthes, The Neutral: Lecture Course at the College de France (1977-1978), trans. Rosalind 
E. Krauss and Denis Hollier (New York: Columbia University Press), 11. 
25 Ibid., 6, 8, emphasis mine. 
26 Ibid., 36. 
27 Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977), 169. 
28 Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1978), 185. 
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cannot be fit neatly into a unified moral system or easily generated to other cases.”  
Gossip as a form of “universal substitute” suggests the view that “a primary emphasis 
of gossip is upon instances of trespass against a community’s norms.  A primary 
purpose of gossip is to sustain those norms, not to make fine-tuned judgments of every 
case.”29  In introducing these two views, my aim is not to set forth for gossip the kind 
of hegemonic/subversive, structuring binary against which both Barthes and Sedgwick 
work, but rather to think about how they are much the same view, differently inflected.  
Sedgwick is attuned to the ways nonce taxonomy is always threatening to get stuck, to 
become rote, normalizing taxonomy; and however much Barthes wants to attack 
gossip, his lingering on its “sumptuous, even ceremonial” qualities suggests a 
concurrent investment in its stylistic and erotic potential, and a way in which one 
might find nuance within discourses which can tend toward troubling generality. 
 Between Sedgwick and Barthes, then, one might piece together a fuller 
theoretical account of gossip’s queer aesthetics and ethics.  Although my project tends, 
like its objects of study, toward an affirmative account of gossip, within the poems I 
consider gossip is never neatly valorized or castigated, and its queer pleasures are 
inseparable from its quite real risks.  Much of the recent critical work on gossip seems 
caught up in a repressive hypothesis, certain that gossip, a liberating discourse of the 
subordinated, has been maligned and repressed precisely because of the threat it poses 
to the status quo.  As useful as this work can be, the critical insistence on, as one 
collection of essays declares, Good Gossip, or “The Vindication of Gossip,” can at 
times seem reductively to declare that Tomorrow gossip will be good again.  The 
poets in my study, faced with phobic networks of suspicion and knowingness which 
implicate and conscript them, cannot celebrate gossip in this way, instead adopting it 
                                                
29 From Robert F. Goodman’s introduction to Good Gossip, ed. Robert F. Goodman and Aaron Ben-
Ze’ev (Lawrence, KS: The University Press Kansas, 1994), 7. 
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as a discourse that inherently neither subverts nor reinforces power, but that one might 
take up for any number of purposes.  Whether in the dizzying shifts Stein makes 
between the first and third person, the ambiguous subjective or objective status of 
O’Hara’s gossip about himself, or Merrill’s representation of two worlds and their 
voices, hinging on gossip, each of these poets plays with lyric gossip’s distinct ability 
to slide back and forth between subjectivity and objectivity, pleasurable particularity 
and violent generalization.  In so doing, their poems nourish the liminal formal space 
between subject and object, a space Barthes might see as the theatrical space of gossip 
and its violent “scene,” or Sedgwick might call a “space for asking or thinking in 
detail about the multiple, unstable ways in which people may be like or different from 
each other.”  
 The unauthorized voices and selves of these poems often emerge from such 
represented and formal spaces of gossip: Stein’s Stanzas presents formal rooms that 
house her poem’s pervasive dish; O’Hara’s poetry at times speaks as a queer, urban 
space of gossip; and Merrill’s use of the Ouija board in Sandover imagines a world 
and an architecture from which the voice of his disembodied, otherworldly gossip 
emanates.  The reputations and iconography of these poets are bound up with spaces 
of gossip: think of the many photographs of Stein posed in her apartment at 27 rue de 
Fleurus; the image of O’Hara on the telephone in one of his well-documented 
Manhattan apartments; or the photograph of the ballroom of Merrill’s childhood home 
upon which the ballroom at his fictional Sandover is based, and which adorns the 
cover of the first omnibus publication of Sandover (figures 1-3).  The iconographic 
force of these spaces of gossip stems largely from the way they mirror, and are 
mirrored in, the lyric spaces of gossip each poet creates.  Across these poets’ bodies of 
work we find a fantasy of the transformative space of gossip, in which collected talk 
floats in and out of the bodies that perform and invariably alter it, thriving on and  
 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 1-3. Houses of Fame: Man Ray, “Gertrude Stein and Alice B. Toklas, 27 rue 
de Fleurus”; Mario Schifano, Frank O’Hara, 791 Broadway; The Ballroom at 
Sandover. 
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producing ambiguities of agency and interiority.   
 Throughout my study I return to the idea of a transforming space of gossip, 
and in tracing lyric gossip’s emphasis on the gossip as a resonant space as much as or  
even more than an embodied figure, I draw on depictions of the classical figure of 
Fame (the Greek Pheme or Ossa, Roman Fama)—goddess of gossip and rumor, spirit 
of fame and infamy, renown and scandal.  When Ovid describes Fame’s dwelling at 
“The limits of the threefold universe, / Whence all things everywhere, however far, / 
Are scanned and watched, and every voice and word / Reaches its listening ears,” he 
inventively locates gossip’s agency not in the goddess herself so much as her “chosen 
home” and “its . . . ears.”30  And while the house of Fame serves as a seemingly 
totalizing archive of “every voice and word” ever spoken, this archive functions less 
as a fixed repository of knowledge belonging to or emitting from a divine authority 
than a disembodied pool of language which mutates as it is picked up and passed 
along from body to body.  Gossip, that is, appears less a subjectivity than a space of 
subjectivities.  As the house of Fame “reverberates, / Repeating voices, doubling what 
it hears,”    
 
                   rumours everywhere,  
Thousands, false mixed with true, roam to and fro,  
And words flit by and phrases all confused.  
Some pour their tattle into idle ears,  
Some pass on what they've gathered, and as each  
Gossip adds something new the story grows.  
Here is Credulity, here reckless Error,  
Groundless Delight, Whispers of unknown source,  
Sudden Sedition, overwhelming Fears.  
All that goes on in heaven or sea or land  
Rumour observes and scours the whole wide world.31 
As a figure for idle talk, the house of Fame conveys the way in which the voice of 
gossip preserves and multiplies but can exist independently of a particular, embodied 
                                                
30 Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. A.D. Melville (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 275. 
31 Ibid. 
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subjectivity.  Significantly, the “overwhelming Fears” this undermining of stable 
interiority can produce are accompanied by a veritable orgy of “Groundless Delight,” 
as free-floating “words” and “phrases” are whispered among a throng that takes 
pleasure in sourceless knowledge and the possibilities of its performance.   
 Gossip, which belongs at once to everybody (what everybody’s saying) and no 
body in particular (you didn’t hear it from me), allows for a simultaneous self-
assertion and self-effacement, an extravagant stylistic performance into which the self 
might all but disappear, but out of which it might also emerge.  Merrill describes how 
when writing a poem, “[t]he words that come first are anybody’s, a froth of phrases, 
like the first words from a medium’s mouth.  You have to make them your own.”32  
O’Hara declares, “the only truth is face to face, the poem whose words become your 
mouth.”33  And Stein—gossipy godmother of us all—prepares us to “Expect pages and 
by word of mouth.”34  Peopling their poems with gossip’s “Credulity,” “Error,” 
“Delight,” and “Whispers” as they contemplate “Sedition” and “Fears,” Stein, O’Hara, 
and Merrill claim a strange lyric authority in voicing and becoming the words of 
others.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 James Merrill, “An Interview with Donald Sheehan,” in James Merrill, Collected Prose, eds. J. D. 
McClatchy and Stephen Yenser (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 61. 
33 O’Hara, “Ode: Salute to the French Negro Poets,” The Collected Poems of Frank O’Hara, 305. 
34 Gertrude Stein, “An Instant Answer or A Hundred Prominent Men,” in Gertrude Stein: Writings 
1903-1932 (New York: The Library of America, 1998), 480. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
“IF I NAME NAMES WITH THEM: GERTRUDE STEIN, LYRIC, AND GOSSIP” 
 
 
So as I say poetry is essentially the discovery, the love,  
the passion for the name of anything. 
 
—Gertrude Stein, “Poetry and Grammar” 
 
Why mention names why not mention names 
 
—Gertrude Stein, “Gentle Julia” 
 
I. “A CONSIDERABLE DISPLAY OF SORDID ANECDOTES” 
Gertrude Stein was a gossip.  You didn’t hear it here first.  It is hardly fresh 
news to assert that Stein, chatty doyenne of 27 rue de Fleurus, had a taste for dish, and 
even less juicy to remark that modernist dish had a decided taste for her.  In his 1914 
essay instructing the public “How to Read Gertrude Stein,” Carl Van Vechten lovingly 
emphasizes both “Miss Stein’s piquant love of gossip” and gossipy details about her 
“personality,” “physique,” “garb,” and salon; elsewhere he positions her writing itself 
as gossip that insinuates its author’s position as “founder” and foremost figure of “the 
modern movement in English literature”: “With the publication of Three Lives,” he 
writes, “her gossip was disseminated.”1  The 1932 publication of the bestselling 
Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas confirmed and consolidated Stein’s reputations as a 
gossip and a writer, ensuring that her fame during her lifetime would have as much to 
do with the gossip swirling around (and emanating from) her formidable personality as 
it would with her gossipy and gossiped-about work.  In a eulogy for Stein, Van 
Vechten claims that “in the work of Gertrude Stein her conversation pieces mixed with 
her landscape, her gossip with her lectures,” reasserting his sense that her gossip 
                                                
1 Carl Van Vechten, “How to Read Gertrude Stein,” Trend August 1914, and “Medals for Miss Stein,” 
New York Tribune, May 13, 1923, both rptd. in The Critical Response to Gertrude Stein, ed. Kirk 
Curnutt (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 155, 156, 123.  
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cannot be considered distinct from her more explicitly literary endeavors.2  Yet even 
as Stein has become nearly synonymous with gossip, her readers have often labored to 
make just such a distinction between “her gossip” and “the work.”  We have had 
critical accounts of the “landscape” and “lectures,” important studies of Stein and 
dialogue, and even recent discussion of Stein’s “conversation”—but the insistent 
presence of gossip in Stein’s writing still has not received sustained critical 
consideration.     
Why this lacuna in Stein scholarship?  Despite Van Vechten’s example, Stein’s 
earliest critics almost uniformly denounced her “piquant love of gossip.” Testimony 
against Gertrude Stein, a collection of testy rejoinders to The Autobiography of Alice 
B. Toklas published in 1935 as a special supplement to Transition, set the terms for 
one strand of subsequent devaluations of Stein’s gossip.  I will have more to say later 
about this pamphlet, in which Georges Braque, Eugene and Maria Jolas, Henri 
Matisse, André Salmon, and Tristan Tzara muster an impressive supply of impotent 
outrage and counter-gossip in order to perform mostly trivial factual corrections (e.g., 
“This incident took place Boulevard des Invalides, not in Clamart”).3  For now, I want 
simply to point toward its “unanimity of opinion that [Stein] had no understanding of 
what really was happening around her, that the mutation of ideas beneath the surface 
of the more obvious contacts and clashes of personalities during that period escaped 
her entirely,” and to Tristan Tzara’s characteristic complaint that in Stein’s gossipy, 
surface-level staging of these “clashes of personalities,” “we witness a considerable 
display of sordid anecdotes destined to make us believe that Miss Gertrude Stein is in 
reality a genius.”4  Two decades later, in his critical hatchet job Art by Subtraction: A 
                                                
2 Carl Van Vechten, “Gertrude Stein: An Epilogue,” syndicated column, November 7, 1946, rptd. in 
The Critical Response to Gertrude Stein, 291.  
3 Henri Matisse, in Testimony against Gertrude Stein, Transition Pamphlet no. 1 (The Hague: Servire 
Press, 1935), 6.  
4 Eugene Jolas and Tristan Tzara, respectively, in Testimony against Gertrude Stein, 2, 12.  
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Dissenting Opinion of Gertrude Stein, B.L. Reid cites such invective in asserting that 
Stein’s “gossip is character revealing in a rather disastrous way, for it often proves to 
be grossly inaccurate.”5  Echoing the claim that she fails to apprehend “ideas beneath 
the surface,” and thus fails to dazzle us into believing her a “genius,” he asserts that 
Stein’s “autobiographical books” are “[b]y and large . . . chitchat—engrossing as the 
gossip of an alert and powerful personality,” but never “deeper than chitchat level.”6    
If antagonistic critics such as Reid seem to declare of Stein’s more 
immediately accessible work there’s nothing more to it than gossip!, the many 
champions of this work have tended to take the opposite tack, proclaiming there’s so 
much more to it than gossip!  These seemingly contradictory positions significantly 
share a sense of literary value as “deeper than chitchat.”  Thus in his review in The 
New York Herald-Tribune, Stein’s friend Louis Bromfield celebrates The 
Autobiography but warns there is “no use in quoting amusing anecdotes or bits of 
gossip from the book.  These are things which any one can put on paper when he 
comes to write his autobiography, whether he has ever written a word before or not.”7  
Similarly, in a favorable review in The Nation, William Troy notes that The 
Autobiography “can be enjoyed for its gossip, its fund of wit and anecdotes,” but 
worries that “[r]ead in this way,” it will “provide inexhaustible fodder for the 
newspaper reviewers and abundant, if somewhat superficial, enjoyment for a large 
section of the reading public.  Indeed, it is all too tempting to plunder some of its rarer 
bits for the purposes of this review; to repeat what Miss Stein has to say.”8  Both 
Bromfield and Troy bear witness, no less than Tzara or Reid, to Stein’s “considerable 
                                                
5 Benjamin Lawrence Reid, Art by Subtraction: A Dissenting Opinion of Gertrude Stein (Norman: 
Oklahoma University Press, 1958), 186.  Reid describes his book as “an essay in decapitation” (vii). 
6 Ibid., 186. 
7 Louis Bromfield, “Gertrude Stein, Experimenter with Words,” The New York Herald-Tribune Books, 
September 3, 1933, rptd. in The Critical Response to Gertrude Stein, 65. 
8 William Troy, “A Note on Gertrude Stein,” The Nation, September 6, 1933, rptd. in The Critical 
Response to Gertrude Stein, 67. 
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display of sordid anecdotes.”  Lest this dish’s “somewhat superficial” pleasures prove 
“all too tempting” to the critic and potential gossip, one must resist “quoting” its 
“anecdotes,” or “repeat[ing] what Miss Stein has to say.”  The Autobiography, here, is 
of interest, but in spite of rather than because of its gossip.  When Richard Bridgman 
laments that The Autobiography “is regarded as gossip, pleasant to read but 
undeserving of serious critical attention,” or Marjorie Perloff insists that “The 
Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas and Everybody’s Autobiography are, in fact, 
anything but the straightforward, anecdotal memoirs that readers, in search of good 
gossip . . . take them to be,” we see that even the sharpest and most sympathetic 
readers of Stein’s popular texts have tended brusquely to move past gossip, as if it 
were a frivolous, inconsequential aspect of her work proper, and a distraction from any 
real estimation of the work’s value.9 
A variation of this response to Stein’s gossip has been to see it as evidence of 
the degree to which the text at hand has capitulated to the expectations of a 
middlebrow reading public, and in so doing strayed from the so-called real work found 
in her more forbiddingly difficult, experimental writing.  In this view, the gossip 
accepted as characteristic of Stein’s personality and popular mode is understood to 
have little to do with the body of work written not for an audience but for herself, and 
this work—in its supposed tight-lipped refusal to offer up gossip—is in turn often 
positioned as critiquing and so redeeming the loose talk of her popular texts.  The 
Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas and Stanzas in Meditation, composed during the 
summer and fall of 1932, have provided scholars with an exemplary pairing for this 
critical narrative, The Autobiography emerging as paradigmatic of Stein’s gossipy, 
popular writing, and Stanzas representing, just the opposite, an abstract, stubbornly 
                                                
9 Richard Bridgman, Gertrude Stein in Pieces (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 218; 
Marjorie Perloff, “(Im)Personating Gertrude Stein,” in Gertrude Stein and the Making of Literature, 
eds. Shirley Neuman and Ira B. Nadel (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988), 61-62.   
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self-enclosed meditation—the richly murky, poetic depth lurking below gossip’s 
sparkling prose surface.  Though the texts are undeniably linked (each refers to the 
other, as when the speaker of Stanzas intones “This is her autobiography one of 
two”10), Donald Sutherland introduces Stanzas into print in Yale’s series of Stein’s 
unpublished work by contrasting the austere achievement of “the ‘Stanzas’ at their 
purest” with that of The Autobiography, written “partly for distraction,” and “concrete 
to the point of gossip.”11  Over three decades later Ulla E. Dydo similarly professes 
                                                
10 Gertrude Stein, Stanzas in Meditation, in The Yale Gertrude Stein, ed. Richard Kostelanetz (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 390.  Further references will appear in the text.  This edition of 
Stanzas reprints that which first appeared in Stanzas in Meditation and Other Poems, 1929-1933 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1956). I quote from this now out of print text of Stanzas, based on a 
revised typescript, despite Ulla E. Dydo’s widely accepted argument that “the text of ‘Stanzas’ in the 
posthumous Yale volume is corrupt” (Dydo, Gertrude Stein: The Language That Rises, 1923-1934 
[Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2003], 510).  Dydo’s argument is based on her fascinating 
archival discovery that the second typescript of Stanzas consistently replaces the word “may” with 
“can” (though not entirely).  Linking the anomaly of this specific, thoroughgoing revision to Stein’s 
having found, while going through old papers in the spring of 1932, the manuscript of Q.E.D., her early 
novel based on her affair with May Bookstaver, Dydo argues that Toklas, who felt this past affair had 
been hidden from her, became “enraged” and “destroyed—or made Gertrude destroy—May’s letters, 
which had served as the basis for the early novel.  She became, as she put it, ‘paranoid about the name 
May.’  That paranoia appears to be the key to the revisions of the text of Stanzas.  Alice Toklas must 
have initiated the elimination of the words may and May from the stanzas in the hope of purging the 
poems of Gertrude Stein of anything suggestive of May Bookstaver” (Dydo, “Stanzas in Meditation: 
The Other Autobiography,” Chicago Review 35 [Winter 1985], 12-13).  Thus the revisions, Dydo 
claims, are “a biographical, not a literary, matter”: “the corruptions of ‘Stanzas’ were not a part of the 
writing process but date to . . . when the poems were being retyped”; but because “the most 
authoritative text of a work is usually thought to be the latest, most up-to-date revised version,” the Yale 
edition of Stanzas relied on this “adulterated” manuscript (Gertrdude Stein: The Language That Rises, 
501, 510, 490, 491). 
 I nonetheless cite the Yale edition of Stanzas primarily because it is this version of the poem whose 
effects I want to trace in linking Stein’s poetics of gossip to the mid-century flourishing of the gossip 
poem.  As Wayne Koestenbaum notes, because poets like John Ashbery read the 1956 edition of 
Stanzas, it “has a certain literary-historical importance, whatever its textual inconsistencies” (“Stein is 
Nice,” in Cleavage: Essays on Sex, Stars, and Aesthetics [New York: Ballantine Books, 2000], 310).  
Even setting “literary-historical importance” aside, though, I contest Dydo’s claim that Stanzas’ 
may/can revisions are textual “corruptions.”  There is no evidence that Toklas either made or somehow 
(but how?) forced Stein to make unauthorized changes to the poem, and Dydo herself notes that the 
“corrupt” text “includes a number of true revisions” (Gertrude Stein: The Language That Rises, 498).  
In fact the six stanzas published by Stein in the Februrary 1940 issue of Poetry are drawn from the 
supposedly “adulterated typescript” and include instances of the may/can revisions.  Why is the text 
Stein authorized for publication during her lifetime not the authoritative text?  Dydo’s reading of the 
may/can edits as “corruptions,” as “biographical” and “not literary,” draws on precisely the neat 
opposition between gossip and the literary that her intense interest in the Bookstaver affair—what she 
calls “this intricate biographical melodrama that leaves ‘blood on the dining room floor’ at the end of 
1932”—so dramatically undercuts (Gertrdude Stein: The Language That Rises, 499).  
11 Donald Sutherland, preface to Stanzas in Meditation and Other Poems, 1929-1933, xxiii.  
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that “[t]he difference between books like the Autobiography and books like Stanzas is 
not a difference in subject matter or genre and not a difference in degree; it is a radical 
difference in kind.  The two books do not even sound as if they were by the same 
author.”12  “Why,” she asks, “in the summer of 1932, did [Stein] suddenly go in two 
opposed directions at once?”13  Bridgman had earlier posed just this question of the 
breezy bestseller and the posthumously published, crabbed, meditative long poem, 
influentially concluding that Stanzas “was written concurrently with The 
Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, as a Steinian apologia for consenting to produce a 
popular book.”14  “Having suppressed her scruples,” he concludes, Stein, in “the 
compromised Autobiography,” “set out to satisfy the public appetite for entertaining 
and understandable anecdotes.”15  Once again, we are asked to bear witness to a 
considerable display of sordid anecdotes, for which, now, Stanzas in Meditation does 
penance: “this parallel autobiography redeemed the betrayal,” Bridgman claims; “it 
rescued Gertrude Stein’s integrity,” proving she “had not sullied herself as an artist.”16  
Stein’s inviting gossip, it appears, compromises her demanding art. 
If we turn to the demands of Stanzas in Meditation, however, we soon find its 
endlessly talky speaker—supposedly the voice of a “Steinian apologia” for the gossip 
of The Autobiography—imploring “Let me think well of a great many / But not 
express two so,” enjoying “That no one had had corroboration,” and wondering “Can 
they be mentioned” (322, 348, 350).  It would seem they can: 
 
 
                                                
12 Dydo, “Stanzas in Meditation: The Other Autobiography,” 4. 
13 Ibid., 5. 
14 Bridgman, 213.  Though writing shortly before Bridgman’s study, the poet and gossip Frank O’Hara 
seems to parody this common take on Stein’s career, more broadly, in the one-line entry for “GERTRUDE 
STEIN” in his poem “Biographia Letteraria”: “She hated herself because she wrote prose.”  The 
Collected Poems of Frank O’Hara, ed. Donald Allen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 
464.  
15 Bridgman, 215, 217. 
16 Bridgman, 217. 
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I think very well of Susan but I do not know her name 
I think very well of Ellen but which is not the same 
I think very well of Paul I tell him not to do so 
I think very well of Francis Charles but do I do so 
I think very well of Thomas but I do not not do so 
I think very well of not very well of William (356) 
“Now think,” we are soon instructed, “how palpably it is known / That all she knows 
which when she goes / They look for him in place of that” (378).  Once we begin to 
feel about for it, gossip in Stanzas in Meditation—its tone, rhetoric, and pronominal 
dramatis personae—becomes eminently palpable: 
 
This is what I saw when they went with them.  (379) 
 
I say this I change this I change this and this. 
Who hated who hated what. (379) 
 
Leave me to tell exactly well that which I tell. 
This is what is known. (392) 
 
How I wish I were able to say what I think 
In the meantime I can not doubt 
Round about because I have found out (392) 
 
Just when they should be thought of and so forth. 
What they say and what they do (414) 
 
Now I wish to tell quite easily well 
Just what all there is of which to tell (419) 
 
I think that if I feel we know 
We cannot doubt that it is so (444)  
Can we doubt that we are here in the presence of gossip?  Of course, just what kind of 
gossip (what was seen “when they went with them,” “who hated what,” and “what,” 
exactly, has been “found out” or “known”?) remains open to speculation: but it is 
precisely this speculation that motivates the discussion that follows, in which I also 
want to bear witness to a considerable, if mostly unconsidered, aesthetic display of 
sordid anecdotes—to the gossip Stein stages and obfuscates, narrates and dismantles, 
feels ashamed of and revels in, meditates on and becomes throughout her work.  
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I have lingered on the critical dismissals and disavowals of Stein’s gossip, 
then, in order to limn the contours of a conspicuous gap in our understanding of talk’s 
role in her writing.  Unlike the broader categories of dialogue or conversation, gossip 
has lent itself less neatly to those interpretive approaches that have significantly 
engaged the “chitchat” in Stein’s experimental texts—especially the key feminist 
readings of Stein’s talk as intimate and equal exchange, what Harriet Scott Chessman 
identifies as a “poetics of dialogue” that “presents an alternative to the possibility of 
patriarchal authoritarianism implicit in monologue.”17  The alternative pleasures of 
gossip—and especially, as we will see, Stein’s gossip—derive from nuanced 
hierarchies and subtle power plays (who’s in and who’s out of the know) as much as 
equality, ill will as much as intimacy, self-assertion as much as mutuality, dishy 
monologue as much as dialogue.  (As the garrulous Adele, Stein’s fictional stand-in in 
her novel Q.E.D., declares, “I believe in the sacred rites of conversation even when it 
is a monologue.”18)  Stein’s complex turn toward the specific discourse of gossip, 
crystallized in narrative form in The Autobiography, is just as persistently present in 
the various literary modes she adopted during the years leading up to it.  Rather than 
the curious premiere of Stein’s trying on the authorial persona of the gossip, The 
                                                
17 Harriet Scott Chessman, The Public Is Invited to Dance: Representation, the Body, and Dialogue in 
Gertrude Stein (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 3.  See also Dana Cairns Watson’s more 
recent examination of Stein and conversation, Gertrude Stein and the Essence of What Happens 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2005).  Gossip plays no part in Watson’s notable discussion of 
Stein’s talk, and it appears in Chessman’s examination of dialogue in Stein only in the gossipy realms 
of the acknowledgments and footnotes, where she indicates Patricia Meyer Spacks’ study of gossip and 
literary language as an influence on her thinking on dialogue, emphasizing—as Spacks herself does—
that study’s account of the “intimacy” of the “relationship” between a gossiping dyad (vii, 205; and cf. 
Spacks, Gossip [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985]).  Though productive, such an emphasis tends to 
idealize gossip as a form of engagement, blurring important distinctions between it and dialogue, 
primarily by effacing the absent other who is objectified by gossip and whose necessary exclusion from 
the scene of gossip enables its intimacies.  
18 Gertrude Stein, Q.E.D. (1903, first published in 1950), rptd. in Three Lives (New York: Penguin, 
1990), 208.  Adele’s bon mot anticipates and brings to mind another, better known feminist and 
modernist take on conversation, Rebecca West’s pronouncement that “There is no such thing as 
conversation.  It is an illusion.  There are intersecting monologues, that is all.”  See Rebecca West, 
“There Is No Conversation,” in The Harsh Voice: Four Short Novels (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935), 
85. 
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Autobiography instead represents part of an ongoing engagement with the 
overdetermined figure of the gossip, with the rhetoric of gossip, and with her and her 
work’s own status as the stuff of gossip.  Stanzas in Meditation thus not only presents 
a poetic use and consideration of gossip that runs parallel to gossip’s presence in The 
Autobiography’s prose narrative, but also continues a project we can see at work in the 
numerous short conversation pieces Stein wrote from 1914 through the 1920s, pieces 
repeatedly perforated by the rhetorical markers of gossip—gestures such as “That’s 
what he said,” “I cannot believe about Julia,” “They had a rich father-in-law to the 
husband,” “If I told him would he like it,” and “Emily said Emily is admittedly is 
Emily said Emily is admittedly Emily said Emily is Emily is admittedly.”19  What did 
he say?  What cannot be believed?  Who married well?  Emily is admittedly what?  In 
these pieces gossip is everywhere, but everywhere abstracted from a conventional 
narrative function, suggesting its significant part in Stein’s more overtly experimental, 
non-narrative work. 
To recognize gossip’s formative role in this work raises questions that 
reconfigure the aesthetic and ethical stakes of Stein’s talk, questions whose import is 
obscured by the conflation of gossip and her accessible, narrative manner, and, further, 
by an understandable but ultimately untenable distinction between the popular and the 
experimental, between “books like the Autobiography and books like Stanzas.”20  This 
chapter pursues two such questions.  First, how do Stein’s conceptions of gossip and 
                                                
19 From, in order, “Lockeridge” (1914), “Gentle Julia” (1914), and “What is This” (1918), in Bee Time 
Vine and Other Pieces (1913-1927) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 178, 197; “If I Told 
Him: A Completed Portrait of Picasso” (1923), in Gertrude Stein: Writings 1903-1932 (New York: The 
Library of America, 1998), 506; and “A Book Concluding with as a Wife Has a Cow.  A Love Story” 
(1923), in A Stein Reader, ed. Ulla E. Dydo (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 456-
457. 
20 In his July 1957 review of the Yale University Press edition of Stanzas in Meditation, John Ashbery 
astutely designates the difficulties of generically pinning down “books like the Autobiography and 
books like Stanzas,” describing Stanzas as “this poem that is always threatening to become a novel.”  
“The Impossible,” originally published in Poetry and rptd. in John Ashbery, Selected Prose, ed. Eugene 
Richie (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 12-13.  
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of poetry inform each other?  Once we imagine a “piquant love of gossip” as part of, 
rather than anathema to, Stein’s poetic efforts, her project of embracing and unsettling 
what she sees as poetry’s constitutive “love” of naming—her attempt “to name the 
thing without naming its names,” to “mean names without naming them”—takes on 
the rhetorical charge of gossip and, in turn, her gossip begins to sound lyric notes.21  
Tracing Stanzas in Meditation’s oft-noted lyric impulses in relation to its 
unacknowledged gossipy ones enables an examination of how Stein’s ongoing 
meditation on gossip—its grammar, rhetoric, and performance—is bound up with her 
seemingly conflicting meditation on poetic form.   
Second, why does Stein turn to gossip?  Reading the figure of the gossip both 
as it manifests itself formally in Stein’s work (that is, as a figure of voice) and as it 
appears in modernist discussions of literary production suggests how the gossip 
provides Stein with an authorial model for her queer negotiation of poetic making and 
literary ambition.  While her contemporaries often phobically disavow gossip, Stein 
finds in it surprising aesthetic and relational possibilities.  In her work, gossip serves 
less as a normative force than a style, a source of pleasure, and a queer mode of 
aesthetic self-fashioning.  To be sure, within Stein’s texts gossip is never wholly 
valorized or castigated, and its pleasures are inseparable from the quite real ethical 
risks of a discourse that depends on the objectification of an absent other.  Even as 
Stanzas in Meditation is propelled by a current of lyric gossip about various hes, shes, 
and theys, its speaker is figured forth and objectified “In their and on their account”—
a disembodied, gossipy narrative as steadily threatening as it is seductive (319).  
Courting a productive tension between gossip as potentially malicious naming and 
gossip as a mode of pleasurable nuance, Stein delights in asking, over and over—as 
                                                
21 Gertrude Stein, “Poetry and Grammar” (1934), rptd. in Gertrude Stein: Writings 1932-1946 (New 
York: The Library of America, 1998), 329, 334, 330.  Further references will appear in the text. 
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will this chapter—what happens “If I name names if I name names with them” (322). 
 
II. LISTENING FOR GOSSIP: “LADIES’ VOICES GIVE PLEASURE” 
What does gossip sound like?  Though it is never made explicit, I imagine 
Stein herself posing this question, listening to gossip as a formal model that animates 
her work as it emerges from and produces the fraught intersection of literature, fame, 
and queerness.  Before turning to Stanzas in Meditation, then, it is useful to consider 
first the answers to this inquiry that Stein ventures in the many short, talk-filled pieces 
she wrote from 1914 through to the composition of Stanzas and The Autobiography in 
1932.  In this writing, usually understood as dramatic and characterized as dialogues 
or “conversation plays,”22 Stein establishes both the central terms of a sustained 
reflection on gossip and the formal and ethical impasses that motivate what I see, in 
Stanzas, as her most extensive meditation both in and on the subject.  For our 
purposes, I take Ladies’ Voices, written in 1916 and first published in 1922 in 
Geography and Plays, as exemplary of Stein’s early efforts to theorize and 
aesthetically enact gossip.  The first line of Ladies’ Voices, “Ladies’ voices give 
pleasure,” announces three nearly unavoidable terms for any consideration of gossip’s 
relationship to modern literary language.23  As the roughly fifty-line text proceeds, 
over four quick acts, to play with conceptions of ladies, voices, and pleasure as they 
appear within the scene of gossip, it soon asks “What are ladies voices”—a 
multivalent question we might understand as asking after the sound of gossip (307). 
Though, as I hope to show, Stein’s gossip displays a specific rhetorical 
repertoire and tonal range, responses to queries regarding the sound of gossip 
                                                
22 See, for instance, Marianne DeKoven, A Different Language: Gertrude Stein’s Experimental Writing 
(Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); Jane Palatini Bowers, “They Watch Me as They 
Watch This”: Gertrude Stein’s Metadrama (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991); and 
Franziska Gygax, Gender and Genre in Gertrude Stein (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998).   
23 Gertrude Stein, Ladies’ Voices, in A Stein Reader, 306.  Further references will appear in the text. 
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generally have involved a subtle shift in attention—away from particular qualities of 
gossip’s speech and toward who is doing the speaking.  Thus when we put the 
question of what gossip sounds like to Western literature, philosophy, anthropology, 
or religion, we are likely to hear, say, that gossip sounds like a woman.  And if we ask, 
in turn, what this figure sounds like (“What are ladies voices”?), the tautological reply 
will often be: a gossip.  It is as if, in compensation for gossip’s distinctly sourceless, 
autonomous speech—winged words that, though they move in and out of those who 
perform them, seem to do so of their own accord—Western culture has generated a 
crude typology of the gossip, pinning down, in lieu of gossip’s elusive voice, bodies 
that are gendered (whether women’s talk or masculine shoptalk or scuttlebutt), classed 
(from servants’ tittle-tattle to society chatter), and sexualized (as in old wives’ tales, 
the homosexual’s camp dish, or the nosy spinster’s gab).   
Yet if we attempt to trace gossip’s image repertoire to its origins, we soon 
discover, alongside such easily identifiable embodiments of gossip, another figure for 
the gossip—this one of indeterminate gender and sexuality, a figure that, indeed, 
though voicing gossip, is less a person than a thing.  We find this figure in Ovid’s 
seminal description of Fame (the Greek Pheme or Ossa, Roman Fama)—classical 
goddess of gossip and rumor, spirit of fame and infamy, renown and scandal.24  There 
is much to be said about Ovid’s brief, astonishing account of the production of gossip 
and rumor as it relates to reputation: for our immediate purposes, however, most 
striking is his report’s almost exclusive emphasis on Fame’s house.  When Ovid 
describes Fame’s dwelling at “The limits of the threefold universe, / Whence all things 
everywhere, however far, / Are scanned and watched, and every voice and word / 
                                                
24 See Book XII of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, trans. A.D. Melville (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 275-276.  Ovid’s brief description of Fame weaves its way through English poetic tradition, 
most notably providing the model for Geoffrey Chaucer’s more extensive version, in his c. 1380 House 
of Fame, and through Chaucer, inspiring Alexander Pope’s 1715 adaptation, Temple of Fame. 
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Reaches its listening ears,” he inventively locates gossip’s agency not in the goddess 
herself so much as her “chosen home” and “its . . . ears.”25  This home, “[c]onstructed 
with a thousand apertures / And countless entrances and never a door,” is    
 
. . . open night and day and built throughout 
Of echoing bronze; it all reverberates, 
Repeating voices, doubling what it hears. 
Inside no peace, no silence anywhere,  
And yet no noise, but muted murmurings 
Like waves one hears of some far-distant sea26 
Just as it seems the house of Fame itself that, eager for good gossip, “scan[s] and 
watche[s] . . . every voice and word,” it is this endlessly listening architecture and its 
“echoing bronze” that both records and spreads gossip as it “reverberates, / Repeating 
voices, doubling what it hears.”  Ovid portrays the gossip not primarily as the 
feminine figure of Fame, nor as a specific identity among the indistinct, gossiping 
“[c]rowds” that “throng” the house’s “halls, a lightweight populace / That comes and 
goes” much like the anthropomorphized “rumours everywhere” that themselves “roam 
to and fro” (275).  Rather, he imagines the gossip as a space in which gossip can be 
collected and staged, a seemingly totalizing archive of “all things everywhere.”  This 
archival space, with its “echoing bronze,” anticipates modern recording devices, and 
its gossip appropriately becomes not simply something like a lady’s voice, but the 
static hiss and whirr of such a device as it records gossip, emitting “no silence 
anywhere, / and yet no noise,” just the disembodied “murmurings” of ambient 
“waves.” 
What does gossip sound like?  Could we say that the voice of gossip sounds 
like a tape recorder’s wavering and stiffening magnetic tone, the technological trace of 
a seemingly passive medium asserting itself?  Reading Stein’s talk-inflected work of 
                                                
25 Ovid, 275. 
26 Ibid. 
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the late teens and early twenties, Bridgman suggests, “is rather like listening to an 
interminable tape recording made secretly in a household.  Amid domestic details, 
local gossip, references to failed ambition, to sewing, to writing, recriminations, 
apologies, and expressions of remorse come passages of intimate eroticism, sometimes 
quite overt in meaning.”27  One could argue that the technology of modern culture is 
here feminized and disavowed, with Bridgman figuring Stein as tape recorder in order 
implicitly to discredit her authorship by drawing on characterizations of gossip as 
mindless, female chatter, and the gossip as mere medium for idle talk: a mass 
produced gadget that can only passively record, never actively create.  There is an 
undeniable force to the claim that modernism often defined itself, and has been 
defined, in anxious opposition to mass culture and its feminized technologies, 
including those of gossip.28  But what interests me in Bridgman’s playful and 
avowedly positive characterization of Stein’s gossipy writing is something he surely 
did not have in mind—how, like Fame ceding agency to her “chosen home” and its 
recording technology, such that she becomes it, Stein’s authorial agency here both 
shifts to and derives from “a household” that contains and is conflated with a tape 
recorder.29   
The gossip as tape recorder might seem an unlikely—not least because 
anachronistic—authorial model for Stein.  Yet consider the following two segments, 
                                                
27 Bridgman, 149. 
28 See, to begin, Andreas Huyssen, “Mass Culture as Woman: Modernism’s Other,” in After the Great 
Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 44-
62.  Norman Weinstein’s description of Stein’s literary “selections from high society or ladies’ tea 
parties” as “fascinating . . . exhibitions of the vapidity and mental sloth of such circles” provides one 
particularly good example of the anxious effort to defend Stein’s “fascinating” art itself from the 
supposedly idle female talk it voices (Weinstein, Gertrude Stein and the Literature of Modern 
Consciousness [New York: Frederick Ungar, 1970], 73. 
29 Kathryn R. Kent usefully suggests that Stein—specifically in Tender Buttons—responds to early 
twentieth-century American “dystopic fantasies of machine production” and their “nightmarish visions 
of female reproductivity gone out of control” by “claim[ing] the machine-as-body for her queer 
project,” celebrating it “as a metaphor for lesbian subjectivity.”  See Kent, Making Girls Into Women: 
American Women’s Writing and the Rise of Lesbian Identity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 
131, 151. 
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retrieved from gossip’s “interminable tape recording”: 
 
 . . . Hideous women.  Why do they look like that?  You like girls don, don’t  
you? . . . Boring.  Oh  thanks.  Blah, blah, blah, I asked him if he was 
completely hetero-heterosexual. 
Oh, what did he say? 
 He said he doesn’t speak about those things.  Isn’t he smart?  Now that’s a  
  gentleman.  
 Mm. 
 You would be a credit to my name.30 
 
 
 Did you say they were different.  I said it made no difference. 
 Where does it.  Yes. 
 Mr. Richard Sutherland.  This is a name I know. 
 Yes. 
 The Hotel Victoria. 
 Many words spoken to me have seemed English. (307) 
The first passage, from Andy Warhol’s a, a novel—his 1968 book comprised 
of unedited transcriptions of audiotape recordings made in and around the Warhol 
Factory—actualizes the idea of recording everyday talk, mostly gossip, that Stein 
experiments with during the period Bridgman describes, here exemplified, in the 
second passage, by part of the final scene of Ladies’ Voices.  If Warhol’s art, films, 
writing, or celebrity would be unimaginable without the precedent of Stein, the 
bewildering implications of Stein’s life and work in turn would be less resonant 
without Warhol’s canny literalizing of so much of her opaque insight.  In this case, 
Warhol’s tape recorder brings into relief Stein’s own queer mix of listening 
technology, domesticity, and gossip.  In THE Philosophy of Andy Warhol, we learn 
that Warhol “didn’t get married until 1964 when I got my first tape recorder.  My 
wife.  My tape recorder and I have been married for ten years now.  When I say ‘we,’ I 
mean my tape recorder and me.  A lot of people don’t understand that.”31  Within this 
                                                
30 Andy Warhol, a, a novel (New York: Grove Press, 1998), 60. 
31 Andy Warhol, THE Philosophy of Andy (From A to B and Back Again) (New York: Harcourt, 1977), 
26.  It is worth noting that Warhol’s ghost-written philosophy, “extract[ed] and redact[ed]” from his 
conversation by Pat Hackett, presents a Pop version of philosophy as table talk, a tradition we might 
trace as far back as Plato’s gossip about Socrates.   
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queer—or not “completely hetero-heterosexual”—domestic arrangement, Warhol 
claims,  
 
Nothing was ever a problem again, because a problem just meant a good tape, 
and when a problem transforms itself into a good tape it’s not a problem any 
more.  An interesting problem was an interesting tape.  Everybody knew that 
and performed for the tape.  You couldn’t tell which problems were real and 
which problems were exaggerated for the tape.  Better yet, the people telling 
you the problems couldn’t decide any more if they were really having the 
problems or if they were just performing.32 
In Bridgman’s remarks, it seems as if Stein’s ceaseless attention, like that of a “tape 
recording,” both captures and, further, produces her work’s notable “passages” of 
“quite overt” queer “eroticism” as they emerge from the background noise of 
“domestic details” and “local gossip”: indeed, as if “Ladies’ voices” give way to 
“pleasure.”  Warhol similarly presents the tape recorder’s (here parodically feminine) 
listening technology as an authorial model (“When I say ‘we,’ I mean my tape 
recorder and me”) that “[a] lot of people don’t understand,” one whose supposed lack 
of authorial agency proves also a shrewd assertion of it.  Warhol’s tape machine—
indeed, Warhol as tape machine—not only passively records the everyday, but, 
through attentively inattentive listening, incites the performance of it, such that “a 
problem transforms itself into a good tape.”   
 Warhol’s example helps us to see how Stein suggests a mode of creative 
listening anticipating and akin to his when, for instance, in Q.E.D., she describes 
Sophie’s response to Adele and Helen’s intimate, gossipy exchanges of their “views 
and theories of manners, people and things.”33  “Sophie,” Stein writes, “would always 
listen with immense enjoyment as if it were a play and enacted for her benefit and 
queerly enough although the disputants were much in earnest in their talk and in their 
                                                
32 Ibid., 26-27. 
33 Stein, Q.E.D., 210. 
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oppositions, it was a play and enacted for her benefit.”34  As Sophie listens to “earnest 
. . . talk” “as if it were” the “play” that, “queerly enough,” it is, Stein emphasizes not 
so much that there are no neat distinctions to be made between performance and 
reality—though that is one of the passage’s queerer implications—but rather the 
stylistic pleasures of transforming such distinctions.  Sophie finds “immense 
enjoyment” in listening to something ostensibly “in earnest” “as if it were a play,” and 
in imagining, in Adele and Helen’s gossip, the pleasures of playing at something as if 
it were in earnest.  In The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas Stein claims this style of 
listening to gossip, and listening as gossip, as her own when she has Matisse—who, 
we are told, “was a good gossip and so was [Stein] and at this time they delighted in 
telling tales to each other”—observe, “Mademoiselle Gertrude, the world is a theatre 
for you, but there are theatres and theatres, and when you listen so carefully to me and 
so attentively and do not hear a word I say then I do say that you are very wicked.”35  
Like Sophie approaching conversation as “a play . . . enacted for her benefit,” Stein 
listens as if “the world is a theatre” for her, and this mischievous listening seems as 
definitive a part of what makes her “a good gossip” as “telling tales.”  As our 
digressive romp from the house of Fame, to Warhol’s “tape recorder,” to Stein’s 
“interminable tape recording” suggests, gossip’s theatre has often been imagined as 
thriving on the drama of performative listening, the kind of creative listening that 
“reverberates, / Repeating voices, doubling what it hears.” 
 In setting familiar conceptions of the gossip as an embodied talker next to a 
less immediate sense of the gossip as a type of listener—a “very wicked” figure, 
particularly attuned to what gossip sounds like and potentially able, even, to generate 
this sound—I do not mean to replace one with the other.  It is in the juxtaposition of 
                                                
34 Ibid.  
35 Gertrude Stein, The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas (New York: Vintage, 1990), 67, 15.  Further 
references will appear in the text. 
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the two, I want to suggest, that we discover Stein’s “piquant love of gossip,” and her 
attraction to the figure of the gossip as it vacillates between a particular busybody and 
the disembodied voice of everybody: between a person and a thing, a tale and a tone, 
talking and listening.  Listening, for Stein, is indeed a way of talking: perhaps even a 
better way of talking, she suggests, than talking itself.  The “essence of being a 
genius,” she boasts, “is to be able to talk and listen to listen while talking and talk 
while listening but and this is very important very important indeed talking has 
nothing to do with creation.”36  Stein’s talk “has nothing to with creation,” but the 
listening with which it is bound up seems for her constitutive of both the gossip’s and 
the writer’s creative efforts to, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick describes it, deploy “the 
precious, devalued arts of gossip” for “projects precisely of nonce taxonomy, of the 
making and unmaking and remaking and redissolution of hundreds of old and new 
categorical imaginings concerning all the kinds it may take to make up a world.”37  
Sedgwick’s concept of nonce taxonomy recalls Stein’s gossipy literary attempt, 
expressed with disarming hubris in “The Gradual Making of The Making of 
Americans,” to “describe every kind of human being that ever was or is or would be 
living.”38  Stein positions listening as central to this effort: “I began to get enormously 
interested in hearing how everybody said the same thing over and over again with 
infinite variations . . . until finally if you listened with great intensity you could hear it 
rise and fall and tell all that that there was inside them, not so much by the actual 
words they said or the thoughts they had but the movement of their thoughts and 
words.”39  In terms resonant with the endless ear for gossip (“every voice and word / 
                                                
36 Gertrude Stein, “What Are Master-pieces and Why Are There So Few of Them (1935), rptd. in 
Gertrude Stein: Writings 1932-1946, 355. 
37 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: The University of California Press), 
1990, 23.  
38 Gertrude Stein, “The Gradual Making of The Making of Americans” (1935), rptd. in Gertrude Stein: 
Writings 1932-1946, 274. 
39 Ibid., 272. 
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Reaches its listening ears”) by which the house of Fame determines reputation, Stein 
proclaims, “I always have listened to the way everybody has to tell what they have to 
say.  In other words I always have listened in my way of listening until they have told 
me and told me until I really know it, that is know what they are.”40  
 Stein positions gossip as a style of listening—what she calls “my way of 
listening”—when, in The Autobiography, she gossips with Matisse by listening with 
such complete absorption that it is also, paradoxically, a kind of distraction: like a tape 
machine, she “listen[s] so carefully . . . and so attentively” that she “do[es] not hear a 
word.”  Listening, for Stein, enables her mind to drift from hearing “the actual words  
. . . said” to the still more revealing “movement of . . . thoughts and words.”  
This distinction—between hearing and listening, the semantic and the semiotic—
occupied Stein throughout her career, if most evidently in her lectures and essays of 
the 1930s.  As succinctly expressed in the voice of Matisse, hearing suggests 
apprehending speech’s intended, referential meaning, while listening entails taking in 
the sound of speech, if not necessarily its sense (“I don’t hear a language, I hear tones 
of voice and rhythms,” Stein declares in The Autobiography) (70).41  Stein’s listening 
thus becomes a way of generating and amplifying gossip, a means of turning even the 
banal exchange of polite conversation into the drama of gossip, as she absents and 
objectifies her interlocutors by gossiping about them with their “tones of voice.”  In 
this sense, her listening is a kind of overhearing, both in that Stein transforms 
conversation’s direct communication into a gossipy moment of eavesdropping—
listening in “with great intensity” as others’ voices unwittingly “tell all that that there 
                                                
40 Ibid., 270. 
41 One should note that, as might be expected, Stein does not consistently employ her distinction 
between the terms hearing and listening, often using them interchangeably (as she uses the term “hear,” 
here, to describe what elsewhere she might refer to as hearing primarily “language” and listening 
primarily to “tones . . . and rhythms”).  Despite this inconsistency, I hope the select examples I present 
show how throughout her work she attempts to theorize a hearing/listening distinction. 
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[is] inside them”—and in that she does so by finding more in what is said than is 
intended, perhaps even more than “the actual words” can support.   
 We find a similar distinction between hearing and listening in Roland Barthes’ 
lectures on the concept of the Neutral—the desire for an ethics of style based on “the 
nonviolent refusal of reduction, the parrying of generality by inventive, unexpected, 
nonparadigmatizable behavior, the elegant and discreet flight in the face of 
dogmatism.”42  Like Stein, Barthes engages the conventions of conversation and the 
“weariness” of their persistent “demand for a position” through a kind of listening that 
transforms talk into theatre.43  When “confronted with a conversation,” he finds it 
“hard to float, to shift places”: overhearing the “tireless” talk of a visitor, he laments, 
“ah, if he could speak a language unknown to me and which would be musical! ”44  
This desire engenders “a means for me to regain control, to retake a grip on myself: no 
longer to hear [conversation] but to listen to it: at another level, to receive it as a 
novelistic object, a linguistic spectacle.”45  Stein, as we have seen, shares Barthes’ 
desire to discover “a language unknown to me and which would be musical! ”  In The 
Autobiography, Alice recalls of a country-house visit that “Gertrude Stein liked it, she 
could stay in her room or in the garden as much as she liked without hearing too much 
conversation” (145).  Stein further makes clear, in The Geographical History of 
America, both her dislike of “hearing too much conversation” and her confidence that 
her kind of listening, in imagining conversation as “a play and enacted for her 
benefit,” can transform it into “a linguistic spectacle.”  She intones,  
  
 Now listen.  What is conversation. 
 Conversation is only interesting if nobody hears. 
                                                
42 Roland Barthes, The Neutral: Lecture Course at the College de France (1977-1978), trans. Rosalind 
E. Krauss and Denis Hollier (New York: Columbia University Press), 36. 
43 Ibid., 18. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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 Hear hear.46 
Like Barthes, Stein attempts to listen “at another level,” one that exceeds hearing “the 
actual words” (and one that, in the caesura between the insistence that “nobody hears” 
and the listening that “Hear hear[s],” literally “reverberates, / Repeating voices, 
doubling what it hears”).  For Barthes, such listening allows the pleasures of talk 
without being “reduce[d]” by “the other’s discourse (often well meaning, innocent) . . . 
to a case that fits an all-purpose explanation or classification in the most normal 
way.”47  It allows one the queer potential “to float”: “to live in a space without tying 
oneself to a place.”48 
 If we focus our attention fully, now, on Ladies’ Voices, we can see how Stein 
envisions the gossip as a figure that floats on the sound of dish.  Like Ovid’s vision of 
Fame merging with the house of Fame, Stein’s short play unsettles the gossip as a 
recognizable identity—ladies whose voices give pleasure—as it figures the voice of 
gossip as a space of subjectivity: a theatre in which one might “live . . . without tying 
oneself to a place.”  Before considering the voice of gossip, though, we must first 
establish that the talk represented in Ladies’ Voices is indeed best viewed as gossip, 
and not as belonging to the more expansive categories of conversation, or dialogue, 
that have so far shaped critical understandings of it.  Of course, as is often noted, what 
the voices in Ladies’ Voices speak about—to what the play’s snippets of talk refer—is 
not entirely clear.  But how these voices speak suggests that, though we can never be 
privy to it, their speech is specifically gossip.  Each of the play’s four acts advances a 
scene—or the fragment of a scene—of gossip, most apparently when, in the first act, 
we find 
 
 Ladies voices together and then she came in. 
                                                
46 Gertrude Stein, The Geographical History of America or The Relation of Human Nature to the 
Human Mind (1935), rptd. in Gertrude Stein: Writings 1932-1946, 460. 
47 Barthes, The Neutral, 36. 
48 Ibid., 19. 
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 Very well good night. 
 Very well good night Mrs. Cardillac. (306) 
This opening exchange appears emblematic of gossip—the kind of intimate talk 
(“Ladies voices together”) that thrives on the exclusion of others, and would be cut 
short by another’s presence (“and then she came in”).  So, too, the talk in “ACT III.,” 
in which what seem to be two voices discuss the absent “Genevieve,” who “does not 
know” that she is the object of gossipy speculation.  This gossip sounds sexual, since 
what “Genevieve does not know” is “That we are seeing Caesar”: 
  
 Yes Genevieve does not know it.  What.  That we are seeing Caesar. 
 Caesar kisses. 
 Kisses today. 
 Caesar kisses every day. (307) 
Even if we set aside the erotic connotations of the term “Caesar” in Stein’s body of 
work,49 her punning, here, presents an intimate “we” whose intimacy derives from its 
gossipy surveillance of the absent Genevieve—a playfully imperial “seeing” that sees 
her “kisses,” not only “today” but “every day,” and in this sense repeatedly seizes her 
kisses as the object of gossip.  Finally, one senses society gossip—this is notably a 
play about ladies—in the voices of the play’s conclusion, in “SCENE II.” of “ACT 
IV.,” as they wonder about an unnamed “they” (“Did you say they were different.  I 
said it made no difference.”) and a “Mr. Richard Sutherland” (“This is a name I 
know”) associated with “The Hotel Victoria,” and we hear them “telling of balls,” 
“masked balls” (307).50 
                                                
49 The term “Caesar,” along with “cow” and others, has been identified in Stein’s writing as part of a 
coded lesbian erotics.  The erotic significance of these terms seems hardly coded, though, in passages 
like the following, from “Lifting Belly” (c. 1915-1917): “I say lifting belly and then I say lifting belly 
and Caesars.  I say lifting belly gently and Caesars gently.  I say lifting belly again and Caesars again.  I 
say lifting belly and I say Caesars and I say lifting belly Caesars and cow come out.  I say lifting belly 
and Caesars and cow come out. . . . Lifting belly say can you see the Caesars.  I can see what I kiss.”  
Rptd. in Gertrude Stein: Writings 1903-1932, 435.  Susan Holbrook usefully critiques the critical effort 
to “decode” Stein’s work in “Lifting Bellies, Filling Petunias, and Making Meanings through the Trans-
Poetic,” American Literature 71.4 (December 1999): 751-771. 
50 Ladies’ Voices passes on its gossip of “masked balls” in Mallorca in a later piece in Geography and 
Plays, “For the Country Entirely. A Play in Letters”: “Dear Genevieve.  Do say where you heard them 
speak of the decision they had come to not to have masked balls. / I didn’t say.  They always have 
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Recognizing the talk in Ladies’ Voices as predominantly gossip makes it 
difficult to follow those readers who maintain that the “linguistic code among these 
female speakers is not based on polarity, hierarchy, or (sexual) difference,” and thus 
claim, “Instead of polarity and dichotomy it is mutuality that determines the aesthetic 
principle of the conversation between the female speakers of Ladies’ Voices.”51  On 
the contrary, hierarchy appears wherever we turn in Ladies’ Voices, from the obvious 
hierarchies of the scene of gossip—the “voices together” that depend on excluded, 
absent others—to the fine-grained attention to social status that so often motivates 
gossip, here apparent in the distinctions between married (“Mrs. Cardillac”) and 
unmarried (“Miss Williams”) women; between those whose names demand a prefix 
and those who, due to intimacy or class difference, demand none (“Genevieve”); 
between different ages (“Honest to God Miss Williams I don’t mean to say that I was 
older”); between nationalities (“there was not the slightest intention on the part of her 
countrymen to eat the fish that was not caught in their country”); and even between 
those who are or are not of nobility (“I feel that there is no reason for passing an 
archduke”) (306-307).  Hierarchy is further present in the persistent emphasis on 
circles of knowledge, on who is and is not in the know (“Does that surprise you,” 
“You know very well,” “Genevieve does not know it,” “In this she was mistaken,” 
“This is a name I know”) (306-307).  Rather than an aesthetics of “mutuality,” the 
rhetoric of Ladies’ Voices, just the opposite, consistently implies “dichotomy” and 
conflict, whether snapping off lines like “You know very well that . . . ,” or “In this 
she was mistaken,” or buzzing with the bad feeling of terse exchanges such as “Did 
you say they were different.  I said it made no difference” (306-307).  At times the 
                                                                                                                                       
masked balls. / Oh so they do. / Yes indeed they do.”  Stein, Geography and Plays (Boston: The Four 
Seas Company, 1922), 233. 
51 Gygax, 48. 
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play’s voices seem explicitly to erupt into argument: 
 
 Honest to God Miss Williams I don’t mean to say that I was older. 
 But you were. 
 Yes I was.  I do not excuse myself. (306) 
If Stein’s play opens with “Ladies’ voices” that “give pleasure,” its final line, “Poor 
Augustine,” closes with a voice granting pity (307).  In Ladies’ Voices, pleasure 
intertwines with pity, each tied to the hierarchies that are a definitive part of gossip: 
the pleasures of objectifying someone else by making of them a thing of scorn, or 
sympathy, or more benign emotional speculation. 
Despite, then, the critical tendency to read Ladies’ Voices and Stein’s 
“conversation plays” more generally as texts in which ladies’ voices come together, 
here they seem to pull increasingly apart.  We begin, both in the play’s title and first 
line, with ladies clearly in possession of their voices (“Ladies’ voices”), but almost 
immediately that possession appears less secure, as we discover “Ladies voices 
together,” but free of the apostrophe’s yoke.  Soon the play asks “What are ladies 
voices,” a question that now wonders not only about gendered speech but about 
gender (what are ladies?) and speech (what are voices?) themselves, and by the final 
scene the script can only refer, less than confidently, to “what are called voices” (307).  
Hence even the play’s tiniest punctuation emphasizes shifting hierarchy—perhaps not 
surprisingly, given Stein’s discussion, in “Poetry and Grammar,” of various 
punctuation marks as “purely servile,” “powerful,” or “imposing” (319).  Of “the 
apostrophe for possession,” she remarks that although “the possessive case apostrophe 
has a gentle tender insinuation that makes it very difficult to definitely decide to do 
without it,” she “absolutely do[es] not like it all alone when it is outside the word 
when the word is a plural, no then positively and definitely no, I do not like it and in 
leaving it out I feel no regret, there it is unnecessary and not ornamental but inside a 
word and its s well perhaps, perhaps it does appeal by its weakness to your weakness” 
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(317-318).  Stein’s apostrophe is a form of gossip, marking a “gentle tender 
insinuation” about a specific, tenuous, hierarchical relationship—one that “appeal[s] 
by its weakness to your weakness.”  But “when the word is a plural,” as in “Ladies’ 
voices,” Stein claims vehemently not to like (“no then positively and definitely no”) 
its more rigid (it is “not ornamental”) and collective assertion of strength.  In the terms 
of our discussion, at stake in the trajectory of Ladies’ Voices from figures of gendered 
speech to “what are called voices” is the difference between gossip’s “insinuation” of 
hierarchy as a malicious, normative fixing in place—“Ladies’ voices” as a universal 
and static type—and gossip’s “insinuation” as a more “tender” assertion of power and 
of non-normative relations, one whose pleasures derive from its nuanced, small-scale 
play with, rather than broad reinforcement of, identity and hierarchy. 
In describing the pleasures of gossip in Ladies’ Voices—pleasures which, 
however intimate, depend on hierarchy as much as mutuality, on gossip’s sharp 
observation of difference and dizzying oscillations between subject and object 
positions, talking and being talked about—I have so far been proceeding as if Stein’s 
play advances a rather straightforward, mimetic presentation of voices engaged in 
gossip.  But as the play’s “Ladies’ voices” increasingly disperse, the “gentle tender 
insinuation” of a register of voice apart from the play’s mimesis becomes audible.  
Dydo describes Ladies’ Voices as a “play of overheard fragments spoken by women,” 
and though she means that Stein overheard these voice fragments in Mallorca in 1916, 
her comment implicitly points toward the overhearing presence at work in the play’s 
text, as well.52  For we do not directly overhear the play’s fragments of speech, but 
rather listen to a figure in the act of overhearing them—a figure which, in mediating 
our access to the play’s scenes of gossip is, thus, a gossip.  This figure of voice, in 
fact, is an effect of a technique characteristic of the dramatic experiments in Stein’s 
                                                
52 See Dydo’s headnote for Ladies’ Voices in A Stein Reader, 306. 
 42 
“conversation plays”: her incorporation of what sounds like side-text (character lists, 
act and scene numbers, stage directions) into the spoken text—or, indeed, vice versa, 
as we will see.  Consider the complete opening section of Ladies’ Voices:  
 
 Ladies’ voices give pleasure. 
 The acting two is easily lead.  Leading is not in winter.  Here the winter is 
sunny. 
 Does that surprise you. 
 Ladies voices together and then she came in. 
 Very well good night. 
 Very well good night Mrs. Cardillac. 
 That’s silver. 
 You mean the sound. 
 Yes the sound. (306) 
The play’s first line—“Ladies’ voices give pleasure”—sounds more like description or 
stage direction than spoken text, especially if read as an imperative, a mood implying 
a voice that commands, orchestrates, and comments on “what are called voices” 
throughout the piece.  In the text’s next lines, this directing voice seems at first to 
continue.  But if the assertion of an “easily lead,” “acting two” still connotes stage 
directions, albeit self-reflexive ones, the comments that follow—especially when 
employing the deictic “Here”—feel increasingly part of the play’s mimesis.  It is 
almost as if an “acting two,” in response to the claim that they are “easily lead,” retort: 
“Leading is not in winter.  Here the winter is sunny.”  The next line’s second-person 
address—“Does that surprise you”—puts the uncertain divide between side-text and 
spoken text directly before us.  Who is this “you,” and who asks about its possible 
“surprise”?  Are both the questioning voice and “you” figures within the mimesis?  Is 
the voice of the side-text here directly addressing, rather than directing or commenting 
on, the mimesis?  Or is this a question from within the mimesis, posed to the voice of 
the side-text or even the reader/audience, surprised now to find itself being resisted 
and addressed?  Side-text in Ladies’ Voices at times seems more clearly to distinguish 
itself among the play’s mimetic voices (as when it indicates “Ladies voices together 
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and then she came in,” or pauses to ask, “What are ladies voices”); it also at times 
seems to cede the stage to these voices entirely (as in those lines that feel like direct 
speech, such as “Honest to God Miss Williams I don’t mean to say that I was older,” 
or the whole of the third act’s discussion of Genevieve).  Most often, however, the 
side-text irretrievably blurs with dialogue, particularly at those moments of second-
person address in which an interpellating “you” sweeps together diegesis, mimesis, 
and reader/audience as it oversteps formal boundaries.   
For Martin Puchner, Stein’s general technique of mixing narrative side-text or 
“diegetic fragments” with mimetic “fragments of dialogue” belongs to her anti-
theatricalism—part of the way in which she “pits theatrical mimesis and diegesis 
against one another”—and so the relationship between the diegetic side-text and 
mimetic spoken text moves mostly in one direction, taking the form of “an intrusion of 
diegesis into the dialogue.”53  Yet just as often in Ladies’ Voices the dialogue steps 
into the world of the diegesis, as each points toward and comments on the other.  In 
the passage above, is “That’s silver” stage-direction, or dialogue, or both?  What about 
the reply, “You mean the sound,” or the confirmation, “Yes the sound”?  Again and 
again, the play’s diegetic voice appears both outside of the mimesis and 
indistinguishable from it, both directing and being directed by it, and we repeatedly 
hear traces of this exchange:  
  
 You like the word. 
 You know very well that they all call it their house. (306) 
 
 You really mean it. 
 I do. (306) 
 
 What are ladies voices. 
 Do you mean to believe me. (307) 
 
                                                
53 Martin Puchner, Stage Fright: Modernism, Anti-Theatricality, and Drama (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 110, 109. 
 44 
 Did you say they were different.  I said it made no difference. (307) 
These instances suggest “an intrusion of diegesis into the dialogue,” but also a 
possible intrusion of theatrical dialogue into the diegesis: an exchange between side-
text and spoken text that becomes structural gossip as the play’s form echoes the 
pleasurable, hierarchical play of its represented scenes of gossip—one voice talking 
about and transforming another, only to find itself transformed and talked about in 
turn.  In The Autobiography, Stein presents what might be a defining moment for this 
technique: “Once when she was about eight,” says Alice of Stein, “she tried to write a 
Shakespearean drama in which she got as far as a stage direction, the courtiers making 
witty remarks.  And then as she could not think of any witty remarks gave it up” (75).  
Here the stage direction itself becomes the witty remark it announces, comically 
blurring diegesis and dialogue in Stein’s first dramatic effort. 
An instructive inconsistency between the initial publication of Ladies’ Voices, 
in Geography and Plays, and the revised text found in Dydo’s A Stein Reader 
highlights the play’s investment in the uncertain imbrication of formal levels.  Dydo 
does not specifically indicate or account for this small change between the two printed 
versions, but, in an introductory note to the anthology, explains that in Geography and 
Plays “the printed pieces so often do not correspond to the manuscript text and 
typescripts that we came to distrust this book,” and that Stein’s plays in particular 
“raise innumerable questions, for ambiguities constantly appear in their formats . . . 
How is a director to come to conclusions about lists of characters, characterization, 
spoken words, and stage directions that are all parts of a continuous text?”54  That any 
answer to such questions must remain inconclusive is very much the point, and neatly 
illustrated by the revision that occurs in the opening section, where, in Geography and 
Plays, Mrs. Cardillac appears on her own line, in parentheses, while in the text in A 
                                                
54 Ulla E. Dydo, Rosalind Moad, and William Rice, “A Note on the Texts,” A Stein Reader, 11, 14. 
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Stein Reader (as we have seen) she is spoken to in the line “Very well goodnight Mrs. 
Cardillac”:   
 
 Geography and Plays:  A Stein Reader: 
 
   Very well good night.  Very well goodnight Mrs. Cardillac. 
 (Mrs. Cardillac.)   That’s silver. 
 That’s silver.   You mean the sound. 
 You mean the sound.  Yes the sound. (306) 
 Yes the sound.55 
Mrs. Cardillac thus drifts out of what would seem to be side-text, which suggests that 
at least some of the opening scene’s last three lines are to be spoken by her, and into 
the spoken text, where we possibly do not hear from her at all, and she is only spoken 
of.  She drifts, in other words, from subject to object as she crosses the inexact line 
between the diegetic and mimetic.  
In Ladies’ Voices, it is through such stray crossings from one formal level to 
another that we become aware of the mediating presence of a figure of voice that, I 
implicitly have been arguing, is the voice of gossip.  We might understand this voice 
as a metaleptic effect.  Though in narratological rather than dramatic terms, Gérard 
Genette’s description of metalepsis—a narrative moment that transgresses the 
“shifting but sacred frontier between two worlds, the world in which one tells, the 
world of which one tells”—helps to clarify the implications of Stein’s textual staging 
of a porous boundary between diegesis and mimesis.56  Genette explains metalepsis as 
“any intrusion by the extradiegetic narrator or narratee into the diegetic universe . . . or 
the inverse,” thus producing “an effect of strangeness.”57  (Somewhat confusingly for 
our discussion, in narrative terms “the world in which one tells” is the extradiegetic, 
and “the world of which one tells” is the diegetic.)  “The most troubling thing about 
                                                
55 Gertrude Stein, Ladies’ Voices, in Geography and Plays, 203. 
56 Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1980), 236.  
57 Ibid., 234-235. 
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metalepsis,” Genette writes, is its “unacceptable and insistent hypothesis, that the 
extradiegetic is perhaps always diegetic, and that the narrator and his narratees—you 
and I—perhaps belong to some narrative.”58  The strange voices that reverberate 
within the metaleptic space of Ladies’ Voices recall those of the house of Fame, 
another “world in which one tells” that becomes “the world of which one tells,” and 
indeed, metalepsis’ “insistent hypothesis” could serve as an apt (if somewhat 
paranoid) description of gossip: for gossip, too, suggests that tales can take on a life of 
their own, and it, too, is always threatening (or promising) to turn gossips into gossip 
as they inevitably find themselves embedded in the stories they pass on.     
I like to think that Virgil Thomson understood the intrusive, diegetic voice of 
so much of Stein’s drama as that of gossip when, in staging Four Saints in Three Acts, 
he introduced Commère and Compère, two characters not originally in Stein’s opera, 
and assigned them, as Puchner explains, “precisely the diegetic parts—narrative, stage 
directions, commentary—of Stein’s confusing text,” such that the diegesis “acquires a 
voice, a face, and a figure.”59  Is this voice, face, and figure that of the gossip?  
Commère and Compère—French for godmother and godfather—suggest gossip’s still 
significant etymological roots in the Old English Godsibb, or godparent.  Stein herself 
seems naughtily to invoke this etymological link between gossip and godmother in 
The Autobiography when Alice, in the midst of the book’s famously gossipy passages 
about Ernest Hemingway, recounts that following the birth of his child Hemingway 
“wanted Gertrude Stein and myself to be god-mothers,” and notes that “[w]riter or 
painter god-parents are notoriously unreliable” (214).  Thus just as her narrative 
indulges in its most notorious dish, Alice quite literally becomes a gossip.60  Whether 
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60 Stein also seems to introduce the link between godparent and gossip (and diegesis) when, in “Studies 
in Conversation” (1923), she presents the following exchange, which we might read as a series of 
speech tags stripped of their gossipy dialogue: “A god-mother to her her god-mother.  A god-father to 
 47 
the suggestion is Thomson’s, or Stein’s, or my own, though, as I entertain the idea that 
gossip sounds like a godmother, I too am guilty of attempting to pin down gossip’s 
elusive voice in a specific, embodied type.  Stein, in figuring the gossip not as a 
recognizable identity but rather the strange and shifting effect of her text’s 
metalepses—those intrusive moments when subjects perhaps become objects, and vice 
versa; when the world becomes a theatre or the theatre becomes a world—asks us to 
do just the opposite.    
In Ladies’ Voices, Stein particularly encourages us to attend to gossip as a 
manner of speech, rather than a particular speaker, through the presentation of a 
perceptible style of listening that, as Barthes believes, allows one “to float . . . in a 
space without tying oneself to a place.”  The gossip, as a figure of voice that floats 
through the play’s diegesis, listens, we could say, “with immense enjoyment as if it 
were a play and enacted for her benefit and queerly enough,” it is “a play and enacted 
for her benefit.”  This metaleptic figure, in other words, listens to “Ladies’ voices” as 
if Ladies’ Voices.  Ladies’ Voices, to be sure, also presents the gossip as a figure of 
voice describing, arranging, and shaping that which it gossips about—as a voice that 
picks up, transforms, and passes on the play’s mimetic gossip about Genevieve, or Mr. 
Richard Sutherland.  But Stein’s gossip is foremost a figure she might describe as 
talking while listening.  Because we most distinctly perceive Stein’s diegesis at the 
moment of metalepsis—at those moments when the mimesis suddenly seems aware it 
is being overheard—the gossip becomes a figure of voice largely, and rather oddly, 
made present through a discernible style of listening.   
When the text declares “Many words spoken to me have seemed English,” we 
                                                                                                                                       
him, his god-father.  A god-father a god-mother, her god-mother his god-father, his god-mother her 
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Bartlett Haas (Los Angeles: Black Sparrow Press, 1973), 126. 
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therefore recognize it in part as a self-reflexive comment on a mode of listening 
focused primarily on sound and not signification, a style that can make the English 
language only seem to be in English (307).  In her lecture “Plays,” Stein recalls a 
formative experience for this style of listening: seeing, at age sixteen, Sarah Bernhardt 
perform in San Francisco.  “[I]t was all so foreign,” Stein remembers, “and her voice 
being so varied and it all being so french I could rest in it untroubled.”61  Johanna 
Frank adduces this memory as evidence for a Steinian “poetics of aurality,” a poetics 
she claims to find at work in Ladies’ Voices, where “the capacity of language to 
communicate signification is superseded by word-sounds as signifiers that have 
nothing to do with communication.”62  In fact, Frank insists, readings of Stein “break 
down as soon as one tries to impose signification on the word-sounds rather than hear 
them as just that, sounds.”63  I agree with Frank insofar as we both see Stein as 
invested in what happens when “signification” gives way to “word-sounds,” or, in the 
terms of our discussion, what happens when one stops hearing and starts listening.  
But for Stein—aware that words can never be “just . . . sounds,” somehow wholly 
outside of signification—listening is not quite separable from hearing.  Even in 
introducing her primal encounter with Bernhardt, Stein admits “I knew a little french 
of course.”64  It is perhaps in the spirit of this “of course” that Barthes, in Empire of 
Signs, tellingly frames his desire “to know a foreign (alien) language and yet not to 
understand it: to perceive the difference in it without that difference ever being 
recuperated by the superficial sociality of discourse, communication or vulgarity,” as: 
“The dream.”65  That this “dream” is unattainable is clear, but it nonetheless has the 
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potential to reveal new vistas in one’s own language: “a landscape which our speech 
(the speech we own) could under no circumstances either discover or divine.”66   
We can in this sense also recognize the line “Many words spoken to me have 
seemed English” as expressing precisely the desire to “impose signification on word-
sounds,” to divine in an alien version of one’s own language meanings one would not 
have otherwise heard.  At its most basic, this is how Stein’s wordplay often works, 
moving from hearing, to listening, and back again as she takes referential bits of 
interest to her and listens to their tones and rhythms as they insinuate new meanings 
that one hears in the translation back into signifying speech.  We have followed 
Stein’s puns in the third act of Ladies’ Voices, for instance, along just this trajectory, 
as “seeing” her becomes “Caesar” and we discover the imperial gaze, and the gossip, 
that would seize her.  I emphasize the way Stein’s abstract listening emerges out of 
and unavoidably returns to referential hearing because, though her experimental work 
is regularly understood to have little, or even “nothing to do with communication,” its 
investment in gossip suggests otherwise.  This investment in personal detail of the 
lives of others is not incidental to her poetics: the Stein who writes of herself, in 
Alice’s voice, “Lipschitz is an excellent gossip and Gertrude Stein adores the 
beginning and middle and end of a story and Lipschitz was able to supply several 
missing parts of several stories,” or, more simply, “She always liked knowing a lot of 
people and being mixed up in a lot of stories,” cannot be separated from the Stein who 
insists, “I don’t hear a language, I hear tones of voice and rhythms” (203, 81).  Nor 
can the identifiable fragments of gossip represented in Ladies’ Voices be considered 
apart from the structure and voice that overhear, resist, refigure, and echo them.  As 
Stein’s writing perks its ears at the slightest sound of gossip, and teases it out—
sometimes where it would least seem to be—by listening to the further gossip of 
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sound, the figure of the gossip emerges not as a fixed identity, but a formal space from 
which one might speak, providing a vital means of “being mixed up in a lot of stories” 
without being reducible to any one. 
 
III. A LITTLE BIRD TOLD ME: LYRIC AND THE VOICE OF GOSSIP 
 
 Teach me half the gladness 
That thy brain must know, 
 Such harmonious madness 
From my lips would flow, 
The world should listen then—as I am listening now. 
 
—Percy Bysshe Shelley, “To a Sky-Lark” 
 
I wish to remind everybody nobody hears me 
 
—Gertrude Stein, Stanzas in Meditation 
 
By the summer of 1932, after years of having “always . . . listened to the way 
everybody has to tell what they have to say,” Stein seemed increasingly to feel no one 
was in turn listening to her.  In The Autobiography she admits, in the voice of Alice, 
that as the 1920s wore on “Gertrude Stein was . . . a little bitter, all her unpublished 
manuscripts, and no hope of publication or serious recognition” (197).  “Let me listen 
to me and not to them,” she decides in Stanzas in Meditation (343), a poem that often 
sounds—in its relentless worrying of the pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions and 
articles that dominate its stark lexis—like listening defiantly turned in on itself:  
 
Who should she would or would be he 
Now think of the difference of not yet. 
It was I could not know 
That any day or either so that they were 
Not more than if they could which they made be 
It is like this (379) 
It is, in fact, much like this throughout the 164 stanzas, ranging from as short as a 
single line to as long as several pages, that make up Stein’s ambitious, often 
inscrutable, five-part meditative poem.  Even within Stein’s distinctively difficult 
oeuvre, Stanzas has proven notoriously obdurate.  Lyn Hejinian cautions, “to indulge 
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in exegesis of this particular work is always risky,” and even Dydo, the poem’s most 
devoted reader, warily wonders how one approaches “a large work whose importance 
we do not doubt even as it defies analysis, characterization, classification,” 
concluding, “[b]eyond useful comments on details, most attempts to speak about [it] 
have failed.”67  One way that readers have gained purchase on Stein’s intractable 
stanzas has been to view their resistance as that of lyric and its intensely subjective, 
private expression.  Stein herself seems partly to have understood Stanzas as a lyric 
sequence, describing the poem in a letter as “200 Sonnets of Meditation” and 
announcing, in its first line, “I caught a bird which made a ball” (316).68  Sutherland 
set the tone for later readings of Stanzas by glossing this line as “I captured a ‘lyricity’ 
that constituted a complete and self-contained entity.”69  Mary Loeffelhoz concurs, 
“Stanzas in Meditation foregrounds its claims on the lyric doubly in its title (songs and 
subjectivity),” and also “in its very first line,” by “throwing out an initial lyric ‘I,’ 
coupled with the familiar lyric song-bird.”70  Neil Schmitz, too, hears “the singing bird 
of lyrical poetry” in this first line, and, nearly paraphrasing John Stuart Mill’s famous 
assertion that lyric “poetry is overheard,” that it is “feeling, confessing itself to itself in 
moments of solitude,” perceives in Stein’s concluding stanza that “[t]he door is open  
. . . and there she is, introspective, thinking for herself about herself.  We are privy to 
that mental drama.”71 
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For most readers, Stein’s inward turn to lyric in Stanzas sits uneasily next to 
her open embrace of gossip in The Autobiography: as we have seen, critics have 
regularly sought in Stanzas a lyric antidote to The Autobiography’s poison pen.  As 
Schmitz also notes, though, Stanzas “at once ironises and transcends the conventional 
notion of lyricity,” presenting “a poetry in which the high-flown meanings of bird and 
ball are immediately relocated.”72  The connotations of lyric bird and ball are partly 
relocated, I suggest, within the unlikely realm of gossip.  Consider again the poem’s 
first line, as well as that which follows it: “I caught a bird which made a ball / And 
they thought better of it” (316).  Stein’s speaker here juggles bird and ball, self-
assertion and others’ perceptions.  But what is at stake in all this juggling?  Is the 
“bird” that of lyric tradition or of gossip (a little bird told me)?  Does “ball” refer to 
lyric’s self-enclosed world or to the open-ended ball of conversation, with which the 
speaker might now run?  Who are “they,” whose better thinking suggests, among other 
things, their own gossip about the poem’s speaker and its authorizing force, as well as 
their third-person status as the object of that speaker’s self-authorizing, lyric gossip?73  
Before entering any further into this poem in which Stein engages the lyric with a 
gossip’s sensibility, we would do well to attend to the bird and ball that flit and 
bounce not only throughout these stanzas but also Stein’s writing of this period more 
generally, provocatively alighting, for instance, in a 1929 notebook in which she 
anticipates the first line of Stanzas by entering a poem entitled “A Bird,” and 
following it with “A Ball.”74  
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From one vantage, “A Bird” and “A Ball” each reflects, in simple diction and 
syncopated rhythm, on Romantic ideals of lyric voice.  “A Bird” begins by asking,  
 
  II 
 
Was it a bird. 
 
 III 
 
This that we heard.75 
 
Stein’s conclusion emphasizes the past tense in explaining that the poem’s “she” “was 
right” to “answer” that “it was a bird,” 
 
IX 
 
Because it was a bird. 
 
 X 
 
Which was not any longer. 
 
 XI 
 
Heard. 
 
 XII 
 
Which was a bird.  Heard.76 
 
This final line evokes and at first appears to refute the Romantic figure of birdsong as 
lyric, setting the flat declaration that it “was a bird.  Heard” against Shelley’s famous 
proclamation to the “Sky-Lark,” “Bird thou never wert.”77  But Stein’s unseen “bird” 
is present only as a disembodied voice—one that spurs the poem’s query, “Was it a 
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bird”—and as her ambiguous punctuation suggests, once “not any longer” heard, it is 
also “not any longer” a bird.  In this sense Stein’s bird is as much a “blithe Spirit” of 
disembodied lyric as Shelley’s bird that “never wert.”78  Each becomes what is called 
in “To a Sky-Lark” an “unbodied joy,” a lyric vocal presence dependent on bodily 
absence, as in Shelley’s well-known representation of the poet as “a nightingale who 
sits in darkness, and sings to cheer its own solitude with sweet sounds; his auditors are 
as men entranced by the melody of an unseen musician, who feel that they are moved 
and softened, yet know not whence or why.”79   
When Stanzas begins, “I caught a bird,” it thus heralds a “captured . . . 
‘lyricity’” exemplary of Romantic lyric but at the same time in defiance of its 
unattainable ideal.  (Indeed, though Shelley’s skylark and Keats’ nightingale remain 
“unseen,”80 Stanzas’ aviary contains a “nightingale” [350].)  Stein’s impossible catch 
lays bare a paradox already apparent in Shelley’s figure of the lyric poet, which 
precisely describes an “unseen musician” supposedly present only in its incorporeal 
“melody.”  A similar, paradoxical assertion of self by effacement characterizes 
Stanzas’ later “wish to remind everybody nobody hears me” (421).  This “wish” 
occupies three significant registers.  Most directly, Stein’s speaker here echoes Stein’s 
desire for literary fame: wishing, because “nobody hears,” that “everybody” would.  
Or, recalling our discussion of Stein’s “way of listening” as a form of gossip, this 
“wish” envisions a scene of address transformed into a space of gossip as “everybody” 
listens but “nobody hears”—as in The Geographical History of America, when Stein 
instructs us to “listen” because “[c]onversation is only interesting if nobody hears.”  
Or, then again, from a certain angle this “wish” is a lyric one, drawing on Mill’s claim 
                                                
78 Ibid. 
79 Percy Bysshe Shelley, “A Defence of Poetry,” in Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, 516. 
80 Shelley, “To a Sky-Lark,” 304; John Keats, “Ode to a Nightingale,” in Complete Poems and Selected 
Letters of John Keats (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), 236. 
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that “eloquence is heard, poetry is overheard.”81  Mill elaborates, “All poetry is of the 
nature of soliloquy,” such that, in performing lyric solitude, though “we know that 
other eyes are upon us . . . no trace of consciousness that any eyes are upon us must be 
visible in the work itself.  The actor knows that there is an audience present; but if he 
act as though he knew it, he acts ill.”82  In “remind[ing] everybody nobody hears me,” 
Stein’s speaker underlines Mill’s dictum and turns it inside-out, as if to say to lyric’s 
overhearing audience that though they know there is a poet present, they must not act 
as though they know it.  Here again, Stein points up the paradox of nineteenth-century 
lyric’s demand that the bird-poet reach its “auditors” through the pretense of 
“sing[ing] to cheer its own solitude.”  As Stanzas’ speaker earlier admits, “I am 
interested not only in what I hear but as if / They would hear” (380). 
I single out these three registers of “wish” in Stanzas in Meditation—the desire 
for literary renown, for the voice of gossip, and for felicitous lyric performance—not 
in order to make one paramount, but instead to propose that for Stein each motivates 
and modulates the others.  Both lyric and gossip suggest variations on a model of 
authorial agency involving self-assertion through self-effacement—one which Stein 
enacts thematically, rhetorically, and structurally in Stanzas.  Although gossip’s voice 
would seem anti-lyrical—an ostensibly frivolous, collaborative exchange worlds away 
from the solemn introspection of lyric soliloquizing—she intuitively joins lyric and 
gossip.  In “A Bird,” for instance, Stein’s lyric songbird also loosely suggests gossip 
in providing a topic and a tone but no certain origin for the poem’s conversation, 
bringing to mind the common phrase indicating the sourceless voice of gossip, a little 
bird told me, in which we see that gossip, like lyric, also leaves “men entranced by the 
melody of an unseen musician.”  In Stanzas we repeatedly encounter gossip’s little 
                                                
81 Mill, 348. 
82 Mill, 349, emphasis mine. 
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bird—a “bird a little very little as little bird”—and its transforming repetitions (370).  
Like the house of Fame, Stein’s bird of gossip keeps “[r]epeating voices, doubling 
what it hears”: “I have thought that the bird makes the same noise differently,” her 
speaker says (327).  It also garbles the message: “It is always not only not foolish / To 
think how birds spell and do not spell well,” we are cautioned (399).  Throughout, “the 
little birds are audacious,” and their rare absence can stifle dish: “not to go into that is 
not in question / Not when no bird flutters” (416, 420).83 
Stein’s “ball” also intimates both lyric and gossip.  On the one hand, Stein’s 
bird-made ball, as Sutherland notes, is “a complete and self-contained entity,” a world 
animated by and within lyric: in the brief “A Ball,” the absence of a purposefully 
misplaced toy ball (“She had put it . . . So that it was not there . . . Where they had put 
it”) enables a repeated “call,” suggestive of both a game of fetch with Stein’s poodle, 
Basket, and the fort/da game of lyric apostrophe and its world-making force.84  On the 
other hand, Stanzas’ opening line presents its bird-made ball as talk fueled by gossip, 
drawing on the sense of the ball of conversation that must be kept up.  Stanzas often 
seems to employ “ball” in this sense, as when, after being told “Once in a while they 
stammer but stand still / In as well as exchange,” we hear “A ball fall” (352).  
Elsewhere, the poem’s voluble speaker finds it remarkable that “I often offer them the 
ball at all / This which they like when this I say” (404).  In Stanzas, it is gossip as 
much as lyric that keeps the ball going, allowing Stein’s speaker to say with 
confidence, “I could go on with this” (396).  Gossip too weaves a world out of words, 
whether by threading together the circles of a given social network or forming, as 
                                                
83 Perhaps another sighting of the bird of gossip in Stein’s work occurs in her lecture “Plays,” when she 
distinguishes between “story” and “landscape” by describing the “magpies” at Bilignin and how “they 
hold themselves up and down and look flat against the sky” (267).  Here, she positions and celebrates 
the magpie—the signature bird of gossip—as establishing not so much any particular narrative but 
rather a theatrical space of gossip: “They the magpies may tell their story if they and you like or even if 
I like but stories are only stories but that they stay in the air is not a story but a landscape” (267, 268).   
84 Gertrude Stein and Alice B. Toklas Papers, Yale Collection of American Literature MSS 76, Box 18, 
Folder 372. 
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Patricia Meyer Spacks puts it, “a psychic space like that of Arden.”85 
Stein’s poem continually changes the subject from lyric to gossip, gossip to 
lyric, in part because of the transformative capacity of each to change subjects.  In 
experiments with gossip like that of Ladies’ Voices, Stein explores gossip’s ability to 
make subjects both into and out of objects, and Stanzas’ opening lines continue to 
pursue this formal capacity, now in relation to lyric subjectivity.  “I caught a bird 
which made a ball / And they thought better of it”: the sentence that traverses these 
lines charts the transformation of a lyric “I” into gossip’s objectified “it.”  Yet along 
the way, it also insistently refigures each object as a subject.  The “bird” that is 
“caught” becomes a subject which “ma[kes].”  The egg-like “ball” that is “made” 
becomes either part of a specific “they” (“bird” and “ball”) that think “better of it,” or 
as a world “made” out of words (“a complete and self-contained entity”) it is inclusive 
of, if not synonymous with, an unnamed “they” and their better thinking “of it.”  And 
this objectified, inhuman “it,” in standing in for the sequence of actions which Stein’s 
“I” has set in motion, dissolves again into the “I” of lyric subjectivity that can relate 
this past sequence of events and the subsequent 163 stanzas of Stein’s poem.  Stein’s 
opening lines unquestionably engage the lyric, but they also offer a précis of Stanzas 
and its constitutive aesthetic and ethical oscillation between lyric and gossip, subject 
and object, person and non-person.   
What does it mean to turn an “I” into an “it”?  How can an “it” become an “I”?  
And why would one be preferable to the other?  In a discussion of personhood and 
personal pronouns, Barbara Johnson quotes the linguist Emile Benveniste’s reworking 
of “the ordinary definition of the personal pronouns”: “Person,” he argues, “belongs 
                                                
85 Spacks, 3.  Arden appears in Stein’s writings as a primary example and effect of the poetic—and, I 
will argue, gossip-inflected—effort “to name the thing without naming its names”: “Shakespeare in the 
forest of Arden had created a forest without mentioning the things that make a forest.  You feel it all but 
he does not name its names.” “Poetry and Grammar,” 334, 330.  
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only to I/you and is lacking in he.”86  “In other words,” Johnson writes,  
 
the notion of “person” has something to do with presence at the scene of 
speech and seems to inhere in the notion of address.  “I” and “you” are persons 
because they can either address or be addressed, while “he” can only be talked 
about.  A person who neither addresses nor is addressed is functioning as a 
thing in the same way that being an object of discussion rather than a subject of 
discussion transforms everything into a thing.87 
The “person who neither addresses nor is addressed” and so is “functioning as a thing” 
is, for Barthes, the victim of gossip.  In Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes he avers:  
 
“he” is wicked: the nastiest word in the language: pronoun of the non-person, it 
annuls and mortifies its referent; it cannot be applied without uneasiness to 
someone one loves; saying “he” about someone, I always envision a kind of 
murder by language, whose entire scene, sometimes sumptuous, even 
ceremonial, is gossip.88  
Gossip reappears in A Lover’s Discourse, where, in a fragment entitled “Gossip,” 
Barthes persists, “The third-person pronoun is a wicked pronoun: it is the pronoun of 
the non-person, it absents, it annuls.”89  Barthes objects to the kind of gossip that fits 
its subjects into pre-determined categories, enacting “murder by language,” and such 
gossip becomes particularly insidious when it threatens the particularity of (and desire 
for) the beloved, when it “takes possession of my other and restores that other to me in 
the bloodless form of a universal substitute.”90  In narrating the love triangle of 
Q.E.D., Stein also suggests the lover’s distaste for gossip’s “possession of my other”: 
“Throughout the whole of Sophie’s talk of Helen,” she writes, “there was an 
implication of ownership that Adele found singularly irritating.”91   
                                                
86 Emile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral Gables, FL: 
University of Miami Press, 1971), 217.  As qtd. in Barbara Johnson, Persons and Things (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2008), 6. 
87 Johnson, 6. 
88 Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977), 169.  
89 Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1978), 185. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Stein, Q.E.D., 220. 
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In Stanzas, Stein seems similarly to consider how those necessarily absent 
from gossip’s scene of address become “possession[s]” when she writes,     
 
I wish now to think of possession. 
When ownership is due who says you and you. (441) 
Yet, as we have seen in our discussion of Ladies’ Voices, possession can sometimes be 
“a gentle tender insinuation,” and one can even wish to be objectified, possessed.  As 
Oscar Wilde quips in The Picture of Dorian Gray, “there is only one thing in the 
world worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about.”92  Indeed, 
however much Barthes wants to attack gossip, his lingering on its “sumptuous, even 
ceremonial” qualities suggests a concurrent investment in its stylistic and erotic 
potential.  And though “[p]erson . . . is lacking in he,” though “‘he’ can only be talked 
about,” though he “absents, it annuls,” in Stanzas Stein is nonetheless drawn to the 
“pronoun of the non-person”:    
 
   No one knows the use of him and her 
And might they be often just tried 
Can they mean then fiercely (397) 
What is the “use of him and her” and “they”?  Can these pronouns and the gossip they 
imply “mean . . . fiercely”?  Rather than a “bloodless form of . . . universal substitute,” 
can gossip meet, as Sedgwick suggests, “one’s descriptive requirements that the 
piercing bouquet of a given friend’s particularity be done some justice”?93  The 
Autobiography intimates the pleasure Stein takes in seeing at least “the piercing 
bouquet” of her own “particularity . . . done some justice.”  She repeatedly 
describes—in the third person—the pleasures of encountering one’s words on 
another’s lips, in the third person: “the newspapers . . . always say, she says, that my 
writing is appalling but they always quote it and what is more, they quote it correctly, 
                                                
92 Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (New York: Penguin, 2000), 6. 
93 Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, 23. 
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and those they say they admire they do not quote.  This at some of her most bitter 
moments has been a consolation.  My sentences do get under their skin, only they do 
not know that they do, she has often said” (70).  Stein lingers on this pleasure, 
recounting “the first time that anybody had quoted her work to her and she naturally 
liked it,” and later repeating, “as Gertrude Stein always says to comfort herself, they 
do quote me, that means that my words and my sentences get under their skins 
although they do not know it” (101, 244).  The insistence of these passages makes 
clear that Stein’s sentences get under her own skin as much as or more than anyone 
else’s, and perhaps most “fiercely” when voiced by another.  Here, in miniature, is the 
formal conceit of The Autobiography, in which Stein imagines her own story as best 
told in the voice of Toklas, and Toklas’ story as best told by Stein.  As Stein writes in 
Stanzas, “I have often thought that she meant what I said” (405). 
Being quoted (“and what is more,” quoted “correctly”) is of course not the 
same as being gossiped about: but when “the newspapers” use their quotations as 
evidence that Stein’s “writing is appalling,” neither is it wholly different.  Stein’s 
explicit pleasure in being quoted in such contexts complicates readings of Stanzas that 
characterize the poem’s pervasive “they” as a repressive force against which the 
poem’s “I” chafes.  Bridgman’s influential claim that “they,” though certainly 
ambiguous, chiefly “represent the normal reading public to whom Gertrude Stein had 
to appeal in the Autobiography,” the “verbal conservatives” who “thought better” of 
her experimental work, underlies the critical consensus that Stanzas’ “I” resists and 
redeems The Autobiography’s capitulation to “them.”94  But although “they” and their 
insistently referenced, gossipy “account” hover ominously over Stanzas’ “I” (and 
sometimes “you”), Stein’s speaker both resists and courts appearing “[i]n their and on 
their account” (319).  Just as Stein’s anecdotes about being quoted by the papers point 
                                                
94 Bridgman, 214. 
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toward the disavowed pleasure “they” take in her, and imply the satisfaction she takes 
in “them,” Stanzas’ “I” and “they” get under each other’s skin, and out from under 
their own.  Schmitz notes of the poem’s pronouns, “Switches in designation would 
seem to occur from phrase to phrase,” and as evidence quotes: “A landscape is what 
when they that is I / See and look” (437).95  Stein’s “they,” by no means a stable 
referent, keeps before us the question of who they are, including the possibility of a 
“they that is I.”  When Stein writes, in the poem’s opening stanza, “In a kind of way 
they meant it best / That they should change in and on account,” are we to take it that 
what is “meant . . . best” is the “change” imposed on those who appear “in and on” 
their “account”? (316).  Or do “they” themselves “change” “in and on” their own—or 
perhaps someone else’s—“account”?  Similarly, when the speaker reflects, “Who can 
be thought perilous in their account. / They have not known that they will be in 
thought,” is it those who “can be thought perilous in their account” who “have not 
known that they will be in thought,” or rather “they” whose account it is who “have 
not known” that they will in turn become objects of “thought” (317)?  Who “they” 
designates is never settled within Stein’s poem, and even the seemingly opposed 
positions of “they” and “I,” third and first person, keep collapsing into each other as 
gossip’s objects become subjects, and its subjects become objects.  “[S]ometimes,” 
Barthes writes of gossip, “the mockery of all this, ‘he’ gives way to ‘I’ . . .”96   
For Stein, the mockery of the third person and its exclusion from the scene of 
address can produce first-person pleasures.  If the “pronoun of the non-person” 
“mortifies its referent,” this mortification has the potential to make Stein feel not less 
but more human: it is in being the object of the newspapers’ ridicule that Stein 
becomes exhilarated by her own voice.  Stanza LV, Part V begins, “I have been 
                                                
95 Schmitz, 134. 
96 Barthes, Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, 169. 
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thought to not respect myself,” but nevertheless maintains, “They can collect me. / 
They can recollect me” (447).  The stanza’s concluding couplet suggests why Stein’s 
“I” consents to being objectified by the poem’s “they” and its ongoing “account,” 
asserting a close relation between gossip, shame and infamy, and renown: “Shame 
shame fie for shame / Everybody knows her name” (448).  Earlier, when Stein’s 
speaker declares, “It is very well to know. / More than to know / What they make us 
of,” the reworked colloquialism evokes “their account” and suggests that the gossipy 
narrative of what they make of us is also “What they make us of” (338).  At  
times this constitutive “account” seems to prey on and create weakness: 
 
She is here when she is not better 
When she is not better she is here 
In their and on their account (318-319) 
 
Indeed sometimes the speaker questions the voraciousness of “their account”: 
   For which they do attack not only what they need 
They must be always very ready to know. 
That they have heard not only all but little. 
In their account on their account can they 
Why need they be so adequately known as much (319) 
 
Often the speaker seems to reassure us one can do “better than” this account:  
Or better than on account of which they much and wish arranged (325) 
 
And gossip’s “account” can even seem to account for and limit one’s agency: 
In which on no account might they have tried (391) 
But despite Stein’s speaker pressuring the limits of this account (“Let me see let me go 
let me be not only determined” [352]) and insisting on the unreliability of its narrative 
and effects (“There is no counting on that account” [328]), despite the poem’s constant 
awareness that “They have threatened us with crowing,” and its hesitance as to 
whether “they will enjoin and endanger / Damage or delight,” Stanzas repeatedly 
presents the objects of others’ accounts becoming subjects through these accounts—
 63 
presents the fraught pleasures and uncertain power of being objectified by gossip 
(375).  In Stein’s poem, gossips become gossip as they “commence in search not only 
of their account / But also on their account as arranged in this way” (371). 
Through her gossip’s circuit of communication and its disorienting 
subject/object shifts, Stein teaches us to listen anew to lyric—to listen, at least, in her 
“way of listening.”  For as gossip comes into contact with lyric in Stanzas, we find 
that lyric, too, presents a voice shuttling back and forth in the space between subject 
and object.  Drawing on Mill’s assessment of lyric as (in Northrop Frye’s later 
phrasing) “preeminently the utterance that is overheard,” Johnson remarks that “The 
poet is in the final analysis a subject as an object for the overhearer.”97  Stein’s gossip 
accentuates this feature of lyric subjectivity—the way lyric’s first-person voice has 
been understood to depend on and necessarily disavow its becoming an overheard 
object, a voice in and on someone else’s account—in order to construct an uncanny 
lyric “I” that is also an “it.”  As one proceeds through Stein’s stanzas, they can seem 
much like—to recall another “I” that is also an “it”—Ovid’s description of the house 
of Fame: gossips and gossip drifting about, an indistinct sea of talkers and talk.  
Occasionally, though, out of the poem’s “muted murmurings,” pronounced moments 
of lyric sing out.  These intimate scenes of lyric address, in which an “I” speaks 
directly to a “you,” are consistently interrupted—but perhaps also confirmed—by 
“they.”  For example, Stanza IX of Part III begins, 
 
Tell me darling tell me true 
 Am I all the world to you 
 And the world of what does it consist 
 Can they be a chance to can they be desist 
 This come to a difference in confusion 
 Or do they measure this with resist with 
 Not more which. 
                                                
97 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 249; Johnson, 9 
(emphasis mine). 
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 Than a conclusion. (363) 
“Am I all the world to you”?  As if in tacit response to this question, “they” arrive, and 
the speaker’s second-person address to “you”—and indeed, this “you” itself—fades 
away as the questions subsequently posed seem less immediately intended for a 
present interlocutor and more generally to imagine “you” and “I” as objects of their 
speculation (“do they measure this . . .”).  Even more insistently, though, “they” are 
conjured as an object of the speaker’s own speculation, the tenor of questioning 
shifting from tell me all about us to something more like tell me all about them.  The 
scene’s initial “you” and “I” thus become “they” and “this” as lyric address morphs 
into gossip both for, and about, an overhearing “they.”  The explicit invocation of this 
“they” seems to sabotage lyric: the relatively regular, four-beat measure established in 
the first three, tetrameter lines is scattered by the entrance of “they” in the fourth line, 
and their own evaluative “measure”; and whereas before “they” appear on the scene, it 
is sonically characterized by the affirmation (“true”) of lyric direct address (“you”), 
after “they” emerge such affirmation seems uncertain at best.  Do “they” represent a 
“chance” or do they cry “desist”?  Do they “resist,” introduce “confusion” and bring 
this lyric interlude to an abrupt “conclusion,” or, quite differently, does their presence 
allow for the scene’s successful closure?  Is the lyric “I all the world to you” 
(emphasis mine), or are “they” a proper part of what lyric’s “world” “consist[s]”? 
Stein approaches these questions again in a similarly heightened lyric passage, 
this one rising out of the midst of Stanza VII of Part V:  
   
Did I not tell you I would tell 
  How well how well how very well 
  I love you 
  Now come to think about how it would do 
  To come to come and wish it 
  Wish it to be well to do and you 
  They will do well what will they well and tell 
  For which they will as they will tell well 
  What we do if we do what if we do 
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  Now think how I have been happy to think again 
  That it is not only which they wish (410) 
This moment of lyric address in fact looks forward to a moment of lyric address.  It 
does not say “I love you,” exactly, but rather asserts its intention to do so: “Did I not 
tell you I would tell,” the speaker says.  Stein’s “I” has not come to “tell,” so much as 
“come to think about how it would do,” or, at an even further remove, “to think about 
how it would do . . . to come and wish it,” as, indeed, is being done at the moment of 
speech.  Stein presents a scene of meta-lyric address that reflects on and reimagines 
the necessary conditions of lyric address.  When, at the linebreak following the 
passage’s sixth line, “you” unexpectedly buckles and “They” take its place, their overt 
presence does not, as one might expect, foreclose the possibility of lyric utterance—
rather, it seems to guarantee that possibility.  Where “I would,” now “They will” 
(emphasis mine).  “They” and what “they will tell well” about “[w]hat we do if we do 
what if we do” prove necessary for lyric’s scene of address: as in Stanzas’ emblematic 
“wish to remind everybody nobody hears me,” Stein’s speaker here advances a “wish” 
for lyric felicity that perhaps only “they” can grant.  “I” and “you” must become the 
stuff of gossip, something “they will tell well,” if the lyric subject is to become “in the 
final analysis a subject as an object for the overhearer.”  In making the methods of this 
analysis transparent, Stein turns the scene of lyric address into a scene of gossip about 
its auditors—a breach of decorum insofar as the lyric “actor knows that there is an 
audience present; but if he act as though he knew it, he acts ill.”  Such bad acting, 
however, seems less to spoil lyric’s effects—including the effect of lyric 
subjectivity—than to allow Stein to rethink their terms.  Before appealing to them, 
Stein’s speaker implores, “Now come to think about how it would do / To come to 
come and wish it.”  After the passage’s self-conscious invocation of their objectifying 
presence, the speaker reconsiders: “Now think how I have been happy to think again / 
That it is not only which they wish” (emphasis mine).  If, for the subject of lyric as 
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much as the object of gossip, “what we do,” or even “if we do,” can seem to depend 
on what “they will tell,” Stanzas pursues a way to embrace the stylistic pleasures of 
both lyric and gossip and yet be “not only which they wish”—a way to be made in, but 
not entirely on their account.   
An earlier brief, marked lyric moment in Stanzas suggests the ethical stakes of 
such unlikely self-making.  Stein writes,    
 
Can we call ours a whole. 
Out from the whole wide world I chose thee 
They can be as useful as necessity (325)  
“Can we call ours a whole”?  (“Am I all the world to you”?)  Once again, at the 
fringes of lyric’s “whole wide world,” populated by “we,” “I,” and “thee,” lurks 
“They.”  Stein’s “thee / They” linebreak underscores how easily “thee” might morph 
into “They” in Stanzas.  When Stein’s speaker implores, in Stanza XXI of Part IV, 
“Now fancy how I need you,” it is soon followed by the caveat that “They should 
fancy or approve fancy” (398, 400).  Even further, “This which I reflect is what they 
like to do / They like me to do,” such that “Fancy what you please you need not tell 
me so” (401).  Though in the rhyme of poetic convention “They” might not seem as 
much a “necessity” as a “chose[n] thee,” within the revisionary reason of Stein’s 
gossipy poem “They” could prove just “as useful.”  But “useful” for or as what?  Not 
simply, I suggest, as overhearing auditors whose unacknowledged presence confirms 
the success of a self-enclosed lyric world, allowing “I” and “thee” to “call ours a 
whole.”  Stein’s “They” prove useful rather as an acknowledged, objectified audience 
for the poem’s scene of lyric address, one which enables the pleasures of lyric without 
strictly reinforcing its norms; as eavesdropping gossips who both objectify and 
animate “I” and “thee” “[i]n their and on their account”; and as the objects of lyric 
gossip, around which Stein’s poem stages what Barthes might call its “entire scene, 
sometimes sumptuous, even ceremonial.”  As Stanzas’ speaker elsewhere affirms, 
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“they used / To use me and I use them for this” (397).  Such use of others, of course, 
has typically received bad press: “Using people,” writes Johnson, “transforming others 
into a means for obtaining an end for oneself, is generally considered the very 
antithesis of ethical behavior.”98  “Respect and distance,” she continues, “are certainly 
better than violence and appropriation, but is ethics only a form of restraint?”99  In 
Stanzas, Stein poses this question in terms of gossip, seeking the possibility of an 
ethics that does not rule out the potential violence—or stylistic pleasures—of idle 
talk’s definitive exclusions and appropriations.  Can gossip’s damaging pleasures be 
justly indulged?  “[B]y word of mouth,” Stein writes, “Can they please theirs fairly for 
me”? (383).  Can invasive appropriation engender another’s agency?  Can “they make 
this seem theirs,” and yet “conclude that parts are partly mine”? (360, 446).  When 
Stein’s speaker wonders of the “They which is made in any violence,” “Can they be 
kind. / We are kind. / Can they be kind,” the question seems less one of desired 
respect, distance, or generosity than of possible affinity between subjects and objects, 
persons and non-persons, gossipers and gossipees (325, 463). 
Johnson emphasizes one common way in which such an affinity might 
ethically be established: “There seems to be an easy way to treat a thing as a person,” 
she writes: “address it.”100  Turning to the rhetorical figure of apostrophe “enables the 
poet to transform an ‘I-it’ relationship into an ‘I-thou’ relationship, thus making a 
relation between persons out of what was in fact a relation between a person and non-
persons.”101  (In the vernacular of gossip we might succinctly express this idea: say it 
to my face.)  Stein, though, in Stanza XIX, Part III, considers and rejects the 
possibility of a relational transformation by apostrophe:  
 
                                                
98 Johnson, 94. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid., 6. 
101 Ibid., 9. 
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I have thought while I was awakening 
That I might address them 
And then I thought not at all 
Not while I am feeling that I will give it to them 
For them 
Not at all only in collision not at all only in mistaken 
But which will not at all. (374-75) 
Later in the stanza, Stein’s speaker more clearly posits this “thought” of “address[ing] 
them”—and thus restaging the poem’s tense I/They as an intimate, lyric I/You—as a 
possible means of circumventing gossip: “I thought this morning to keep them so they 
will not tell” (376).  But the poem firmly sets aside the possible mutuality of an 
address to “them” in favor of what we might call being used—“giv[ing] it to them / 
For them.”  Instead of speaking directly and specifically to “them,” then, the speaker 
instead voices the stanza to no one in particular: “Now I ask anyone to hear me” (376).  
As in Stein’s “wish to remind everybody nobody hears me,” the speaker’s request, 
here, keeps “them” productively lurking at the edges of the scene of address, a tacit 
presence, spoken to “not at all” yet keenly acknowledged, as we have seen, at those 
points of limit and possibility where lyric’s seams begin to show: “only in collision,” 
“only in mistaken.”  “[T]hey are not forgotten,” Stein subsequently writes, “but 
dismissed” (451).  
Stein’s speaker revisits this line of thought in Stanza XX, Part IV, by also 
flirting with the alternate possibility of being addressed by “them.”  The stanza begins,  
 
Should however they be satisfied to address me  
For which they know they like. 
Or not by which they know that they are fortunate 
To have been thought to which they do they might (396) 
“Should . . . they be satisfied to address me . . . Or not”?  The stanza presents two 
possibilities: on the one hand, an address decidedly not the result of infelicitous 
“collision” or “mistaken” circumstances, but motivated instead by the certainty of that 
“which they know they like” and promising the satisfaction of known pleasures; or, on 
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the other hand, the refusal of this address in favor of the less certain and less 
autonomous pleasures of being talked about, of “know[ing]” instead “that they are 
fortunate / To have been thought”—to have been, we might say, an object of gossip 
rather than a subject in a dialogue.  If “the notion of ‘person’ has something to do with 
presence at the scene of speech and seems to inhere in the notion of address,” the 
refusal of their address might seem anything but “fortunate.”  Yet Stein’s speaker 
insists, “This is what I say fortunately”:        
 
There nicely know for which they take 
That it is mine alone which can mean 
I am surely which they can suggest 
Not told alone but can as is alone (396) 
Just as the speaker rejects addressing “them,” “feeling that I will give it to them / For 
them,” here “they” are imagined as “tak[ing]” it as they choose not “to address me.”  
In preserving the poem’s I/They relationship, what Stein’s speaker self-consciously 
“give[s] to them” seems to be the lyric solitude, the overheard “melody of an unseen 
musician,” that depends on this refused address: “it is mine alone which can mean.”  
Yet although “it is mine alone which can mean,” Stein’s lyric bird requires the ball of 
gossipy talk to actualize this meaning: “I am surely which they can suggest / Not told 
alone but can as is alone.”  Alone, but “[n]ot told alone”: in drawing together lyric 
solitude and gossipy sociality, Stein pursues affinities enabled less by the mutuality of 
dialogue or address than by distinct registers of speech and circles of talk.  Elsewhere 
in the poem, she more explicitly links lyric solitude to the objectification of gossip’s 
“account,” writing, “I wish I wish a loan can they / Can they not know not alone” 
(453).  Being “alone” becomes “a loan,” something “they / Can . . . not know” but 
which “I will give . . . to them,” and this pun suggests the economics of gossip’s 
“account,” which is almost always borrowed, almost always someone else’s private 
story—but also, perhaps, almost always paid back with interest.  Stein’s speaker gives 
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up what “is mine alone,” knowing in return, “I am surely which they can suggest.”  
Throughout Stanzas, “They can be as useful as necessity” for the poetic voice 
engendered not by lyric or gossip only, but rather the staged “collision” of the two.  
“Now a little measure of me,” Stein writes: “I am as well addressed as always told” 
(433).  
 
IV. WITHOUT NAMING NAMES  
 
Far be it from me to throw any doubt upon the fact that Miss Stein is a  
genius.  We have seen plenty of those.  Nor that Miss Toklas is  
convinced of it.  To tell the truth, all this would have no importance if  
it took place in the family circle between two maiden ladies greedy for  
fame and publicity.  But the immense apparatus which has been put in  
motion in order to arrive at this affirmation finds an obviously noisy  
echo in the well-known process by which the aforementioned maiden  
ladies thought they had the right to quote names and tales  
indiscriminately . . . 
 
—Tristan Tzara, Testimony against Gertrude Stein 
 
Now that was a thing that I too felt in me the need of making it be a  
thing that could be named without using its name. 
 
—Gertrude Stein, “Poetry and Grammar” 
 
One would be forgiven for assuming, given the obviously noisy response to the 
dish served up by the “maiden ladies” behind The Autobiography, that any subsequent 
discussion of naming names on Stein’s part might involve chiefly a consideration of 
gossip.  Indeed, in February of 1935, while Tzara and company asserted, in Testimony 
against Gertrude Stein, their own “right to quote names and tales indiscriminately,” 
Stein was in the middle of her American lecture tour, delivering here and there a talk 
which sought “a way of naming things that would . . . mean names without naming 
them” (330).  Her subject, however, was not the risks and pleasures of gossip but those 
of poetry.  Or at least her announced subject: for although “Poetry and Grammar” has 
long been understood, albeit variously, as a central statement of Stein’s theory of 
poetry and poetic practice, the rich interplay of lyric’s and gossip’s structures of 
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address that we have been tracing in Stanzas asks us to review both the lecture and 
Stein’s poetics more generally in relation to gossip.  The supposition that Stein’s 
ongoing meditation on gossip provides one basis for the retrospective account of a 
poetics found in “Poetry and Grammar” hinges on the issue of naming.  Certainly 
when Stein’s lecture characterizes poetry as defined by “naming”—“now and always,” 
she writes, “poetry is created by naming names the names of something the names of 
somebody the names of anything” (329)—she positions herself vis-à-vis a 
longstanding philosophical concern with the appellative function of poetic language, 
most immediately Ralph Waldo Emerson’s declaration, in “The Poet,” “The poet is 
the Namer, or Language-maker, naming things sometimes after their appearance, 
sometimes after their essence, and giving to every one its own name and not 
another’s.”102  But when we look to the subject of naming in Stein’s work we also see, 
entwined with such high theoretical interest in the name, an equally pressing 
exploration of naming within the more commonplace context of gossip and its 
                                                
102 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Poet,” Essays and Lectures (New York: Library of America, 1994), 
456-457.  Stein seems also to have an engagement with Emerson in mind when, in discussing “the 
history of poetry,” she invokes that poet most famously interpellated by him, Walt Whitman, as an 
inaugural figure in modern poetry’s attempt “to name the thing without naming its names”: “And then 
Walt Whitman came.  He wanted really wanted to express the thing and not call it by its name” (333-
334).  Throughout “Poetry and Grammar” and its gossip with “The Poet,” Emerson himself remains 
appropriately unnamed; Stein does, however, favorably cite him (and the erotics of his work) in a 1935 
interview: “Emerson might have been surprised if he had been told that he was passionate.  But 
Emerson really had passion; he wrote it; but he could not have written about it because he did not know 
about it.”  See John Hyde Preston, “A Conversation,” Atlantic Monthly LVI (August 1935): 192.  For 
another account of “Poetry and Grammar” as “a twentieth-century response to Emerson’s ‘The Poet,” 
see Chessman, 82-87.  
 Given the lecture’s implicit conversation with Emerson one should note that, whether or not Stein 
was aware of it, he is on the record as no fan of gossip.  In “Friendship,” gossip appears the hallmark of 
insincere sociality: “Every man alone is sincere.  At the entrance of a second person, hypocrisy begins.  
We parry and fend the approach of our fellow-man by compliments, by gossip, by amusements, by 
affairs.  We cover up our thought from him under a hundred folds” (Essays and Lectures, 347).  In 
“Worship,” gossip is admitted but only as “the coarsest muniment of virtue,” and only in its policing 
capacity: “We are disgusted by gossip; yet it is of importance to keep the angels in their proprieties.  
The smallest fly will draw blood, and gossip is a weapon impossible to exclude from the privatest, 
highest, selectest.  Nature created a police of many ranks” (The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Volume VI: The Conduct of Life [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003], 117).  And in 
the late work Letters and Social Aims, gossip is dismissed outright: “Why need you, who are not a 
gossip, talk as a gossip, and tell eagerly what the neighbors or the journals say?” (Letters and Social 
Aims [Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1904], 86). 
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everyday rhetoric. 
In fact the several conversation pieces collected by Stein, along with Ladies’ 
Voices, in Geography and Plays place gossip at the forefront of their dealings with 
names and naming.  The chattering drama of “Mexico,” for instance, exemplifies 
Stein’s repeated inquiries into the social currency of names either brandished or 
withheld, used alternately to erase or insinuate social distinctions, to acknowledge or 
assert a position of power and pleasure within a social network.  Consider: 
  
 Mr. and Mrs. Bing.  They had a book.  Yes Miss. 
Mr. and Mrs. Guilbert.  I mention that name. 
Of course you do. 
Of course you do to me. 
Don’t cry.103 
 
Or: 
 
 Mark Guilbert.  How often I have mentioned his name. 
 Lindo Bell.  I have not mentioned his name before. 
 Oh yes you have. 
 Charles Pleyell.  This is a name we all know.104 
As Stein asks in another piece from this period, “Why mention names why not 
mention names”?105  The gossipy “He Said It” introduces the poet into this debate: not 
as the Emersonian “Namer,” but instead as the “named” object of a tentatively 
broached scene of literary gossip: 
 
You should always speak the name. 
I don’t feel that I can mention it. 
Do you believe in me. 
Are you surprised that you have gone so far. 
To me not to me. 
Insulting yes she is insulting she asks have we ever heard of a poet named  
 Willis. 
Alice has.  I have not.  She says he belonged to a group.  Like Thoreau. 
I am not displeased with the remark.106 
                                                
103 Stein, “Mexico,” Geography and Plays, 322. 
104 Ibid., 324. 
105 Gertrude Stein, “Gentle Julia” (1914), in Bee Time Vine and Other Pieces (1913-1927), 178. 
106 Stein, “He Said It,” Geography and Plays, 273. 
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“You should always speak the name. / I don’t feel that I can mention it”: here, in 
capsule form, and in the register of gossip, is the dialectic Stein delineates in “Poetry 
and Grammar” between the desire or even imperative to “speak the name” and the 
competing feeling that one should not or is not allowed to “mention it.”  Here too, we 
see again poetic subjectivity set in relation to gossipy speculation, the lyric subject-as-
object at the level of reception: in order to listen to the “poet,” we must have “heard 
of” him.  Placing these lines next to the lecture’s description of the poetic effort “to 
name the thing without naming its names” accentuates the difficulty of neatly sorting 
Stein’s meditations on poetry from those on gossip, and further suggests that gossip 
informs Stein’s writing—in even its most overtly experimental modes—as both a 
rhetorical and authorial model (334). 
 It feels rhetorically fortuitous, then, that “Poetry and Grammar” illustrates 
Stein’s efforts “to name the thing without naming its names” by citing Tender Buttons 
and “An Acquaintance with Description,” and quoting generously from Portraits and 
Prayers and Before the Flowers of Friendship Faded Friendship Faded, but does not 
mention Stanzas in Meditation.  For though of course Stein’s examples, culled from 
her printed works and mostly available from her and Toklas’ own recently established 
press The Plain Edition, practically served as advertisements, Stein’s lecture also often 
seems like an attempt to name her gossip-inflected project and its culmination in the 
unpublished Stanzas without once naming that poem by name.107  Stein contends in 
“Poetry and Grammar” that “poetry is essentially the discovery, the love, the passion 
for the name of anything,” and since “[n]ouns are the names of things,” they form “the 
                                                
107 This is not to imply that those works Stein cites and quotes from are unrelated to gossip—Tender 
Buttons (1914), for instance, with its sometimes delicate, sometimes turbulent eddies of language 
around “Food,” “Objects,” and “Rooms,” could productively be read as a dishy deconstruction of 
gossip’s sumptuous, domestic mise-en-scène and the pleasures of its intimate cattiness.  Instead I want 
to suggest simply that Stanzas, a recently composed product of Stein’s long meditation on gossip and 
poetic language, is very much on her mind as she writes and delivers “Poetry and Grammar.”  See 
Tender Buttons, in Gertrude Stein: Writings 1903-1932, 313-355. 
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basis of poetry”—but over time and with use nouns become conventional, static, even 
restrictive (329).  “After all,” she writes, “one had known its name anything’s name 
for so long, and so the name was not new but the thing being alive was always new” 
(330).  Because one cannot simply do without names in poetry (“I struggled 
desperately with the recreation and the avoidance of nouns as nouns and yet poetry 
being poetry nouns are nouns”), the poet’s task is to find “a way of naming things that 
would . . . mean names without naming them” (331, 330).  As Stein “struggled more 
and more” with this task, she recalls she “found in longer things . . . that I could come 
nearer to avoiding names in recreating something,” raising “the question will poetry 
continue to be necessarily short as it has been as really good poetry has been for a very 
long time.  Perhaps not and why not” (333).  Her answer: “If enough is new to you to 
name or not name, and these two things come to the same thing, can you go on long 
enough.  Yes I think so” (333).  Stein’s verse had never gone on and never would go 
on longer than in Stanzas, a poem exhaustively and impossibly seeking to level the 
difference between what it means “to name or not name,” and in which two years 
earlier she had announced (can you go on long enough?) “I could go on with this,” “I 
wish to remain to remember that stanzas go on,” and “I wish always to go on” (Yes I 
think so) (396, 359, 423). 
 Whether anticipating or described by “Poetry and Grammar,” Stanzas’ ongoing 
meditation on what is at stake “If I name names if I name names with them” takes a 
similarly pronounced, equivocal stance towards naming, with Stein’s speaker evincing 
equal parts unease and fascination that “Namely they name as much” (322, 321).  
Stanzas’ more evident blurring of naming as gossip and naming as poetic practice 
helps clarify Stein’s quirky focus, in “Poetry and Grammar,” on nouns as personal 
names.  In the first specific example the lecture provides for the inadequacy of names, 
Stein turns not to the natural world, as one might expect in a discussion of poetic 
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naming, but instead to the proper names that populate her circle: “Call anybody Paul 
and they get to be a Paul call anybody Alice and they get to be an Alice . . . generally 
speaking, things once they are named the name does not go on doing anything to them 
and so why write in nouns” (313).  Later, the possible inadequacy of proper names 
becomes exemplary of the opportunity and effort to revitalize nouns and naming.  
“Now actual given names of people are more lively than nouns,” Stein writes, since 
“there is at least the element of choice even the element of change”: one “may be born 
Walter and become Hub, in such a way they are not like a noun” (316).  As “Poetry 
and Grammar” negotiates the slippage between nouns, names, and proper names; 
between the names of things and the names of persons; between an exhausted naming 
that “does not go on doing anything” and a lively naming and its “element of change”; 
and between the concerns of poetry (“poetry . . . is a vocabulary entirely based on the 
noun”) and those of gossip (the satisfactions of describing “Paul” or “Alice”), we hear 
echoes of Stanzas’ lyric gossip (327).108  How, Stein asks in Stanzas, to engage the 
poetic and gossipy pleasures of naming “names with them” without letting such 
                                                
108 In the other significant elaborations of her theory of naming, in How to Write  (1931) and Four in 
America (c. 1934, published 1947), Stein further explores the poetic, linguistic and philosophical 
dimensions of naming in terms of gossip, though critics have yet to acknowledge the gossipy textures of 
these discussions, let alone treat them as significant.  In How to Write, for example, a discussion of the 
“name” drifts into chatter about “[t]he Georges whom I have known,” who “have been pleasant not 
uninteresting,” and also “Pauls Christians Virgils and Williams and even Franks and Michaels and 
James and pleasures.  They can be united in resemblance and acquaintance.”  Stein’s “Georges” 
reappear in the opening pages of Four in America, where we again learn “I have known a quantity of 
Georges, a quantity of Georges.  Are they alike.  Yes I think so”; soon anecdotal speculation about 
“Pauls” is adduced to jokingly illustrate the potentially determining power of names: “I have known a 
great many Pauls.  One of them I have even tried to change the name, unsuccessfully.  I know just what 
Pauls are like even though they differ.  What are they like.  They are alike insofar as it is possible, 
nobody, that is not any woman ever really loves them.  Now just think of that think how true it is.  None 
of them not one of them have been really loved by any woman.  They have been married and sometimes 
not married, and anything can be true of them, but they have never, dear me never, been ever loved by 
any woman.  That is what no Paul can say.”  See Stein, How to Write (New York: Dover Publications, 
1975), 289; and Four in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 5.  My focus is on the 
relationship in Stein’s work between gossip, poetry, and naming: for an account of Stein’s theory of 
names within the contexts of modern philosophy of language and deconstruction, see Jennifer Ashton, 
“Making the rose red: Stein, proper names, and the critique of indeterminacy,” in From Modernism to 
Postmodernism: American Poetry and Theory in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 67-94.  
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pleasurable nuance slip into rote and possibly immobilizing categorization?  And 
“[h]ow are our changes,” the poem’s speaker worries in turn, “When they could fix 
titles or affix titles”? (375).  Stanzas frequently registers its deep ambivalence about 
the pleasures and risks of naming names and being named.  Given that its speaker 
allows, “It is very anxious not to know the name of them / But they know not theirs 
but mine. / Not theirs but mine,” yet also implores, “Be made to ask my name,” is it a 
lament or boast that “I cannot often be without my name. / Not at all” (363, 457, 365)?  
Is the query “when where will they name me” eager or paranoid (391)?  Similarly, 
though the speaker’s own refusal to name names is sometimes forceful, as in “I do not 
wish to say what I think / I concluded I would not name those,” or “It is easy to say 
easily. / That this is the same in which I do not do not like the name,” the poem 
elsewhere undercuts the ease of not naming: “I wish to say again I like their name / If I 
had not liked their name / Or rather if I had not liked their name. / It is of no 
importance that I liked their name” (375, 439, 451).  Can naming and not naming, 
liking their name or not liking their name, “come,” as Stein claims in “Poetry and 
Grammar,” “to the same thing”?  Stanzas provides an elaborate record of one poet’s 
repeated endeavors to achieve a naming without names. 
 Stein represents one version of this endeavor in the brief Stanza XII, Part II, in 
which her speaker (speaking perhaps of herself in the third person?) self-reflexively 
stands apart from and comments on a scene of (poetic? gossipy?) naming and its 
I/They relationship: 
 
And she will be so nearly right 
That they think it is right 
That she is now well aware 
That they would have been named 
Had not their labels been taken away 
To make room for placing there 
The more it needs if not only it needs more so 
Than which they came. (349-350) 
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As “she” and “they” alternate lines and agency, figuring each other in and on their 
respective accounts, they importantly eschew the certainty (“she will be so nearly 
right,” “they think it is right”) of pre-determined “labels,” or the kind of presumptive 
naming in which “the name was not new but the thing being alive was always new.”  
Rather than reducing the other, to recall Barthes’ concern about gossip, to “the 
bloodless form of a universal substitute,” this scene’s “she,” at least, removes such 
“labels” in order “[t]o make room for placing there / The more it needs” as a “thing 
being alive” and “always new.”  Such naming—or not naming—is accretive rather 
than reductive, allowing for “more so / Than which they came.”  As Stein later writes, 
wishfully, “They will come come will they come / Not only by their name” (416).  In 
response to a normative naming that would try to “affix titles” and “labels” and thus 
“fix” one in place, Stein pursues in Stanzas an alternative naming that could 
paradoxically “come to the same thing” as not naming.  If this pursuit entails an 
ultimately unsustainable balancing act, the ambivalent demands of such an act 
nevertheless motivate her poem in its desire—even as it confesses “It is very foolish to 
go on”—“always to go on,” supplying it and its aesthetic of lyric gossip with a 
grammar and rhetoric (417).  
A quick assay of these features of Stein’s poem clarifies gossip’s significance 
as a formal model for Stanzas and her innovative writing more generally.  First, 
grammar.  Against inert nouns (“completely not interesting”) and adjectives (“the 
thing that effects a not too interesting thing is of necessity not interesting”), “Poetry 
and Grammar” advocates for more mobile parts of speech: pronouns (“not really the 
name of anything”), verbs and adverbs, articles, conjunctions, and prepositions (314, 
316).  Dydo notes that “Poetry and Grammar” explains grammatical “ideas in the 
stanzas,” and I agree that within Stein’s work, Stanzas most nearly anticipates the 
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lecture’s difficult grammar of avoiding names.109  Proper names are rare in Stanzas’ 
drama of pronouns, in which “they refuse names,” but indulge lavishly in “[a]rticles 
which they like” (322); the poem’s grammar, almost entirely devoid of nouns and 
adjectives, is typified in lines like “Or not at all or not in with it,” “Not to be with it 
now not for or,” “Which or for which which they can do too,” and “For it or for which 
or for might it be” (319, 359, 383, 398).  Such lines might seem impossibly arid, 
anything but gossipy, but considered in the larger context of the poem’s engagement 
with gossip, their grammar begins to suggest an extreme version of the intimate 
shorthand of private talk and a rhetoric dripping with insinuation.  This is the 
discourse of “you know who,” “I’ll leave it at that,” or “let’s just say,” and of the rich 
innuendo of a well-timed silence—a mode of gossip that revels in saying what cannot 
be said (while maintaining the deniability of never quite saying it).  The extent to 
which nouns are conspicuously omitted from Stein’s lines betrays a similarly 
compulsive interest in disclosing names that are never conclusively named.  Stanzas 
deploys this particular grammar of gossip in a poetry “concerned,” as Stein puts it in 
“Poetry and Grammar,” “with losing with wanting, with denying with avoiding with 
adoring with replacing the noun” (327).    
In this sense, Stein’s poetic grammar also evokes the elliptical style of gossip 
columns like Walter Winchell’s, which interrupted and linked their items with ellipses 
that quite literally asked their readers to connect the dots.  (The maxim “gossip is the 
art of saying nothing in a way that leaves practically nothing unsaid” is commonly 
attributed to Winchell.)  Neal Gabler suggests that Winchell’s spare, fragmented prose 
“mirrored the modernistic experiments in high literature then being conducted by 
Gertrude Stein, Hemingway, Céline and others”; one might venture that Stein’s 
                                                
109 Dydo, Gertrude Stein: The Language That Rises, 509n.36. 
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writing in turn bears marks of the gossip columns she read, appeared in, and saved.110  
Some of Stein’s works from the early 1930s, for instance, experiment with the use of 
typography to break the text up into elliptical fragments, full of charged pauses.  “We 
Came. A History” employs equal signs to this effect, reading at times like a Steinian 
gossip column: “Florence is made to George=Now listen to that.=It does surprise 
you=Florence is not yet married to George but they have had the dinner of betrothal 
which was later than noon and a good deal of bother.=”111  Stein seems to want this 
loud stylistic device to be audible in gossipy bits like “=Now listen to that.=,” and in 
“Winning His Way. A Narrative Poem of Poetry,” she similarly uses periods 
suggestively to score an increasingly nameless narrative “Of poetry. And friendship. 
And fame” with a syntactical static that prefigures the more subtle nominative gaps of 
Stanzas:  
 
 Wherein. They. Mentioning. Never. Think. It told. 
 I wish to say. That it never does any good to tell about it. And so. There. Is  
  why. There is now when. They know. 
 Pleasures. A Name.112 
Though “They. Mentioning. Never. Think. It told,” and though “it never does any 
good to tell about it,” Stein’s poetic forays into gossip keep mentioning “it” and telling 
“about it,” enjoying the “Pleasures” of  “A Name” that is “Never” named.  Stein’s 
periods, like the buzz of “=” in “We Came. A History,” navigate and sonically stand in 
for the passage’s denied and avoided content.  Will Straw, alluding to the sound of 
                                                
110 Neal Gabler, Winchell: Gossip, Power and the Culture of Celebrity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1994), 80.  Items from Winchell’s columns are mentioned in Stein’s correspondence with both Carl Van 
Vechten and Thornton Wilder (see The Letters of Gertrude Stein and Carl Van Vechten, 1913-1946, 
392, 410, 444, 588, 614; and The Letters of Gertrude Stein and Thornton Wilder, eds. Edward Burns 
and Ulla E. Dydo [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996], 71); in addition, a variety of syndicated 
gossip columns appear in those clippings saved by and sent to Stein and collected in the Gertrude Stein 
and Alice B. Toklas Papers, Yale Collection of American Literature MSS 76, Box 145. 
111 Stein, “We Came. A History” (1930), in Reflection on the Atomic Bomb, 151. 
112 Stein, “Winning His Way. A Narrative Poem of Poetry” (1931), in Stanzas in Meditation and Other 
Poems, 194.  The fifty-page exploration of “fame,” “friendship,” and “poetry” in “Winning His Way” 
presages Stein’s more extended meditation on these issues in Stanzas.   
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telegraph keys used to mimic the ellipses of Winchell’s gossip column when he began 
his radio broadcast in 1932, notes that the “pulses and gaps of the elliptical gossip 
column were seen, from the very beginning, to resemble those of electronic or 
machine-based communication,” and understood “as attempts to approximate the 
sounds of inter-war technologies, as manifestations of modernist sonic sensibilities,” 
the gossip column’s suggestive ellipses recall our discussion of the gossip as tape 
recorder, a mechanized figure whose voice becomes most audible in the technological 
traces of a listening which gives rise to gossip.113 
Something of this occurs in also Stanzas, which sheds the arguably mannered 
punctuation of the work of 1930-1931 but still emits, through its grammatical 
omissions, the subtle noise of the gossip at work.  For in the absence of clear subject 
matter, we listen instead to Stein’s grammar as it orchestrates the poem’s vocal 
textures, much as we perceive the voice of gossip in the evident diegetic fragments of 
Ladies’ Voices.  Stein’s marked use of prepositions and conjunctions in the poem’s 
first two stanzas sets the tone for what follows, establishing a rhetorical pattern of 
assertion and qualification that enacts on a micro-level Stanzas’ large-scale effort to 
name without naming names.  Stanza I is organized around “In” and “But”: one third 
of its 27 lines begin with these terms, and Stein uses them eight more times within the 
stanza’s lines as it moves between statements of enclosure within specific 
circumstances—often statements of convention—and statements of exception from 
these circumstances.  In the drift from “In a kind of way they meant it best” to “But 
they must not stare when they manage,” or from “And in a way there is no repose” to 
“But it is very often just by the time . . . ” we find both the endlessly intricate 
speculation of gossip as nonce taxonomy and the welcome (rather than disavowed) 
contingency of poetic naming, each of which ensure that the naming and not naming 
                                                
113 Will Straw, “Squawkies and Talkies,” Parallax 14.2 (2008): 29, 27. 
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of one’s world “can . . . go on” (316).  Stanza II’s driving counterposition of “For” and 
“Or”—for example, “For which they will not like what there is . . . Or should they care 
which it would be strange”—works similarly to unsettle authoritative claims for 
purpose or function with alternatives and afterthoughts that both derail and vivify the 
poem’s language and its objects of attention (317).   
As explanations become elisions and claims become caveats, and vice versa, 
these structures of digression—“Now I have lost the thread,” Stanzas announces; “I 
have lost the thread of my discourse” (411, 419)—facilitate a poetry “doing nothing,” 
per “Poetry and Grammar,” “but using losing refusing and pleasing and betraying and 
caressing nouns” (327).  Stein’s refusal of naming, so exorbitant it affirms, captures 
quite well the second major formal feature—the rhetoric of paralipsis—in which we 
see the influence of gossip in Stanzas.  Paralipsis, the self-contradictory technique by 
which one emphasizes what one ostensibly passes over, furnishes Stein’s stanzas with 
a lush rhetorical repertoire of ways to name without naming.114  More than any other 
word, the adverb “not,” often used by Stein in variations of the paradigmatic paraliptic 
tag “not to mention,” dominates the poem’s lexis and plays a determining role in its 
syntax.  One need not mention the array of paralipses common to exchanges of dish 
(“but you won’t hear it from me,” or “I really shouldn’t say that . . . ,” or “as for 
Gertrude Stein’s gossip, we won’t even go there!”) to establish the trope’s familiar 
role in gossip’s rhetoric; and the countless negations of Stanzas’ circular syntax, if not 
                                                
114 The Rhetorica ad Herennium defines paralipsis (Latin occultatio or occupatio) as “when we say that 
we are passing by, or do not know, or refuse to say that which precisely now we are saying”; George 
Puttenham, in his Arte of English Poesie, terms paralipsis “the Passager,” and defines it “as if we set but 
light of the matter, and . . . therefore we do but passe it over slightly when in deede we do then intend 
most effectually and despightfully if it be invective to remember it: it is also when we seeme not to 
know a thing, and yet we know it well enough.”  Puttenham’s emphasis on “invective” and on what “we 
seeme not to know . . . yet we know it well enough,” as well as his illustration—four lines of verse in 
which “I hold my peace, and will not say, for shame / The much untruth of that uncivil dame”—
strongly link paralipsis to gossip.  See Rhetorica ad Herennium, ed. and trans. Harry Caplan 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 321; and Arte of English Poesie, eds. Gladys Doidge 
Wilcock and Alice Walker (London: Cambridge University Press, 1936), 232. 
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all strict instances of paralipsis, generally share in what Susan E. Phillips calls the 
trope’s “capacity for simultaneous disclosure and concealment,” steadily generating 
the paraliptic effects of gossip.115  The poem’s recurrent paralipses are set against, and 
emerge from, the less ambiguous naming of what “they” directly “say” (“It is what 
they did say when they mentioned it”) (331).  While Stein’s speaker at times seems to 
“name names with them,” as when we are told, “I will mention it. / She has been very 
well known to like it,” or “It has just come to me now to mention this / And I do it,” 
more characteristic is the claim, “I wish I had not mentioned it either” (443, 445, 413).  
Not just an expression of regret for naming names “with them,” this paralipsis presents 
an alternative way of naming, mentioning “it” even as it purports to set “it” aside.  As 
Stein’s “I” elsewhere declares, “I try to do it and not to do it,” and in the emphasis on 
what is pointedly and extensively not said, “to name or not name . . . come”—or at 
least come close—“to the same thing” (384).  Thus the poet acts as “Namer” without 
ever quite naming—  
 
It is not only that I have not described 
A lake in trees only there are no trees 
Just not there where they do not like having these  
Trees. (359) 
—and Stanzas uses paralipsis to convey the lyric subject’s necessary, yet 
unacknowledgable, awareness of and ardent interest in overhearing auditors:  
 
Not to be interested in how they think 
Oh yes not to be interested in how they think 
Oh oh yes not to be interested in how they think (421). 
Naming by not naming becomes a kind of revisionary doublespeak, a way “I manage 
                                                
115 Susan E. Phillips, Transforming Talk: The Problem with Gossip in Late Medieval England 
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 76.  In her discussion of gossip 
and Chaucer’s House of Fame, Phillips notes how paralipsis (she uses the Latin term occupatio) evades 
common standards of evidence, “straddl[ing] the border between truth and falsehood, the liminal space 
where gossip thrives” (77).  Though far afield from the concerns of Stein’s circle, Phillips’ discussion 
of gossip in the late medieval courtroom suggestively speaks to the emphasis critics of Stein’s gossip 
placed, as we have seen, on “testimony” and “witness.” 
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to think twice about everything”: 
 
Why will they like me as they do 
Or not as they do 
Why will they praise me as they do 
Or praise me not not as they do 
Why will they like me and I like what they do 
Why will they disturb me to disturb not me as they do 
Why will they have me for mine and do they 
Why will I be mine or which can they 
For which can they leave it 
Or is it not (382-383) 
“I think I will begin,” Stein writes, “and say everything not something,” such that 
“What I know is not what I say so” (377, 423). 
Recognizing Stein’s gossipy rhetoric of paralipsis complicates the 
interpretations of critics such as Alison Rieke, who deftly describes how in Stanzas, 
“Stein writes endlessly about it without mentioning it once,” but hastily concludes 
from this that the poem “has something to hide,” employing a “language of 
repression.”116  Rieke’s account of Stanzas forms part of what Kathryn R. Kent 
describes as a tradition of sympathetic readings that seek “to rescue Stein’s texts from 
charges that they have no meaning and thus no aesthetic or cultural value” by arguing 
that she “turns to textual difficulty as a way to escape censorship . . . creat[ing] a 
private language that only she and perhaps Toklas may interpret, and thus protect[ing] 
the sanctity of their relationship in a closet of her own creation.”117  Hence for Rieke, 
Stein’s “sexuality” provides the necessary motive for her supposed “need to speak of 
herself in enigmas and silences,” explaining why she “declines to speak about her 
subjects, withholding, in negations and tautologies, privileged and intimate content,” 
and why, “[w]hen anxiety or uncomfortable feelings try to make their way to the 
surface of this private language and become public, she buries them”—“[a]s writer 
                                                
116 Alison Rieke, The Senses of Nonsense (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1992), 61, 64. 
117 Kent, 142. 
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and as censor”—“in vagueness.”118  At first blush, Stein’s abstract stanzas indeed 
might seem to indicate such sexual repression or self-censorship: “How I wish I were 
able to say what I think,” the speaker exclaims in one instance of the poem’s refrain of 
countless wishes for expression (“I wish to say,” “The thing I wish to tell,” “This 
which I wish to say is this,” “What I wish to do to say,” “What I wish to say is this,” 
and on and on) (392, 395, 408, 418, 436, 438).  Yet considered as part of a pattern of 
gossipy paralipses, Stanzas’ many wishes give voice to what they profess only to wish 
they could say (as in “I wish I could repeat as new just what they do”), or to what they 
wish they had not said (as in “I wish I had not mentioned which / It is that they could 
consider as their part”), or to what they wish they did not have to say (as in “Nor do I 
wish to have to think about what they do not do / Because they are about out loud”) 
(377, 405, 415).  As with the poem’s broader project of naming and not naming, 
saying and wishing to say ultimately bend toward much the same thing:  
 
This which I wish to say once which I wish to say 
I wish to say it makes no difference if I say 
That this is this not this which I wish to say. 
But not not any more as clear clearly 
Which I wish to say is this. (449) 
When Stein’s speaker says, “I am trying to say something but I have not said it,” it 
thus seems an expression of pleasure more than failure, the poem’s paralipses 
suggesting not “something to hide” but something to say, not self-censorship but a sly 
style of self-expression (439).  Stanzas emphasizes the unspeakable but is still, as John 
Ashbery describes it, “a hymn to possibility.”119  “It is often when it is not stated,” 
                                                
118 Rieke, 66, 68, 85.  Edmund Wilson perhaps first suggests this reading of Stein when he concludes 
that “the vagueness that began to blur [Stein’s work] from about 1910 on and the masking by 
unexplained metaphors that later made it seem opaque, though partly the result of an effort to emulate 
modern painting, were partly also due to a need imposed by the problem of writing about relationships 
between women of a kind that the standards of that era would not have allowed her to describe more 
explicitly.”  See “Gertrude Stein Old and Young,” The Shores of Light (New York: Farrar, Straus, and 
Young, 1952), 581.   
119 Ashbery, “The Impossible,” 12. 
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Stein writes, “That at it two or to / That it is better added stated”—lines we might 
paraphrase: “often when it is not stated . . . it is better . . . stated” (365). 
Michel Foucault famously reminds us that “There is not one but many 
silences,” and in reframing Stanzas’ “enigmas and silences,” its “negations and 
tautologies” as less concealments or disclosures than pleasurable, gossipy play with 
the power-laden structures of concealment and disclosure, my point is emphatically 
not to deny the (absent) presence of Stein’s sexuality in the poem, or to admit it but 
claim it bears little import for Stein’s readers.120  Rather, I want to suggest the sexiness 
of Stein’s difficult style itself, considering it as something other than primarily an 
effort to maintain an inviolate space of privacy, something more than symptomatic of 
coded, withheld, protected, buried, or censored sexuality.121  As Stein avows, 
“Literature—creative literature—unconnected with sex is inconceivable.  But not 
literary sex, because sex is a part of something of which the other parts are not sex at 
all.”122  If, straining to make visible the presumed sexual subject matter—the “literary 
sex”—that supposedly is left unsaid in Stanzas, we brush past the performance and 
palpable erotics of how the poem so expressively does not say it, we affirm a less 
                                                
120 Foucault writes, “There is no binary division to be made between what one says and what one does 
not say; we must try to determine the different ways of not saying such things.”  Michel Foucault, The 
History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990), 27.  
See also Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, 3.  
121 A number of seminal feminist accounts of Stein’s style postulate, as Margaret Dickie puts its, 
“Stein’s self-censorship, the sexual anxiety that drove her tireless experimental writing, the self-
judgment that undercut even her most exaggerated celebrations of her sexual power.”  See especially 
Dickie, “Recovering the Repression in Stein’s Erotic Poetry,” Gendered Modernisms, 3-25; Elizabeth 
Fifer, “Is Flesh Advisable? The Interior Theater of Gertrude Stein,” Signs 4.3 (1979): 472-483, 
“Guardians and Witnesses: Narrative Technique in Gertrude Stein’s Useful Knowledge,” Journal of 
Narrative Technique 10 (1980): 115-127; and Catharine Stimpson, “The Mind, the Body and Gertrude 
Stein,” Critical Inquiry 3.3 (1977): 489-506, “Gertrude Stein and the Lesbian Lie,” American Women’s 
Autobiography: Fea(s)ts of Memory, ed. Margo Culley (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1992), 152-166.  While I agree with many of the important, central observations of this body of work, 
including observations about the risks of lesbian representation during Stein’s lifetime and the 
importance of Stein’s lived sexual experience for her writing, I ultimately concur with critics like Kent 
(141-142) and Holbrook, who argue that “the privileging of the referent that inspires a drive to break 
codes is ill-conceived” when reading work “in which textual eroticism is in play at the level of the 
signifier” (Holbrook, 752). 
122 Preston, “A Conversation,” 191. 
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imaginative view than Stein’s of what counts as sex.123  For Stein, sex in “creative 
literature” has little to do with explicit representation but is instead something, we 
might say, that one names without ever naming it: it is not simply mimetic, but always 
“a part of something” else and “really,” she explains, “a matter of tone.”124  The 
“matter of tone” in Stanzas is largely a matter of gossip.  Sex in these stanzas is one 
interrelated part of the poem’s complex gossip network and its affiliations, a network 
whose “other parts” include friendships, rivalries, poetry, and fame; but also pronouns, 
articles, conjunctions, and prepositions; omissions, negations, and paralipses.  
Certainly, as Spacks writes, “sexual activities and emotions supply the most familiar 
staple of gossip,” but “[g]ossip, even when it avoids the sexual, bears about it a faint 
flavor of the erotic,” generating, even in the absence of explicit sexual subject matter, 
an “atmosphere of erotic titillation.”125  In Stanzas, Stein’s “piquant love of gossip” 
entails—more than any specific content—an erotics of style: a grammar, a rhetoric, 
and a persona.  Thus although the gossipy rhetoric of Stein’s infamously abstract 
poem rarely announces its subjects, it should nonetheless be listened to as a series not 
of occlusions but of invitations, welcoming us to its queer lyric performance of gossip.  
In its final stanza, Stein’s poem renews its open invitation into the space of both lyric 
meditation and gossip.  “I call carelessly that the door is open / Which if they can 
refuse to open / No one can rush to close,” Stein writes, having offered proleptic 
thanks, in the single-line penultimate stanza, to those who accept this invitation: 
“Thank you for hurrying through” (464). 
 
 
                                                
123 “One thing which I have tried to tell Americans . . . is that there can be no truly great creation 
without passion, but I’m not sure that I have been able to tell them at all.  If they have not understood it 
is because they have had to think of sex first, and they can think of sex as passion more easily than they 
can think of passion as the whole force of man.  Always they try to label it, and that is a mistake.”  Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Spacks, 11. 
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V. “I BECOME A GOSSIP”  
Under the title “Preliminary Aside to the Reader; Regarding Gossip, and its 
Pitfalls,” Wyndham Lewis set down, in the autumn of 1936, the opening lines of his 
proposed memoir.  “I am about to gossip,” he typed.  “I am going to be exceedingly 
‘personal’ about certain persons.  But this is not at all because I wish to be.  It is 
because of you that I descend to these picturesque details.”126  If, as we have seen, 
Stein’s engagement with lyric tradition and dominant understandings of lyric as what 
T.S. Eliot sums up as “meditative verse,” or “the voice of the poet talking to himself—
or to nobody,” provides one context for Stein’s persona of the gossip, the modernist 
rhetoric surrounding gossip and its role in the literary provides another.127  Lewis’ 
brief draft preface—ultimately rejected as the project that would become Blasting and 
Bombardiering took shape—has much to tell us about masculinist modernism and its 
perceptions of the gossip.  Much of it, to be sure, is expected: Lewis depicts gossip as 
the crass lingua franca to which the modern writer is pressured to “descend” in order 
to navigate the anti-intellectual mushiness and passivity of a feminized mass culture.  
“Ideas the Public does not relish,” he complains.  “If it is desirous of acquiring ideas, it 
prefers to come by them without tears.  It finds it more agreeable to extract them, in 
small quantities, out of a mass of inorganic and drifting gossip.”128  The previous 
year’s “testimony” against Stein makes essentially the same case as Lewis, 
underscoring the “[p]itfalls” of becoming, in one’s work, a gossip.  The witnesses 
assembled in Transition seek to “invalidate the claim of the Toklas-Stein memorial” 
by emphasizing the figure of the gossip’s lack of agency and deluded sense of it: we 
are repeatedly told that despite Stein’s “egocentric deformations” and “clinical case of 
                                                
126 Wyndham Lewis, “Preliminary Aside to the Reader; Regarding Gossip, and its Pitfalls,” ed. Thomas 
R. Smith, Modernism/Modernity 4.2 (1997): 184. 
127 T.S. Eliot, The Three Voice of Poetry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954), 27.  
128 Ibid. 
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megalomania,” she was not “in any way concerned with the shaping of the epoch she 
attempts to describe,” that she “understood nothing of what went on around her.”129  
They dwell on the gossip’s trivial, middlebrow motivations and their threat to the 
modern artist’s “humanly important enterprises”: “the depraved morals of bourgeois 
society are now opposed by the strong loathing which is felt by a few rare beings who 
have posited the problem of man’s destiny and dignity with a gravity that is very 
different from the attitude which approaches it under the form of certain politely 
esthetic games.”130  And, troubled that “Miss Stein expresses herself through the 
mouth of Miss Alice Toklas,” that she “let herself be told by her ‘secretary,’” they 
position and disparage the gossip as both feminine and queer—a troublingly “coarse” 
mimic of normative domestic and literary productivity, cooking up loose talk in her 
“literary kitchen” and letting that promiscuous prattle, in “the lowest literary 
prostitution,” spill up and over the brim of “the family circle” of “two maiden ladies 
greedy for fame and publicity.”131 
If this phobic embodiment of the gossip is familiar enough, perhaps less so is 
the way Lewis self-reflexively allows himself to occupy the very role he resists—the 
way gossip paradoxically supplies the blueprint for his anxious effort to withstand its 
infectious influence.  The contributors to Testimony against Gertrude Stein betray no 
such awareness of themselves as even potential gossips, even though—despite the 
juridical authority claimed in its title—their pamphlet was received as and consists 
mostly of its own gossip about Stein and Toklas, and immediately became one more 
cog in the Stein gossip machine.132  Lewis, however, introduces his own forthcoming 
                                                
129 Eugene Jolas and Georges Braques, respectively, in Testimony against Gertrude Stein, 2, 13. 
130 Tristan Tzara, in Testimony against Gertrude Stein, 13. 
131 Ibid., 12-13. 
132 For instance, the gossip columnist O. O. McIntyre included, among items on Tallulah Bankhead and 
the cartoonist Rube Goldberg, the news that “Gertrude Stein may remain permanently in the America 
she has not known for thirty-two years or at least until the storm of her last book in Paris blows over.  
The autobiography of her secretary, which she penned, resulted in a pooling of resentment that might 
 89 
gossip by satirically positioning himself on the verge of becoming a gossip (“I am 
about to gossip”), and in so doing demonstrates his uneasy intimacy with the pleasures 
and “[p]itfalls” of the dish he ultimately claims to reject.  He performs his own odd 
mix of a feminized lack of agency (“I become a gossip, in the present instance. . . . I 
have no choice in the matter”) and bald egotism (“I am out to popularise Pound, to 
jack up Joyce’s stocks, and to make my own alarming name a little less horrific”); and 
he affirms his own mass cultural compromises (“I will show what stuff I am made of, 
and make a hearty picaresque affair full of jolly incidents, of all this highbrow 
business”).133  More pointedly, he deploys gossip’s rhetoric with wink, worrying about 
the consequences “if I betray a suspicious indifference to the great unwritten law of It 
isn’t done . . . For (between ourselves) I mean to do it.”134  And (between ourselves) 
he does: when Lewis identifies “the trouble” with becoming “a gossip” as “how to 
overstep that decorous limit without appearing a little disreputable,” the satire of his 
preface—his reputable disavowal of the gossip he so skillfully and disreputably 
enacts—provides one solution, suggesting that the gossip draws as much as 
transgresses the limits of literary decorum, that it is less a subversive figure at the far 
edge of modernism than an authoritative discourse quietly inscribed at the center of its 
artistic practice.135  Indeed, for all his faux-trepidation “Regarding Gossip, and its 
Pitfalls,” Lewis—hardly known for mincing words when it came to being “‘personal’ 
about certain persons”—had already made his debut as a gossip on the stage of the 
modernist memoir.  When, in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, Lewis appears, 
                                                                                                                                       
make Paris a bit uncomfortable.  Matisse, the great painter, is in a fury.  So is Tzara, who daddied 
Dadaism.  And Jolas, publisher of Transition.  They claim Gertrude has been talking through her funny-
shaped hat.”  Undated syndicated column by McIntyre, collected in the Gertrude Stein and Alice B. 
Toklas Papers, Yale Collection of American Literature MSS 76, Box 145, Folder 3368.  
133 Lewis, 183, 184, 185. 
134 Ibid., 185. 
135 Ibid., 186.  That this (perhaps too revealing) preface never made it into print provides another, more 
certain solution to the problem of how to gossip without seeming one. 
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we are told, “Gertrude Stein rather liked him.  She particularly liked him one day 
when he came and told all about his quarrel with Roger Fry.  Roger Fry had come in 
not many days before and had already told all about it.  They were exactly the same 
story only it was different, very different” (122-123). 
Stein, I propose, tells us “exactly the same story” about becoming a gossip as 
Lewis, Braques, Jolas, and Tzara—among the many others whose names this list 
might include—only it is “different, very different.”  She does not reject their narrative 
of the gossip, but brazenly inhabits it and the indecorous pleasures of its disavowed 
persona.  Her aesthetic of gossip, her self-fashioning as a gossip, is thus not so much a 
subversion of artistic authority—though it is that too—but more properly a queer bid 
for it.  Consider the authorial give and take surrounding Pablo Picasso’s 1909 painting 
“Homage à Gertrude.”  Picasso, Alice tells us in The Autobiography, “made for [Stein] 
the tiniest of ceiling decorations on a tiny wooden panel and it was an hommage à 
Gertrude with women and angels bringing fruits and trumpeting.  For years she had 
this tacked to the ceiling over her bed” (89).  Those few critics who have commented 
on this painting have identified the central presence of Picasso’s panel, an angelic 
figure bearing a trumpet, as both a biblical herald and a stand-in for Stein.136  The 
iconography of Picasso’s painting, though—from the soaring figure’s herald trumpet 
and posture to the buffeting clouds on which its words take flight—clearly references 
Fama, classical deity of gossip and rumor (figures 4 and 5).  Picasso’s homage, then, 
depicts Stein as Fame, a goddess of gossip presiding over the divine dish of 27 rue de  
                                                
136 Sarah Bay-Cheng, for instance, links this figure to Stein and identifies it—or to my mind 
misidentifies it—as “the classical image of the biblical herald—a winged figure with a trumpet.”  See 
Mama Dada: Gertrude Stein’s Avant-Garde Theater (London: Routledge, 2004), 1.  John Richardson 
does not identify the figure as a herald, but does see Stein in the painting’s “ironical apotheosis.”  He 
writes: “A group of nudes surround a scroll inscribed with the words ‘Homage a Gertrude.’ One of the 
nudes—not unlike Alice—proffers fruit; another—Gertrude?—blows her own distended  trumpet.”  
John Richardson, “Picasso and Gertrude Stein: Mano a Mano, Tete-a-Tete,” The New York Times, 
February 10, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/10/arts/art-picasso-and-gertrude-stein-mano-a-
mano-tete-a-tete.html. 
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Figures 4-5.  Depiction of Fama (detail), from the frontispiece to Alexander Pope’s 
Temple of Fame: A Vision (London: Bernard Lintott, 1715); and reproduction of Pablo 
Picasso’s “Homage à Gertrude” (1909), from The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas. 
 
Fleurus and boasting the ability to make or break artistic reputation; but Stein’s gossip, 
in his painting, seems to be about herself: the text of the scroll from which she heralds 
presents an “Homage a Gertrude,” as if, more than trumpeting the reputations of 
others, Stein is preoccupied primarily with tooting her own horn.  Yet if Picasso’s 
homage is also a dig, it is one Stein recognizes and affirms.  In The Autobiography of 
Alice B. Toklas she reproduces as an illustration “Homage à Gertrude,” making the 
wily painting an emblem of the text it illustrates, in which Stein simultaneously 
gossips about others and presentsgossip about herself through the voice of Toklas.  
Reclaiming the panel in The Autobiography, Stein in effect gossips about Picasso’s 
visual gossip about her gossip.  
Here we find the frisson of the sudden shifts and tensions between first- and 
third-person representations that are, as we have seen, central to Stanzas’ lyric gossip.  
We find, too, the concern with renown that often motivates and is the effect of such 
uncertain negotiations of authorial agency.  Fame, Stein seems aware, depends on 
one’s becoming a subject as an object, and somehow maintaining that tenuous 
balance.  Part III of Stanzas concludes, 
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I often think how celebrated I am. 
It is difficult not to think how celebrated I am. 
And if I think how celebrated I am 
They know who know that I am new 
That is I knew I know how celebrated I am 
And after all it astonishes even me. (403)  
These lines’ terminal refrain—I am, I am, I am, I am—punctuates their boastful 
insistence on the self; but, we are told, Stein’s “I” trumpets its own homage in order 
that “They know who know,” as if the speaker’s irrepressible “think[ing]” about the 
self is actualized only by becoming the object of others’ “know[ing],” at which point 
“it astonishes even me.”  “Once now I will tell all which they tell lightly,” Stein’s 
speaker declares in an earlier stanza, suggesting an account of oneself enabled by the 
gossipy account of others—or “exactly the same story only . . . different, very 
different” (321).  Stanzas’ speaker continually emphasizes the necessity of this I/They 
relationship for its motivating interests (“I could have been interested not only in what 
they said but in what I said. / I was interested not interested in what I said only in what 
I said” [379]), and in the passage above, when “They know who know” is clarified, 
“That is I knew I know,” we see again the poem’s “they that is I” and the role of third-
person gossip in its fame-driven, aesthetic self-making.   
In depicting herself in The Autobiography as a modern version of Fame, Stein 
thus extends a persona she had already tried on in what Lewis might call the “mass of 
inorganic and drifting gossip” that is Stanzas in Meditation.  As Stanzas’ speaker 
tirelessly speculates about who will “be seen to come,” it is hard not to think of Stein 
(thinking of herself) as Fame, holding court over Saturday nights at her Paris salon and 
the reputations of the names there in circulation:   
 
We learned we met we saw we conquered most 
After all who makes any other small or tall  
They will wish that they must be seen to come. (320) 
As with Fame, the speaker’s gossip “makes any other small or tall,” bestows fame or 
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relegates one to infamy or obscurity.  The poem frequently depicts this difficult 
arbitration of others’ reputations: “Might they be mostly not be called renown,” the 
speaker wonders, “Or can they be very likely or not at all / Not only known but well 
known” (324, 346).  In a passage that seems explicitly to portray the art-filled atelier 
of 27 rue de Fleurus, Stein describes those who come to name and be named within its 
space of gossip.  (John Malcolm Brinnin vividly imagines the scene at “27” as 
“something between a court and a shrine,” where “jockeyings for position went on” 
while “[i]n the background, over the noise of the teacups, one could hear the sound of 
rolling heads, the rumble of dead reputations being carted away.”)137  “So much comes 
so many come,” Stein writes:    
 
Tables of tables and frames of frames. 
For which they ask many permissions. 
I do know that now I do know why they went 
When they came 
To be 
And interested to be which name. (357) 
They “[c]ame here to want it to be given to them,” the poem elsewhere tells us (324).  
Yet if “they came / To be” by being given a “name,” it is in turn the fame attached to 
these names and the speaker’s role in their accounts by which Stein’s “I” will be 
known.  As in Picasso’s rendering of Stein as Fame, as in the claims of the 
“testimony” against Stein’s idle talk, as in Lewis’ literary aside regarding the figure of 
the gossip, Stanzas’ speaker, in making or breaking others, is primarily concerned with 
the making of oneself.  “I have thought that I would not mind if they came / But I do,” 
the speaker admits.  “I also thought that it made no difference if they came / But it 
does” (391).  In Stanzas’ gossipy persona, perhaps specifically that of Fame, we 
recognize both another instance of and the interest behind the poem’s meditation on 
                                                
137 John Malcolm Brinnin, The Third Rose: Gertrude Stein and Her World (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1959), 269.  
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the mutually constitutive I/They relationships of lyric and gossip.  For despite 
“mind[ing]” the potential threat of their expectation or demand that “They can be well 
enough known,” they are a “welcome” and necessary presence for a speaker granting 
but “unknown to fame”: “Please be not only welcome to our home” (434, 437). 
This invitation into the “home” in Stanzas (which recalls Stein’s open, weekly 
invitation to her Paris apartment) marks out a liminal space, both private and 
temporarily available to the public—an interior that “I” allows “they” to inhabit, like 
the gossip’s interiority as it is opened up to other voices, or the lyric interiority coyly 
staged for its auditors.  These are, like the house of Fame, transformative spaces of the 
subject-as-object—the gossip morphing into disembodied gossip, the lyric subject 
disappearing into its “unbodied,” overheard song—and in this sense, the poem’s 
architectural diction (its “home” or “house” and its “windows” and “door” [401, 434; 
367, 387; 335; 359, 370, 402, 464]) refers both to the social space of gossip and the 
formal space of poetry.  “Stanza,” of course, is Italian for room, and Stein links her 
stanzaic structure to the rooms of both gossip and poetry when, in Stanza XXII, Part 
V, her speaker asks “What is a stanza” (424), and answers: 
 
         it is it is just like Italy 
And if it is just like Italy 
Then it is as if I am just like it 
That is make it be. 
There is no necessity to make it be if it is 
Or there is not any real making it do too (425)  
Beyond the melding of gossip’s and poetry’s stanzas, we notice here how Stanzas’ “I” 
is conflated with the poem’s structure: “it is as if I am just like it,” the speaker 
observes of the “stanza,” and though it might appear at first as if “I . . . make it be,” 
“it” in fact seems to work of its own accord, since “There is no necessity to make it be 
if it is,” and “there is not any real making it do.”  As Stein’s stanzas themselves 
“make”—“A stanza can make wait be not only where they went”—their “I” begins to 
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seem almost incidental to, or even the effect of, their “making” (427).  Thus Stein 
writes, “I wish to remain to remember that stanzas go on,” and the speaker’s 
declaration of “how celebrated I am” gradually becomes an insistence that “this stanza 
has been well-known” (359, 414, emphasis mine).   
This is the story condensed, we recall, in the poem’s first two lines, which 
begin with a specific “I” and end with an indefinite “it”; and also in its last two—
“Certainly I come having come. / These stanzas are done”—which subtly shift their 
agency from a singular person to a plural thing (464).   It is the story of the poem’s 
title, as well, which ambiguously announces its stanzas as objects contained within the 
extended meditation of a subject who can only be implied, and also as perhaps 
themselves a meditating subject—stanzas in the act of meditation.  If walls could 
talk?—Stein’s rooms, imagined as speaking for her speaker, figure a Fame-like voice 
of gossip that multiplies and preserves but can “go on” independently of any 
particular, embodied subjectivity.  Stein’s stanzas, in other words, become a space 
through which one might indefinitely “float . . . without tying oneself to a place.”  The 
pleasures of such a space—in which unmoored subjects might become objects and 
fleeting persons could turn into persistent things—are not always benign.  Stein writes,   
 
Believe me it is not for pleasure that I do it 
Not only for pleasure for pleasure in it that I do it. 
I feel the necessity to do it 
Partly from need 
Partly from pride 
And partly from ambition. 
And all of it which is why 
I literally try to do it and not to do it. (384) 
Talker and listener, subject and object, person and thing, bird and ball: as Stein tries 
“literally . . . to do it and not to do it,” she fashions a queer persona that both enables 
and is effected by the fraught pleasures of her poem’s gossipy meditation on the ideals 
of lyric voice, and on one set of norms for modernist authorship.  Stein, that is—for 
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“pleasure,” certainly, but also for “need,” for “pride,” and for “ambition”—becomes a 
gossip. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
“THE DISH THAT’S ART”: FRANK O’HARA’S SELF-GOSSIP 
 
 
I claim them all for my insufferable 
genius my demon my dish 
 
—Frank O’Hara, “A Proud Poem” 
 
I. “DEEP GOSSIP” 
Fondly remembered as “a terrible (also first-rate) gossip,” Frank O’Hara has 
seemed to many a poet whose work—talky, bursting with intimate references, peopled 
with celebrated and obscure proper names and knowingly indeterminate pronouns—is 
itself “all gossip, local gossip, social gossip.”1  Just as in friendship he “savored gossip 
and playful malice,” in his poems O’Hara remains always attuned to, as he writes, “a 
little supper-club conversation for the mill of the gods.”2  “[W]hat really makes me 
happy,” he claimed of his verse, “is when something just falls into place as if it were a 
conversation or something,” and throughout his conversational poetry he evinces a 
particular fascination with the stylistic possibilities of idle talk.3  In a memoir he 
recalls himself and his circle of fellow poets splitting their time during the postwar 
halcyon days of American painting “between the literary bar, the San Remo, and the 
artists’ bar, the Cedar Tavern.  In the San Remo we argued and gossiped: in the Cedar 
we often wrote poems while listening to the painters argue and gossip.”4  Not 
surprisingly, in these poems gossiping, listening to gossip, and writing poetry 
                                                
1 Bill Berkson, “Frank O’Hara and His Poems,” in Homage to Frank O’Hara, eds. Bill Berkson and Joe 
LeSueur (Bolinas: Big Sky, 1978), 161; and Allen Ginsberg, “Early Poetic Community (Kent State, 
April 7, 1971)” in Allen Verbatim: Lectures on Poetry, Politics, Consciousness, ed. Gordon Ball (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), 149.  
2 John Bernard Myers, introduction, The Poets of the New York School, ed. John Bernard Myers 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Graduate School of Fine Arts, 1969), 20; “Rhapsody,” The 
Collected Poems of Frank O’Hara, ed. Donald Allen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 
326.  Where clear, further references to poems included in this volume will appear in the text as CP. 
3 Frank O’Hara, “Edward Lucie-Smith: An Interview with Frank O’Hara” (1965), in Standing Still and 
Walking in New York, ed. Donald Allen (Bolinas, CA: Grey Fox Press, 1975), 21. 
4 “Larry Rivers: A Memoir” (1965), in The Collected Poems of Frank O’Hara, 512. 
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intoxicatingly bleed one into the other.  “[Y]ou must / work,” O’Hara quietly asserts to 
himself in one poem, “to make succulent the dish that’s art,” whereupon a voice much 
like a boisterous party guest barges into the poem to ask: “Are you dishing art?” (CP 
75).  O’Hara experienced these two voices and their seemingly unique demands—for 
gossip and poetry, “dishing art” and “the dish that’s art”—not as competing but vitally 
co-constitutive, each productive of a crucial part of his work and each able to feed the 
muse he called, not without ambivalence, “my insufferable / genius my demon my 
dish” (CP 52). 
Yet how, why, and to what effect does O’Hara’s dish become poetry, and his 
poetry become dish?  Marking out the extremes of the response to his gossipy poetics, 
Allen Ginsberg’s oft-quoted elegy for O’Hara hails him as a “Chatty prophet” with “a 
common ear / for our deep gossip,” while in her review of The Collected Poems of 
Frank O’Hara, Pearl K. Bell unhappily wades through “huge trash-heaps” of “poems, 
full of campy gossip.”5  These two takes suggest that encountering O’Hara’s poetry 
entails finding oneself up to one’s neck in gossip, but still uncertain just how “deep” it 
is.  And indeed, considering the extent to which O’Hara’s champions and detractors 
alike have understood gossip to play a central role in his personality and poetic 
practice, we know relatively little about the contours of this role and its thematic, 
historical, theoretical, and especially formal concerns and implications.  In her 
pioneering study of O’Hara, for instance, Marjorie Perloff clears the ground for a 
rigorous analysis of the poetry by first sweeping away the seeming distractions of 
gossip.  She contends that in the aftermath of O’Hara’s bizarre, early death—struck by 
a dune buggy on a Fire Island beach in 1966—the artist “became a work of art, and 
                                                
5 Allen Ginsberg, “City Midnight Junk Strains” (1966), Collected Poems 1947-1980 (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1984), 459; Pearl K. Bell, “The Poverty of Poetry,” New Leader, 10 January 1972, rptd. 
in Frank O’Hara: To Be True to a City, ed. Jim Elledge (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
1990), 39. 
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attention was deflected from O’Hara’s real achievement, which was his poetry.”6  
Quoting in her final chapter the closing lines of Ginsberg’s elegy, she concludes, “This 
is essentially the mythologized version of the poet . . . the ‘gay’ (in both senses of the 
word) . . . celebrant of New York and purveyor of ‘deep gossip’”—thus consigning 
O’Hara’s queer gossip, and our own, to the diversions of the O’Hara myth (185).  
When Perloff herself turns to O’Hara’s “intimate talk,” she accordingly proceeds as if 
carefully letting the hot air out of his brilliantly chatty balloon: noting the poems’ 
frequent sense of an “ongoing conversation,” she is quick to assure us that “this is not 
to say, as critics often have, that an O’Hara poem is just good casual talk,” and in her 
reading of “Rhapsody” the poem succeeds “[d]espite its air of casual talk” (26, 27, 29, 
emphases mine).  “[I]nterest in the legend—our inveterate love of gossip—has 
deflected attention from the poet’s accomplishment,” Perloff insists, and she is, of 
course, partially right—perhaps as much now, with O’Hara’s star in ascendance, as 
when these words first appeared over three decades ago (6).  But “our inveterate love 
of gossip” is also precisely what O’Hara’s poetry itself—often at its most 
accomplished—so brazenly appeals to, making it a love whose insights are difficult to 
do without.  
To be sure, gossip has made revealing cameo appearances in significant 
assessments of O’Hara’s “queer talk” and his conversational poetics more generally;7 
and any account of his engagement with idle talk has much to learn from important 
recent studies of the social formations of postwar American poetry, many of which 
                                                
6 Marjorie Perloff, Frank O’Hara: Poet Among Painters, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1998), 3.  Where clear, further references will appear in the text. 
7 Among the many useful discussions of O’Hara’s talk, see Bruce Boone, “Gay Language as Political 
Praxis: The Poetry of Frank O’Hara,” Social Text 1 (1979): 59-92; Gavin Butt, Between You and Me: 
Queer Disclosures in the New York Art World, 1948-1963 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 95-
99; Stuart Byron, “‘Poetic Queertalk,’” Real Paper 24 (1974), rptd. in Elledge, 64-69; Alan Feldman, 
Frank O’Hara (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1979), 49-53; Srikanth Reddy, “Digression Personified: 
Whitman, the New York School, and the Drift of Poetry,” Literary Imagination 11.1 (2009): 1-25; and 
Hazel Smith, Hyperscapes in the Poetry of Frank O’Hara: Difference/Homosexuality/Topography 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000). 
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feature O’Hara as they treat aspects of sociality closely related to gossip, including 
community, coterie, and friendship.8  Yet the “playful malice” of gossip’s talk about 
others cannot be subsumed neatly into broader considerations of O’Hara’s 
conversation (in dialogue with others) or the communities these conversational 
practices are often seen as sustaining.  At the same time, the term gossip—in 
suggesting an identity that gathers, interprets, invents, and circulates private and 
typically unverified information about others; in designating this unconfirmed material 
itself; and in indicating (as a verb) the performance by which this information is 
disclosed—provides the conceptual ability to move fluidly among the actors, content, 
and style that continually work in concert to form, deform, and reform communities 
and the selves of which they are comprised.  An explicit focus on O’Hara’s queer art 
of gossip thus both usefully condenses varied critical emphases on talk, sexuality, the 
social, and the poetic and offers a rhetoric whose formal specificity holds out the 
promise of more nuanced examination of how dish actually shapes and takes shape 
within individual poems.    
As soon as one begins to sound the largely unexplored depths of O’Hara’s 
“deep gossip,” one discovers that although O’Hara is widely viewed as American 
poetry’s paradigmatic instance of the poet as gossip, his poems’ dish confounds many 
of the most basic paradigms of idle talk.  This breaking of the rules of gossip might be 
                                                
8 See in particular Lytle Shaw’s Frank O’Hara: The Poetics of Coterie (Iowa City: University of Iowa 
Press, 2006) and Andrew Epstein’s Beautiful Enemies: Friendship and Postwar American Poetry 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  See also Michael Davidson, The San Francisco Renaissance: 
Poetics and Community at Mid-century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Guys Like 
Us: Citing Masculinity in Cold War Poetics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Terrence 
Diggory, “Community ‘Intimate’ or ‘Inoperative’: New York School Poets and Politics from Paul 
Goodman to Jean-Luc Nancy,” in The Scene of My Selves: New Work on New York School Poets 
(Orono, ME: National Poetry Foundation, 2001); Daniel Kane, All Poets Welcome: The Lower East 
Side Poetry Scene in the 1960s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Maggie Nelson, 
Women, The New York School, and Other True Abstractions (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 
2007); Libbie Rifkin, Career Moves: Olson, Creeley, Zukofsky, Berrigan, and the American Avant-
Garde (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000); and Reva Wolf, Andy Warhol, Poetry, and 
Gossip in the 1960s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
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seen as—and no doubt in part is—the result of its adaptation to literature, in which 
form it becomes, Patricia Meyer Spacks claims, “no longer true gossip, only a 
simulacrum.”9  Setting aside that Spacks’ description of literature’s gossip as untrue 
representation oddly makes it sound even juicier and more truly gossipy than the so-
called “true gossip” it imitates, to understand gossip in literature in this way would be 
to make of it what Barbara Herrnstein Smith influentially calls a fictive representation 
of natural discourse, one that “invite[s] and enable[s] the reader to create a plausible 
context for it.”10  But O’Hara’s lyric gossip, I argue, does not so much gesture toward 
“a plausible context” one must “create” for it as constitute its own often rather 
implausible context—neither lyric nor gossip, yet deeply engaged with both as it 
attempts to glimpse what is possible beyond the apparent horizons of each genre.   
In attending to this implausible context and the possibilities of its bad form, the 
discussion that follows revolves around the foremost ways O’Hara’s lyric gossip, 
already a transgression of what he calls the “awful lot of dicta laid down by everybody 
about what was good and what was bad” in modernist poetry, also and more 
unexpectedly deviates from established notions of good dish.11  Although 
unmistakably gossipy, O’Hara’s poetry often complicates gossip’s staging by talking 
about the scenario’s typically absent others not behind their backs but in front of their 
faces; and at times it upsets even the most fundamental definition of gossip as talk to 
and about other people by dishing to and about O’Hara himself.  This self-gossip, like 
the “self-talk” Erving Goffman describes as “a kind of perversion, a form of linguistic 
self-abuse,” becomes for O’Hara a queer means of poetic self-fashioning whose gossip 
presents an alternative to the idea of confession that has dominated understandings of 
                                                
9 Patricia Meyer Spacks, Gossip (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 4. 
10 Barbara Herrnstein Smith, On the Margins of Discourse: The Relations of Literature to Language 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), 33. 
11 O’Hara, “Edward Lucie-Smith: An Interview with Frank O’Hara,” 12. 
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disclosure in mid-century lyric poetry, especially in relation to changing conceptions 
of privacy, subjectivity, sexuality, and style.12  Beginning with his first poetic 
experiments with gossip in the early 1950s, O’Hara builds a rhetoric that holds in 
tension lyric abstraction and gossipy particularity, self-effacement and self-assertion, 
strangeness and intimacy, and absence and presence, continually shuffling the terms of 
these seeming binaries in order to baffle and reconceive the gendered and sexualized 
as much as generic assumptions that structure them.  His lyric gossip seeks not an 
ideal of disclosure by which one uncovers and inhabits the authorized truth of one’s 
subjectivity, but rather, in a Cold War climate notoriously hostile to queerness, 
pursues within the intimately cultivated failures of lyric poetry and gossip an imagined 
space for the real emergence of improper names, unauthorized selves.   
 
II. IMPROPER NAMES 
“We’ll open with a question.  Is style hearsay?”13  With this query the painter 
Joan Mitchell commenced an April 1958 panel on “Hearsay” at the Club, a New York 
artists’ gathering for discussion, debate, and a fair amount of gossip about avant-garde 
art and poetry.  Let’s open with this question, too, since it is one O’Hara poses and 
inspires throughout a body of work whose reception has been indelibly marked by 
“our inveterate love of gossip,” and since the dialogue’s collaborative script—
assembled by Elaine de Kooning “after three evenings of private discussion” among 
herself and panel members Norman Bluhm, Mike Goldberg, Mitchell, and O’Hara; 
subsequently “tampered with by Frank O’Hara”; and eventually published as “5 
Participants in a Hearsay Panel”—provides one instance of O’Hara’s and his cohort’s 
                                                
12 Erving Goffman, Forms of Talk (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 80.  Further 
references will appear within the text. 
13 From the script for an April 25, 1958 Club panel, published as “5 Participants in a Hearsay Panel” in 
It Is 3 (1959), rptd. in Frank O’Hara, Art Chronicles 1954-1966 (New York: George Braziller, 1975), 
149.  Further references will appear in the text. 
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unorthodox thinking about gossip.  Is style hearsay?  The panel posits a number of 
possible answers, the following among them:  
 
NORMAN: Frank says: Style at its lowest ebb is method.  Style at its highest ebb 
is personality. (149) 
 
FRANK: Elaine says Pavia says Dogs don’t mind being dogs.  The panel has 
heard—hasn’t it, Joan—that certain galleries have dropped all their artists and 
are looking for promising new talent. (150) 
 
FRANK: Someone in the know says more women artists keep journals than men 
do. (151) 
 
MIKE: Frank says Elaine says Norman is being stuffy again. (151) 
Thus satirically assuming and celebrating gossip’s rhetoric, the dialogue proceeds as if 
purposefully inverting the initial inquiry so that the question at hand (“Is style 
hearsay?”) becomes as well “Is hearsay a style?” (149).   
If to ask the former question is to broach an interpretive problem having to do 
with the seemingly distracting role played by gossip in aesthetic judgment, especially 
amid the noise of the marketplace and its often disavowed influence, to respond to the 
latter question, a more immediately formal one, is to suggest, just the opposite, that 
art, criticism, and gossip are impossibly and productively intertwined.  Nearly all of 
the panel’s prepared remarks on hearsay, parsed out “with careful attention to 
misattribution and misquotation,” are tagged as hearsay, from the relatively 
straightforward dish of “Norman says,” “Harold Rosenberg says,” “Fairfield says,” or 
“Someone in the know says” (150, 151), to more elaborate chains of talk whose 
genealogies rival the actual dish they spread in gossipy significance, such as “Philip 
Guston told Andrew Wyeth that Louis B. Mayer told John Huston,” or “Ernestine 
Lassaw told Franz Kline and Tom Young that Bob Rauschenberg told her that Joseph 
Cornell saw a beautiful girl in a box, a cashier’s box, outside a movie house . . . ” 
(149, 151).  In this way, the dialogue’s dense thicket of speech tags and proper names 
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presents the aesthetic as inevitably mediated by the social, but also troubles any easy 
distinction between the two by tacitly asserting that hearsay is an available style—one 
that itself often circulates as a form of hearsay.   
As the first of Mitchell’s fellow panelists to respond to her question, O’Hara 
sets the discussion’s tone of inversion and paradox with a reply that helps to illuminate 
more specifically his own poetics of gossip: “Well Pavia says,” O’Hara says, referring 
to Philip Pavia, sculptor and founding member of the Club, “nowadays everyone talks 
about you behind your back in front of your face” (149).  In this opening gambit’s bit 
of meta-gossip, O’Hara theatrically exemplifies the self-contradictory quip he voices 
by talking about Pavia and indeed, at one remove, “everyone” in New York’s 
vanguard circle of artists, many of whom were in the audience during the panel, in 
front of their faces but as if behind their backs.  Strictly speaking this is not gossip, 
which “[a]lways,” as Spacks writes, “involves talk about one or more absent figures”; 
in this case the others taken as the subject of talk are present (and, in the rambunctious 
atmosphere of the Club, might well be expected to intervene).14  Nonetheless, this 
witticism and its mischievous enactment provocatively propose that gossip depends 
not on a necessary framework for communication but instead a manner one might 
deploy in various frameworks, an attitude one might strike toward others and the 
social norms that govern our relationships with others.  Studies of gossip have 
emphasized how the just between us intimacy of its shared exclusions facilitates group 
cohesion and defines community membership by establishing who is out of the loop 
and therefore who is in it.  But the impossible spatial metaphor of talking “behind your 
back in front of your face” positions both those being talked about and those doing the 
talking—both gossipees and gossips—in a liminal space, simultaneously inside and 
outside the social circle and its norms.  Gossip, in this formulation, might be 
                                                
14 Spacks, Gossip, 4, emphasis mine. 
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understood as a style of talk (as if “behind your back”) whose breach of decorum (in 
fact “in front of your face”) wants to reimagine and transform more than consolidate 
the given arrangements of inhabited spaces ranging from a panel to a party to a poem. 
The idea of gossip as a transformative style is suggestive of what I take to be 
the queer poetics of O’Hara’s lyric gossip, which in adopting the rhetoric of idle talk 
makes strange the familiar surroundings of the lyric poem.  Indeed, being talked about 
“behind your back in front of your face” aptly describes the experience of O’Hara’s 
poetry and the compendium of proper names and personal references that, at once 
inviting and opaque, can make even O’Hara’s most immediate readers feel both 
addressed by and absented from the poems, talked to and talked about, approached as 
an intimate and a stranger.  One of O’Hara’s lovers, the dancer Vincent Warren, 
captures this effect when he writes, “The poems are full of personal references that 
mean so much to me—and maybe nothing to strangers—but there are many references 
in the earlier poems that I don’t get, except the intimacy of Frank’s feelings about 
whatever he’s referring to—so I guess the ‘strangers’ who read the love poems too, get 
what Frank’s talking about.”15  This uncertain relational dynamic of intimacy and 
strangeness, getting it and not getting it, mirrors the way O’Hara himself, though 
everywhere designated, is seldom properly in or out of his poems or the world they 
describe—a strategy of aesthetic self-making that recalls the gossip’s self-assertion by 
self-effacement (but you didn’t hear it from me). 
These issues—style and hearsay, poetry and dish, intimacy and strangeness, 
self-assertion and self-effacement—converge in a formative instance of O’Hara’s lyric 
gossip, the 1951 poem “A Party Full of Friends.”  Among the first of O’Hara’s verses 
to feature prominently the names of friends, the poem commemorates in gossip “a 
party,” as Mark Ford writes, “that [John] Ashbery hosted in his furnished room on 
                                                
15 Vincent Warren, “Frank . . . ” (1973), rptd. in Homage to Frank O’Hara, 74. 
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West Twelfth Street while O’Hara was staying with him during a Christmas break 
from Ann Arbor in 1950.”16  O’Hara begins by plunging into the revelry:    
 
Violet leaped to the piano 
stool and knees drawn up 
under her chin commenced to  
spin faster and faster sing- 
ing “I’m a little Dutch boy 
Dutch boy Dutch boy” until 
the rain very nearly fell 
through the roof!17 
Each of the poem’s six subsequent stanzas similarly accumulates partygoers, 
breathlessly relating, for example, how “Jane . . . advanced slowly” from across the 
room while “Hal” and “Jack” discussed Violet’s and Jane’s antics; how “Larry paced 
the floor” as “Arnie . . . muttered”; how “John yawked / onto the ottoman” and 
“George thought / Freddy was old enough / to drink”; and how “Gloria had not been / 
invited, although she had / brought a guest” (PR 24-25). 
As this précis suggests, “A Party Full of Friends” is most immediately a poem 
full of names.  How are we to understand them?  For Charles Altieri, such more or less 
unknown proper names have the effect of alienation: O’Hara’s “texture of proper 
names gives each person and detail an identity, but in no way do the names help the 
reader understand anything about what has been named.  To know . . . a person 
O’Hara expects to meet is named Norman is rather a reminder for the reader that the 
specific details of another’s life can appear only as momentary fragments, insisting 
through their particularity on his alienation from any inner reality they might 
possess.”18  Citing Altieri, Perloff similarly asserts that “persons and places, books and 
                                                
16 Mark Ford, introduction, Frank O’Hara, Selected Poems, ed. Mark Ford  (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2008), xiii. 
17 Frank O’Hara, “A Party Full of Friends,” Poems Retrieved, ed. Donald Allen (San Francisco: Grey 
Fox Press, 1996), 24.  Further references to poems included in this volume will appear in the text as PR. 
18 Charles Altieri, Enlarging the Temple: New Directions in American Poetry during the 1960s 
(Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1979), 111. 
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films are named because they are central to O’Hara’s particular consciousness”; these 
names gesture toward an inaccessible world of experience, not the lyric transcendence 
of “mythologizing portraits” (130-31).  Yet Ford sees the proper names of “A Party 
Full of Friends” as just such transcendent efforts, “initiating what one might call 
O’Hara’s mythopoeic gossip mode.”19  And Geoff Ward claims that, rather than 
“insisting” on “alienation,” O’Hara’s references to friends’ proper names tend to serve 
as points of identification: discussing “Adieu to Norman, Bon Jour to Joan and Jean-
Paul,” he contends, “Any of us middle-class speaking subjects has a friend like 
Kenneth and a lunch appointment next week with our own Joan or Jean-Paul.”20  
Do O’Hara’s unknown proper names signal our exclusion from the world the 
poems represent, or do they transcend their particularity to become a point of abstract 
identification?  And how could these names’ particularity either designate a reality 
from which we are barred, or, quite the opposite, form an invitation to a party full of 
mythologized friends we recognize as surrogates for our own?  Rather than simply 
choosing one reading or the other, Lytle Shaw has recently argued that O’Hara’s use 
of proper names is best understood as part of a fluid rhetoric that productively 
negotiates between the poems’ vital, empirical contexts and their anticipated textual 
afterlives.  Shaw’s focus on how these contexts “come into awkward and revealing 
contact” better accounts for the coincident intimacy and strangeness I find central to 
O’Hara’s lyric gossip, and in keeping with this emphasis, I read “A Party Full of 
Friends” as a significant experiment in what happens when gossip’s naming names 
coincides with lyric naming, and a circle of friends becomes a poem of names.21   
This question is brought to the fore when, following Larry’s boastful lament 
that “when I’m not paint / ing I’m writing and when I’m / not writing I’m suffering / 
                                                
19 Ford, introduction, O’Hara, Selected Poems, xiii. 
20 Ward, Statutes of Liberty, 62.  
21 Shaw, Frank O’Hara, 79. 
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for my kids I’m good at all three” (PR 24-25), O’Hara responds: 
 
        indeed you are, I 
added hastily with real ad- 
miration before anyone else 
could get into the poem, but 
Arnie, damn him! had already 
muttered “yes you are” not  
understanding the fun of 
idle protest. (PR 25) 
This stanza’s narrative of earnest Arnie stepping on O’Hara’s ironic retort both 
introduces and strikingly blurs the boundary between the poem and the experience it 
represents.  O’Hara’s attempt to prevent “anyone else” from entering “into the poem” 
enacts a form of the narrative figure metalepsis, defined by Gérard Genette as “any 
intrusion” of the “narrator or narratee” into the narrative’s world, “or the inverse,” thus 
producing “an effect of strangeness.”22  Specifically, these lines present an instance of 
author’s metalepsis, “which consists of pretending that the poet ‘himself brings about 
the effects he celebrates’”—although here, O’Hara seemingly fails to bring about his 
intended effect of guarding entry “into the poem” (“Arnie, damn him!”), such that his 
metalepsis comically connotes not the poet’s autonomy but the threat posed to it by 
the subjects of his gossip, whose stories are and are not his own.23  This moment thus 
presses what Genette calls metalepsis’ “unacceptable and insistent hypothesis, that the 
extradiegetic is perhaps always diegetic, and that the narrator and his narrates—you 
and I—perhaps belong to some narrative.”24  
Once the poem’s narrative levels have been brought intrusively together, the 
textual relationship between O’Hara, the friends who are the subjects of his poem’s 
gossip, and the reader becomes increasingly destabilized.  In this sense, metalepsis’ 
                                                
22 Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1980), 234-35.  
23 Ibid., 234.  Genette here is quoting Pierre Fontanier’s Commentaire raisonné sur “Les Tropes’ de 
Dumarsais, vol. 2 of Dumarsais’ Les Tropes (Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1967), 116.   
24 Genette, Narrative Discourse, 236. 
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transgression of the border between those doing the talking and those being talked 
about suggests another way in which O’Hara’s lyric gossip chats “behind your back in 
front of your face,” using style to transform the relations of a given space.  O’Hara 
seems to have enjoyed flirting with metaleptic effects: numerous anecdotes recall his 
habit of composing poems in the midst of, and about, everyday social occasions, as if 
bringing backstage talk front stage to dish on an ongoing experience.  Kenneth Koch 
recollects, “One of the most startling things about Frank in the period when I first 
knew him was his ability to write a poem when other people were talking, or even to 
get up in the middle of a conversation, get his typewriter, and write a poem, 
sometimes participating in the conversation while doing so.”25  James Schuyler 
similarly remembers “having coffee with Frank and Joe LeSueur . . . and Joe and I 
began to twit him about his ability to write a poem any time, any place.  Frank gave us 
a look—both hot and cold—got up, went into his bedroom and wrote ‘Sleeping on the 
Wing,’ a beauty, in a matter of minutes.”26  And Joe Brainard writes, “I remember 
seeing Frank O’Hara write a poem once.  We were watching a western on T.V. and he 
got up as tho to answer the telephone or to get a drink but instead he went over to the 
typewriter, leaned over it a bit, and typed for four or five minutes standing up.  Then 
he pulled the piece of paper out of the typewriter and handed it to me to read.  Then he 
lay back down to watch more T.V.”27 
Such accounts, while no doubt part of the O’Hara myth, usefully dramatize the 
way his lyric gossip improbably occupies everyday social spaces, making their 
familiar experiences strange—as if any moment could be revealed to perhaps belong 
to some poem.  Even when O’Hara’s poems have not literally been written 
                                                
25 Kenneth Koch, “A Note on Frank O’Hara in the Early Fifties” (1964), rptd. in Homage to Frank 
O’Hara, 26. 
26 James Schuyler, “Frank O’Hara: Poet Among Painters” (1974), rptd. in Homage to Frank O’Hara, 
83. 
27 Joe Brainard, “Frank O’Hara” (1968), rptd. in Homage to Frank O’Hara, 168. 
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simultaneous with their occasions and the doings of those involved, their ambiguous 
shaping of temporality often frames them as if this were the case.  A well-known 
paratextual instance of such framing occurs in the humorous, self-authored jacket copy 
for O’Hara’s Lunch Poems, a blurb which begins: “Often this poet, strolling through 
the noisy splintered glare of a Manhattan noon, has paused at a sample Olivetti to type 
up thirty or forty lines of ruminations . . . .”28  At first blush, the effort to effect the 
sense that occasion and poem correspond exactly might seem a continuance of a 
particularly American poetic desire to close the gap between experience and verse, a 
desire given voice, for instance, in Walt Whitman’s 1855 preface to Leaves of Grass, 
where he claims of the American people’s “manners speech dress friendships” that 
“these too are unrhymed poetry.”29  Yet if O’Hara wants to merge everyday experience 
and poetry, or to perpetuate the illusion of such a merging, he certainly does not 
succeed, since what often proves notable in the poems, as in the above anecdotes of 
O’Hara’s composition of them, is not the seamless fusing of the everyday and the 
poetic but rather their conspicuous and “startling” encounter. 
The metalepsis of “A Party Full of Friends” stages this odd encounter.  
Figuring “the poem,” like the “party,” as a space one might “get into” or be kept out 
of, O’Hara imagines too that friends, poet, and reader might variously move between 
these spaces, their characteristic styles (gossip and lyric), and their different 
ontological statuses.  Does Arnie’s muttering occur in the poem or the party?  Which 
space does O’Hara’s hasty interjection occupy?  Can Arnie cross as a name “into the 
poem” through his presence at the party?  Has Gloria “not been invited” to the party or 
the poem?  Can the reader—a bit like the “guest” of an uninvited guest—gain entrance 
to the party by means of the poem’s surrogate names?  Very little seems certain, as 
                                                
28 Frank O’Hara, Lunch Poems (San Francisco: City Lights, 1964), back cover. 
29 Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass and Other Writings, ed. Michael Moon (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2002), 617. 
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O’Hara’s metalepsis both draws attention to and fantastically erases the border 
between these two worlds—as Genette writes, “the world in which one tells, the world 
of which one tells”—in spatial but also temporal terms.30  The poem’s gossipy, past 
tense account initially sets the party, expectedly, in a temporality prior to the poem’s 
narration of it, but this straightforward temporal relation is hopelessly muddied once 
O’Hara presents Arnie, in the party’s temporality, as beating him into the poem 
(“Arnie, damn him! had already / muttered ‘yes you are’”), even as in the poem he 
beats Arnie to the punch (“indeed you are, I / added hastily . . . before anyone else / 
could get into the poem”).  This contradictory distinction between the time of the 
poem and (as it were) party time suggests these lines depict O’Hara anticipating 
during the party the future writing of the poem, or, more exactly, recalling while 
writing the poem his past anticipation of this future moment.  Thus during the party 
O’Hara is already in the poem, but during the writing of the poem he is back at the 
party, ensuring that he—like the reader—is never fully within nor without either 
world.   
Given O’Hara’s lightness of tone in “A Party Full of Friends,” we might chalk 
up these strange and dizzying effects as simply so many spatial and temporal pranks 
on the reader.  Yet something more seems at stake when the poem concludes by laying 
claim to the resulting disorder as a means of poetic self-fashioning, exclaiming in the 
first lines of the final stanza, in another marked instance of author’s metalepsis:   
 
                           What 
confusion! and to think 
I sat down and caused it  
all! (PR 25) 
The sense that these lines’ ambiguous “it” could refer to either the “confusion” of the 
represented party or that of the poem that represents it is only heightened by their echo 
                                                
30 Genette, Narrative Discourse, 236. 
 112 
of O’Hara’s slightly earlier poem “Autobiographia Literaria,” a more obvious if no 
less ironic example of ars poetica, which concludes:   
 
And here I am, the 
center of all beauty! 
writing these poems! 
Imagine! (CP 11) 
Taken together, these passages suggest the affinity in O’Hara’s work between the 
“center of all beauty” and the center of “confusion,” a stance similarly expressed in his 
1955 poem “My Heart,” which invokes the reader as an “aficionado of my mess” (CP 
231).  “A Party Full of Friends” locates poetic identity within a “mess” and 
“confusion” that is not only that of the exuberant party or giddy poem, but also and 
even primarily that between party and poem, experience and representation—the 
boundary O’Hara’s metalepses have both performed and distorted.  Thus the final 
stanza’s metalepsis, in “pretending that the poet ‘himself brings about the effects he 
celebrates’” (“I sat down and caused it”), peculiarly pretends to bring about the 
confusing effect of metalepsis itself, celebrating it as constitutive of his poetic self.     
As O’Hara transgresses the line between the world of the party and the world 
of the poem, and so fails to inhabit properly either one, he imagines out of this failure 
a threshold space between the two, one whose “confusion” culminates, in the poem’s 
final lines, in the emergence of the poet’s proper name.  Consider the complete closing 
stanza:  
 
                        What 
confusion! and to think 
I sat down and caused it  
all!  No!  Lyon wanted some 
one to give a birthday  
party and Bubsy was born 
within the fortnight the 
only one everybody loves.  I 
don’t care.  Someone’s going 
to stay until the cows 
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come home.  Or my name isn’t 
 
  Frank O’Hara (PR 25) 
In one sense, the poem’s gossipy network of names—Violet, Jane, Hal, Jack, Larry, 
Arnie, John, George, Freddy, Gloria, Lyon, and Bubsy—here finds closure in the one 
full name which has “caused it / all,” and whose authority unifies the poem’s 
represented experience: “Frank O’Hara.”  Yet as soon as O’Hara asserts that he has 
“caused it / all,” he negates this claim (“No!”), allowing that the party (and hence the 
poem) might have been “caused” in part by Lyon, who “wanted some / one to give a 
birthday / party,” and Bubsy, whose birth date provided a convenient excuse for it.  
This gesture recalls O’Hara’s previous claim to have kept others out of the poem and 
the subsequent admission that they have already made their way in, forming a pattern 
of self-assertion and self-effacement that makes the final lines’ my name is my word 
guarantee—“Or my name isn’t / Frank O’Hara”—anything but certain, and perhaps 
recommends the opposing interpretation.  Rather than a poem progressing toward the 
constitution of the poet’s authoritative name and its implied subjectivity, we might 
also grasp the poem’s organizing subjectivity as gradually deconstituted, moving 
toward the anonymity of free-floating gossip as the lyric voice is unveiled as a textual 
figure in a poem functioning independent of any subjectivity an authorial proper name 
might imply.   
O’Hara accentuates this double movement between gossip and lyric—toward a 
voice somehow particular and anonymous—by placing the status of the proper name 
in necessary relation to the indefinite pronoun someone: “Someone’s going / to stay 
until the cows / come home.  Or my name isn’t / Frank O’Hara.”  Most considerations 
of O’Hara’s use of proper names have treated these names in isolation, or only in 
relation to other types of proper names (exploring, for instance, the canonizing effect 
of setting unknown names of friends next to the celebrated names of literary forebears 
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or Hollywood stars, or examining the way O’Hara’s gatherings of names imagine 
alternative kinship structures).  But O’Hara’s names are often mirrored by indefinite 
pronouns, and the recognition of this mutually constitutive relationship between the 
particular and the anonymous provides, in a number of poems, a form of poetic 
closure.  In O’Hara’s 1955 poem “At the Old Place,” for example, the presence of a 
nameless “Someone” facilitates the closing scene of camp, queer acknowledgment 
among the poem’s proper names:  
 
Jack, Earl and Someone drift 
guiltily in.  “I knew they were gay  
the minute I laid eyes on them!” screams John. 
How ashamed they are of us!   we hope. (CP 224) 
This camp mix of the intimate and the strange becomes uncanny in O’Hara’s well-
known 1959 elegy for Billie Holiday, “The Day Lady Died,” as the poet’s 
idiosyncratic maneuvering among the proper names “Miss Stillwagon,” “Verlaine,” 
“Patsy,” “Bonnard,” “Hesiod,” “Richard Lattimore,” “Brendan Behan,” “Genet,” and 
“Mike” gives way to a memory, both personal and impersonal, O’Hara’s own and 
everyone’s, in which the self is formed and lost: 
 
and I am sweating a lot by now and thinking of  
leaning on the john door in the 5 SPOT 
while she whispered a song along the keyboard  
to Mal Waldron and everyone and I stopped breathing (CP 325) 
Finally, another poem from 1959, “Personal Poem,” concludes by focusing on an 
unnamed “one person” who mediates O’Hara and LeRoi’s, and the poem’s, 
valedictory moment: 
 
I wonder if one person out of the 8,000,000 is 
thinking of me as I shake hands with LeRoi 
and buy a strap for my wristwatch and go 
back to work at the thought possibly so (CP 336) 
Here, the ambiguous “one person out of the 8,000,000” is itself both as particular as 
can be (one specific person among the multitudes?) and wildly general (any “one 
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person” in New York?), just as in “At the Old Place” the anonymous moniker 
“Someone” functions as a kind of proper name.  Such slippage between the 
anonymous and particular is inherent in the very definition of the term someone, 
which can refer to an indefinite, unknown or unspecified person (and thus a no one), 
or a person of importance or authority (a real someone).  At risk of flattening their 
distinctive uses of the indefinite pronouns “Someone,” “everyone,” and “one,” we 
might understand each of these poems to close, like “A Party Full of Friends,” with a 
self on the verge of becoming a particular someone or—or rather and—an anonymous 
no one.   
In an obituary for O’Hara, Peter Schjeldahl writes that “[t]he painter Helen 
Frankenthaler says personal invitations to parties in the ’50s often carried the 
information ‘Frank will be there’—the ultimate inducement to attend.”31  The closing 
lines of “A Party Full of Friends”—“Someone’s going / to stay until the cows / come 
home.  Or my name isn’t / Frank O’Hara”—suggest a similar inducement, yet also 
retroactively reflect the uncertain presence and agency of the poet, who has been the 
indefinite “anyone” attempting to get a word into the poem before “anyone else” and 
the “some / one” who gives the party “Lyon wanted,” and whose “name” now, as 
before, depends on someone’s continued presence.  Employing the present tense, these 
lines recall the poem’s previous instances of reported speech from the party.  Yet free 
of quotation marks—like the indirect discourse of O’Hara’s earlier statement, “indeed 
you are,” ambiguously situated between the world of the party and the world of the 
poem—their tense implies a lyric present.  Read as the former, O’Hara insists 
“Someone’s going / to stay” at the party; as the latter, he declares that someone—some 
reader—will stay within the poem.  Since we can neither conclusively choose between 
                                                
31 Peter Schjeldahl, “Frank O’Hara: ‘He Made Things & People Sacred,’” The Village Voice 11 August 
1966, rptd. in Homage to Frank O’Hara, 141. 
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nor reconcile these alternatives, where are we to locate “Frank O’Hara,” whose proper 
“name” (or its loss) thus depends on its relation to both an intimate and a stranger?   
O’Hara’s 1950 poem “A Letter to Bunny” (addressed to V. R. Lang, the Violet 
of “A Party Full of Friends”) worries about the uncertain effect on poetic selfhood of 
straddling two formal spaces—here epistolary and poetic: “When anyone reads this 
but you it begins / to be lost,” O’Hara writes, not without excitement.  “My voice is 
sucked into a thousand / ears and I don’t know whether I’m weakened” (CP 23).  
Encouraging O’Hara to try to publish “A Party Full of Friends,” Ashbery frames the 
loss of intimacy in moving between these spaces as more certainly productive, 
affirmatively suggesting the queer intimacy of a party full of strangers: “the fact that 
no one would know who the people are would add rather than decrease charm.”32  
Designating a voice at once lost and found as it pursues intimacy and publicity, one 
ear and “a thousand,” the “name” that invites us to and excludes us from “A Party Full 
of Friends” can only be an improper one.  Its formal transgressions ensure it is fully 
present within neither the party nor poem, gossip nor lyric, but instead an intervening 
space, one the poet’s lyric gossip can imagine and foster if never authorize or 
confirm—a space in which, as long as someone else remains, Frank will be there.  
 
III. DISHING DIRT 
What motivates O’Hara to imagine this space, somewhere between the 
everyday and poetic?  When John Ashbery writes that O’Hara’s poetry makes room 
for “the reader who turns to poetry as a last resort in trying to juggle the contradictory 
components of modern life into something like a livable space,” he could be 
describing the O’Hara we have glimpsed so far, always the vitalizing life of the 
                                                
32 John Ashbery to Frank O’Hara, 26 April 1951, qtd. in Brad Gooch, City Poet: The Life and Times of 
Frank O’Hara (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 187. 
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party—or poem.33  But what contradictions of “modern life” provide the basis for 
O’Hara’s poetic attempt to live with and within them?  One year after the composition 
of “A Party Full of Friends,” in a poem entitled “Prose for the Times,” O’Hara 
presents a darkly comic allegory that again uses the terms “party” and “poem” to 
explore the limitations and possibilities of his work’s burgeoning investment in the 
friction between social experience and the poetic.  Less an instance of lyric gossip than 
a poem about lyric gossip, it begins:  
 
Yesterday I accepted an invitation to a party.  But I had no sooner arrived and 
let my coat tumble, exhausted, onto a bed, when a perfect stranger whom I 
immediately and unwittingly admired asked me if I were a poet. 
 Many guests crowded around the two of us, as at a wedding.  “I suppose I 
am,” I said, “for I do write poems.”  
 “Well write one now, will you?” he said, smiling fiercely . . . (PR 70)  
Although we are used to hearing about, as one friend remembers it, “Frank’s 
legendary capacity for friendship,” this poem’s “perfect stranger” and his fierce smile, 
as much a threat as a kindness, might serve as an emblem for the deep ambivalence 
toward friendship that, as Andrew Epstein has argued, informs O’Hara’s poetry.34  
O’Hara’s reputation for dashing off on-the-spot occasional poems, so central to the 
legend of his generous sociability, here entails a potentially dangerous (as we will see) 
imposition: “Well write one now, will you?”  And whereas in “A Party Full of 
Friends” the identity of the “poet” seems to depend upon his getting the ear of a figure 
of intimacy and strangeness (“Or my name isn’t / Frank O’Hara”), in this case an 
encounter with an “immediately . . . admired” albeit “perfect stranger” inspires only a 
reluctant assertion of poetic identity (“I suppose I am . . . for I do write poems”), one 
which is quickly undercut by the refusal of the stranger’s appeal for a poem: “‘I’m 
sorry, but I don’t feel like one just now, if you don’t mind,’ I said, thinking of many 
                                                
33 John Ashbery, introduction, Frank O’Hara, Collected Poems, x. 
34 J. J. Mitchell, “The Death of Frank O’Hara,” Homage to Frank O’Hara, 144.  See Epstein, Beautiful 
Enemies, 86-126. 
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things, chiefly, perhaps, of childhood, when I would make myself vomit so I wouldn’t 
have to go to parties” (PR 70). 
The most arresting aspect of the allegory presented by “Prose for the Times,” 
however, is its emphasis on the erotics bound up with and partly accounting for this 
ambivalent negotiation of the social and the poetic—an erotics that suggests just how 
much O’Hara’s stylistic negotiation of these imbricated worlds is a queer one.  
Certainly there is something queer about the meeting between the intimate stranger 
and possible poet in “Prose for the Times,” which anticipates O’Hara’s oft-cited, semi-
satirical statement of poetics, “Personism: A Manifesto,” in situating “the poem 
squarely between the poet and the person, Lucky Pierre style.”35  Here the “poet,” 
“immediately and unwittingly” drawn to the “stranger,” focuses his cruising eye 
specifically on how “[a] few tendrils of hair escaped the opening of his shirt” while 
their chance encounter, charged with the frisson of the pas de deux between knowing 
and unknowing, promise and risk, plays out with all the choreography of a “wedding” 
ritual (PR 70).  Are you?  Do you?  Will you?  After the poet coyly brushes off the 
stranger’s request—part come-on, part taunt—for a poem, the scene’s erotic tension 
becomes unavoidably explicit:  
 
 “Well, what makes you feel like writing one?” he said, and kicked me in the 
balls. 
 Ugh! 
 As I hobbled to a chair, however, I managed to somewhat regain my 
composure.  “You needn’t be afraid of me,” I said, turning.  “I don’t love you.” 
(PR 70) 
Slipping uneasily into slapstick violence rather than sexual or indeed poetic 
consummation, the poem’s conclusion frames the constitutive meeting of poet and 
would-be reader as an erotic encounter gone awry, its final declaration asserting that 
the poet’s particular form of “love”—or is it poetry?—might be something both 
                                                
35 Frank O’Hara, “Personism: A Manifesto” (1959), Yugen 7 (1961), rptd. in Collected Poems, 499. 
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desired and feared, and its pursuit thus fraught with danger. 
It is in this sense that “Prose for the Times” takes the temperature of its times, 
particularly within O’Hara’s social circle, where the era’s phobic suspicions and the 
violence hounding queerness engendered, among other anxieties, poetic uncertainty.  
John Ashbery claims not to have been able to “write anything from about the summer 
of 1950 to the end of 1951”: “The Korean War was on,” he recalls, and “[t]here were 
anti-homosexual campaigns.  I was called up for the draft and I pleaded that as a 
reason not to be drafted.  Of course this was recorded and I was afraid that we’d all be 
sent to concentration camps if McCarthy had his own way.  It was a very dangerous 
and scary period.”36  Numerous histories of Cold War sexuality have shown how 
during this period, as Gavin Butt writes, “in the absence of reliable signifiers of 
homosexual difference, and given the widespread rumors about the large number of 
gays in the arts . . . artistic identity itself becomes phobically charged with queerness,” 
such that the male artist, especially, “is constantly shadowed by queer meaning.”37 
O’Hara literalizes such shadowing when, in “A Young Poet,” he depicts the poet of 
the title as “taken for a junky or a pervert / by police / who follow him, / as he should 
be followed, but not by them” (CP 279).  
Following the poet “as he should be followed,” O’Hara’s work enters into and 
valorizes a queer network of desire paradoxically limned by homophobic gossip.  
Rather than disavowing the gossip that keeps queer meanings in circulation around the 
poet and poetic production, he embraces and redeploys it, proclaiming “To the Poem”: 
“Let us do something grand,” something “small and important and / unAmerican” (CP 
175).  In Kenneth Koch, A Tragedy, his self-proclaimed “great collaborative play” 
with Larry Rivers “which cannot be printed because it is so filled with 50s art gossip 
                                                
36 Brad Gooch, Interview with John Ashbery, 4 February 1988, qtd. in Gooch, City Poet, 190. 
37 Butt, Between You and Me, 44, 45. 
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that everyone would sue us,” O’Hara has Koch’s character recall with mock-
anxiousness: “They called me ‘queer’ and I thought they meant I was a poet, so I 
became a poet.  What if I’d understood them?”38  Recognizing how “poet” can signify 
“queer,” O’Hara humorously intimates that “queer” can in turn signify “poet,” as if 
one identity might insinuate the other.  And as “Prose for the Times” suggests, in the 
culture of suspicion surrounding postwar American sexuality, a culture fueled by the 
Kinsey report and McCarthyism, they often did.  As sexuality and poetry blur in 
“Prose for the Times,” O’Hara diagnoses and plays on the fears of his era, considering 
that to make poetry out of one’s queer social world during a “dangerous and scary 
period” involves accepting an invitation to an uncertain encounter, and perhaps 
creating something out of even this encounter’s violent failures.  If “[y]esterday” the 
poet was “exhausted” and could only “suppose” he was “a poet,” these failures are, 
nonetheless, presumably what make him “feel like writing” the poem that we read 
today.    
As an instrument of Cold War political power, gossip seeks out, produces, and 
disciplines the non-normative; it harries queerness.  Yet the negative affect that motors 
such gossip, implicit in the scene of malicious knowingness about poetic identity in 
“Prose for the Times,” is not simply opposed to but at the ambivalent heart of 
O’Hara’s lyric gossip and its queer erotics.  Or perhaps gossip’s bad feeling is rather, 
as the title of a 1954 poem announces, seated in this poetry’s “Spleen.”  Spleen, an 
affective state of spite, moroseness, and melancholy conceived of as rooted in the 
body, linked to artistic genius, and manifesting a nervous response to modernity, was 
familiar to O’Hara foremost from his enthusiastic reading of Charles Baudelaire, who 
describes it in Paris Spleen as “some malicious Demon” that “gets into us, forcing us, 
                                                
38 O’Hara, “Larry Rivers: A Memoir,” Collected Poems, 514; Frank O’Hara and Larry Rivers, Kenneth 
Koch, a Tragedy, in Amorous Nightmares of Delay: Selected Plays (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
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in spite of ourselves, to carry out his most absurd whims.”39  Baudelaire’s figure calls 
to mind O’Hara’s image of the muse as “my demon my dish,” and in “Spleen” O’Hara 
reflects on how this “demon” indeed “gets into” and possesses him, seemingly in spite 
of himself:   
 
I know so much 
about things, I accept 
so much, it’s like 
vomiting.  And I am 
nourished by the 
shabbiness of my 
knowing so much 
about others and what 
they do, and accepting 
so much that I hate 
as if I didn’t know 
what it is, to me. 
And what it is to 
them I know, and hate. (CP 187) 
Even as O’Hara claims to “accept / so much,” “Spleen” seems formally to have 
accepted as little as possible, working within a purposefully restricted lexicon whose 
every word it worries, teasing out of each as much meaning as it can.  Thus chewing 
for fourteen terse lines on his taste for distasteful dish—what he calls the “shabbiness 
of my / knowing so much / about others and what / they do”—O’Hara here examines 
how the relationship between disgust and desire, often remarked, plays a central role 
in gossip and its commitment to the sordid details of dishing the dirt.  When William 
Ian Miller writes of disgust that it “might bring in its train affects that work to move 
one closer again to what one just backed away from,” affects ranging “from curiosity, 
to fascination, to a desire to mingle,” he could just as easily be describing gossip, 
which can in one breath recoil, How horrible! and in the next insist, Tell me 
everything.40  In the terms of “Spleen,” gossip’s way of “knowing” can make 
                                                
39 Charles Baudelaire, “The Bad Glazier,” Paris Spleen (1869), trans. Louise Varèse (New York: New 
Directions, 1970), 13. 
40 William Ian Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 111. 
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“accepting” feel like “vomiting” and “vomiting” seem “nourish[ment],” such that it is 
difficult to decide whether O’Hara’s repeated claim to “know so much” is a disgusted 
confession or a fascinated boast.   
Of course, it is both.  O’Hara imagines his poetry more generally if no less 
ambivalently in terms of “spleen” when, in a letter to Fairfield Porter, he ostensibly 
criticizes his own work as “full of objects for their own sake, spleen and ironically 
intimate observation which may be truthfulness (in the lyrical sense) but is more likely 
to be egotistical cynicism masquerading as honesty.”41  Porter’s reply, perhaps sensing 
the self-valorizing undercurrent of this assessment, shrewdly assures O’Hara that 
“[a]nother name” for the quality of “spleen” in his poetry “is generosity,” drawing out 
the suggestion that aversion can also be a form attraction.42  O’Hara later says as much 
in “Joe’s Jacket,” where we find “the incessant talk of affection / expressed as 
excitability and spleen” (CP 329).  In collapsing the opposition between attraction and 
repulsion, between taking “things” in (“accepting”) and forcing “things” out 
(“vomiting”), “Spleen” further suggests how the performance of gossip troubles 
distinctions between self and “others,” “I” and “they,” what “I am” and “what they 
do”; between “knowing” and unknowing; between subjective (“what it is, to me”) and 
objective (“what it is to / them I know”) perspectives more generally—and between, 
most of all, feeling disgusted and feeling disgusting.   
This promiscuous “desire to mingle” subjectivities, inspiring and arising out of 
disgust, resonates with the progression in “Prose for the Times” from the child who 
“would make myself vomit so I wouldn’t have to go to parties” to the poet who 
nevertheless “accept[s] an invitation to a party” (if only to wind up exclaiming, 
“Ugh!”).  In “Spleen,” too, a marked ambivalence toward negotiating the intimacy and 
                                                
41 Frank O’Hara to Fairfield Porter, 7 July 1955, qtd. in Gooch, City Poet, 268.  
42 Fairfield Porter to Frank O’Hara, 8 July 1955, Material Witness: The Selected Letters of Fairfield 
Porter, ed. Ted Leigh (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 131. 
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strangeness of “others” carries with it an erotic allure.  Within the poem’s thematic 
and formal dialectic between attraction and repulsion, reception and release, its 
seemingly dominant affect, “hate,” becomes as well a form of desire that, to recall 
Miller, “work[s] to move one closer again to what one just backed away from.”  As 
O’Hara asks in a later poem concerned with the productive role played by “hate” and 
“shabbiness” in relationships with others, “why be afraid of hate, it is only there / 
think of filth, is it really awesome / neither is hate” (CP 333-34). 
“Spleen” takes up the “hate,” “spleen,” and disgust that often motivate gossip’s 
“ironically intimate observation” not as a moral stance but as a shameful undoing of 
gossip’s tedious moral stance.  “[N]ourished” by his eroticized relation to gossip and 
the “shabbiness” of “knowing” and “accepting / so much” that his culture deems filthy 
or disgusting, including the practice of gossip itself, O’Hara imagines gossip’s 
performance of repulsion and attraction as a means of queer self-making in which one 
flirts with and is seduced by the disgusting (we might label its four acts “I know,” “I 
hate,” “I accept,” and “I am”).  “The complex of judgments that are embodied in 
disgust, the way disgust in fact works,” Miller writes, “means that it has to get its 
hands dirty.  How could it be otherwise?”  In fact, he adds, disgust “may even have to 
be curious about [the disgusting] or fascinated by it to do its job really well, carouse 
with it after a fashion.”43  Put to queer use, this dynamic recalls what Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick identifies as gossip’s “rich, unsystematic resources of nonce taxonomy for 
mapping out the possibilities, dangers, and stimulations” of one’s “social landscape.”44  
We might even envision gossip’s fascination with the illicit, the erotic, and the 
disgusting as asking the multivalent question that announces one of O’Hara’s six 
poems entitled “Song” (this one from 1959): “Is it dirty”? 
                                                
43 Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust, 111. 
44 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1990), 23. 
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Is it dirty 
does it look dirty 
that’s what you think of in the city 
 
does it just seem dirty 
that’s what you think of in the city 
you don’t refuse to breathe do you 
 
someone comes along with a very bad character 
he seems attractive.  is he really.  yes.  very 
he’s attractive as his character is bad.  is it.  yes 
 
that’s what you think of in the city 
run your finger along your no-moss mind 
that’s not a thought that’s soot 
 
and you take a lot of dirt off someone 
is the character less bad.  no.  it improves constantly 
you don’t refuse to breathe do you (CP 327) 
This lyric “Song” about feeling “dirty”—unclean, disgusted, sexual—loosely 
references villanelle form, using its refrains (“that’s what you think of in the city,” 
“you don’t refuse to breathe do you,” and variations on the question “Is it dirty”) to 
edit together dirt, gossip, and sex.  As the poem dissolves between the filth 
everywhere present in “the city,” gossip about “someone” as “attractive as his 
character is bad” (“is he really.  yes.  very”), and a scene of cruising for “someone” to 
“take a lot of dirt off” of, dishing the dirt becomes an eroticized way of “mapping out 
the possibilities, dangers, and stimulations” of a queer “social landscape” within the 
squeaky-clean conformity of the 1950s mainstream cultural terrain.  In many ways, 
“Song” presents—as its title suggests—a more obviously celebratory and less spiteful 
rewrite of “Spleen,” and as in that poem, O’Hara here viscerally figures himself, as 
gossip, as the permeable border between the space of the poem and this “social 
landscape,” making bodily his lyric gossip’s transformative play with invitation and 
exclusion, who is in and who is out.  The poet’s dish, as Miller might say, carouses 
with dirt, and inevitably “get[s] its hands dirty.  How could it be otherwise?”  You 
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don’t refuse to breathe do you?  
Accordingly, the obsessively mulled-over meanings of “dirty” (“that’s what 
you think of in the city”) shift over the course of the poem as “dirt” moves from 
something external to the poet to something internal.  If in the first stanza’s repulsed 
pose the “dirty” is to be avoided and observed only from a safe distance (“Is it dirty / 
does it look dirty”), by the second stanza it appears less conclusively filthy (“does it 
just seem dirty”) and at any rate unavoidable (“you don’t refuse to breathe do you”), 
and by the final stanza it is actively sought out (“you take a lot of dirt off someone”) 
and reimagined as something that “improves” one’s “character.”  This rapid 
progression from disgust to desire accompanies an emergence of a lyric self, as the 
“dirty” surfaces of “the city” become the “dirty” surfaces of “attractive” bodies, of 
others’ interiorities (“his character”), and finally of one’s own interiority: “run your 
finger along your no-moss mind,” the poet declares; “that’s not a thought that’s soot.”  
The poem’s “you,” at first indicating a second-person address to a general, anonymous 
“you,” thus increasingly (though never completely or finally) points toward the lyric 
self-address of a particular subjectivity, so that once again gossip about a strangely 
intimate “someone” enables a provisional lyric self-performance—as if “Song” 
declares that someone’s going to come along with a very bad character, or my name 
isn’t Frank O’Hara. 
At the same time, the fleeting lyric self that appears in “Song” internalizes the 
“dirty” exterior space of “the city” to the extent that it can seem, as much as any 
particular subjectivity or body, a resonant space of gossip, echoing with all of the dirty 
thoughts one might “think of in the city.”  The figure of the self as a queer urban space 
is a recurring one in O’Hara’s work.  In the 1953 poem “Grand Central,” for instance, 
O’Hara speaks as the station, presenting his voice as the gossipy heart of New York’s 
infrastructure: “The wheels inside me are thundering,” he begins; and he is, in an 
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image that suggests Ovid’s vision of the House of Fame, “an expanse of marble floor / 
covered with commuters and information” (CP 168).  This “information” is chiefly 
sexual gossip, and in the final stanza the voice of the terminal comes alive as it relates 
in detail one particularly juicy bit: “During the noon-hour rush a friend / of mine took 
a letter carrier across / the catwalk underneath the dome,” “knelt inside my cathedral,” 
and “unzipped the messenger’s trousers / and relieved him of his missile, hands / on 
the messenger’s dirty buttocks, / the smoking muzzle in his soft blue mouth” (CP 
169).  In “Homosexuality,” from 1954, O’Hara similarly slips into the voice of a queer 
urban space of gossip.  “It’s wonderful to admire oneself / with complete candor, 
tallying up the merits of each // of the latrines,” he writes, fluidly moving from the 
“merits” of “oneself” to the “merits” of restrooms known for public sex, such that one 
stands in for the other: “14th Street is drunken and credulous,” he dishes, while “53rd 
tries to tremble but is too at rest” (CP 182).   
These lyric voices are both intimate and inanimate, bodily and disembodied, 
intensely personal yet ultimately anonymous, much like the spaces of gossip and 
public sex from which they emanate, spaces menaced but also queerly charged by the 
“shabbiness” of “knowing so much / about others and what / they do.”  They are 
voices that suggest how O’Hara’s lyric gossip more generally claims a space for the 
circulation of queerness, using dish as a source for an erotics of style that makes dirt 
desirable.  Turning inside out disgust and desire, these poems do something “small and 
important and / unAmerican” by providing “something like a livable space” for the 
shabby, filthy, dirty, gossipy—a space unwittingly nourished by the very culture that 
would find it disgusting.  “I don’t have an American / body, I have an anonymous 
body,” O’Hara writes in “Grand Central,” adding, “though / you can get to love it” 
(CP 168).  
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IV. SELF-GOSSIP  
Thus far we have seen how O’Hara’s stylized performance of gossip seeks to 
reimagine varied social spaces—ranging from the intimate party to the anonymous 
city to the textual space of the poem—as livable worlds for a queer network that 
ripples out from an empirical inner circle to more affectively and temporally distant 
readers.  Figuratively talking behind his objects’ backs but in front of their faces, 
O’Hara’s lyric gossip brings to mind Roland Barthes’ remarks on friendship: “friends 
form a network among themselves,” Barthes writes, “and each must be apprehended 
there as external/internal, subjected by each conversation to the question . . . where 
am I among my desires?  Where am I in relation to desire?  The question is put to me 
by the development of a thousand vicissitudes of friendship.”45  Is one internal or 
external to an exchange of gossip, a social circle, a community, a culture, a poem?  Is 
one an intimate or a stranger?  Is one within or without oneself and one’s desires, 
disgusted or disgusting?  O’Hara’s lyric gossip amplifies the “vicissitudes of 
friendship” and their pressing questions in order to map (to recall Sedgwick) “the 
possibilities, dangers, and stimulations” of his “social landscape.” 
In line with such queer world-making efforts, O’Hara’s use of gossip has been 
understood primarily as a function of community or friendship.  Bruce Boone’s 
important early analysis of O’Hara’s “gay language” briefly identifies O’Hara’s gossip 
as an example of a “language practice [that] calls up and relates, or narrates, a 
community,” and numerous subsequent readers have noted his gossip in passing as, as 
Srikanth Reddy writes, a “social form [that] consolidates a larger group identity.”46  In 
his study of friendship and postwar poetry, Epstein demonstrates how O’Hara often 
seeks to manage his relationships “in the realm of the text rather than ‘real’ life,” an 
                                                
45 Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977), 64.  
46 Boone, “Gay Language as Political Praxis,” 83; Reddy, “Digression Personified,” 18. 
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observation that accords with the consensus among those few critics who attend more 
specifically to O’Hara’s gossip.47  Hazel Smith, for instance, views the gossip in 
O’Hara’s poetry as part of “a strategy for regulating relationships: a way of bringing 
out into the open, and at the same time containing, tensions,” and David Trotter, too, 
suggests that O’Hara’s gossip works to “ensur[e] a certain fluidity in his relationships 
with other people” by alternating gossipers and gossipees, those he gossips with and 
about, so that “the group is sustained without ever separating into permanent 
alignments.”48  Focusing on this dynamic’s objectified gossipees, Trotter—in a view 
loosely shared by Smith and Epstein—sees O’Hara’s gossip as a productive denial of 
intimacy, insofar as it temporarily distances O’Hara from his “feeling” for whichever 
friends he takes “as the objects of an impersonal curiosity,” thus ensuring “a 
continuous redistribution of roles,” and no set “hierarchy” of friendships.49    
Without refuting these useful takes on gossip’s relationship to the fluid social 
logics of O’Hara’s poetry, I do want, by way of retracing where my discussion has 
been and where it has been headed, to pause over two of their tacit assumptions about 
O’Hara’s gossip—the first being that, although O’Hara’s poetry engages in a 
relatively benign form of gossip’s othering, it is better in this scenario to be the subject 
than the object of gossip; and the second that O’Hara’s poetic gossip is fundamentally 
about other people.  These basic ideas are not specific to O’Hara criticism; indeed, 
they are widely understood as definitional aspects of gossip in general.  To complicate 
their basis in O’Hara’s poetry, then, is to ask how that poetry itself seeks to reimagine 
gossip.  More specifically, to question the first assumption is to suggest the queer 
agency O’Hara’s poetry locates in the unauthorized selves that are objectified and 
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circulated by gossip, while to question the second is to contend that O’Hara’s lyric 
gossip pursues a version of such agency through the self-othering strategy of gossiping 
about himself.  In so doing he seeks to transform, as much as the social spaces of 
friendship and community which have been the focus of his readers, the solitary space 
of lyric subjectivity.  
Conventional wisdom tells us that to be gossiped about is to be absented and 
objectified, and it accords relatively greater agency and power to gossipers; yet one of 
the most curious aspects of O’Hara’s lyric gossip is the immediacy and intimacy of its 
relationship to its gossipees, whose objectification is often paradoxically imagined as a 
form of agency—indeed, an agency that infringes on the gossip’s own.  O’Hara, recall, 
understood the “spleen” of good dish as expressing as well a form of “generosity” 
toward its objects, or what he terms in “Joe’s Jacket” “the incessant talk of affection.”  
“If we were some sort of friends I might have to bitch you,” he writes in “Day and 
Night in 1952” (CP 93).  Bill Berkson similarly recollects of O’Hara’s “terrible” 
gossip, “He gleaned a whole repertoire of anecdotes out of every day.  He dramatized 
your words to others.  If you heard them, or if they came back to you, they weren’t 
exactly your words, his voice was too much his own—but he showed what they meant 
in his terms.  Nobody ever seemed to mind.”50  Berkson’s anecdote suggests how 
O’Hara’s lyric gossip, not exactly someone else’s words but not exactly his own, 
either, talks gossip’s other into a liminal space of unauthorized agency.  Gossip in this 
sense becomes a way—both ironic and intimate, bitchy and friendly, shabby and 
generous, objectifying and animating—for O’Hara to temporarily give himself over, 
as in “Spleen,” to the incomplete agency of “others and what / they do.”   
When we turn to instances of gossip in the poems themselves, we can see how 
a frequent strategy of O’Hara’s talk about absent others is to make them present, 
                                                
50 Berkson, “Frank O’Hara and His Poems,” 161. 
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bringing them imaginatively into rather than excluding them from the experience of 
the poem.  The gossipy “Adieu to Norman, Bon Jour to Joan and Jean-Paul” is 
representative in its use of dish to gather together a series of names: 
   
and Allen is back talking about god a lot 
and Peter is back not talking very much 
and Joe has a cold and is not coming to Kenneth’s 
although he is coming to lunch with Norman 
I suspect he is making a distinction 
well, who isn’t  (CP 328) 
Each member of this network of friends is “apprehended there as external/internal ”—
to the city (Allen and Peter are “back,” while Norman is saying “Adieu”), to the 
conversation (“talking” or “not talking”), to a “weekend coming up / at excitement-
prone Kenneth Koch’s” (“Joe . . . is not coming”), and to a “lunch with Norman” (CP 
328).  The one space they all inhabit together, of course, is the space of the poem, 
suggesting how the poet and gossip who has elaborated this dishy list of distinctions is 
yet the only one not “making a distinction,” as his lyric gossip simultaneously 
excludes and includes the various objects of its talk. 
In similar fashion, in “To Richard Miller”—a 1958 sonnet addressed to the 
publisher of the Tiber Press, which would soon bring out O’Hara’s Odes, a volume 
including prints by Mike Goldberg—O’Hara gossips with Miller about the apparently 
missing in action Goldberg, yet it is Goldberg, being gossiped about, who seems more 
intimately connected to O’Hara, who begins by conjecturing:   
    
Where is Mike Goldberg?  I don’t know, 
he may be in the Village far below 
or lounging on Tenth street with the gang  (CP 301) 
Goldberg “may be in the Village,” or “on Tenth street,” but he is certainly in the 
poem, and gradually the poem’s loose speculations about his possible activities 
accumulate an agency of their own and even a kind of poetic authority, standing in, in 
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a manner both jokey and erotic, for poems O’Hara does “not intend to write”: 
Maybe he is living sketches of an ODE 
ON SEX which I do not intend to write 
in his abode or drinking bourbon in the light (CP 301) 
The increasingly clunky rhymes which commandeer the sonnet’s logic mirror and 
accentuate how O’Hara’s gossip begins to speak for itself—a development especially 
appropriate since the poem and its dish have been inspired by O’Hara’s inability to 
account for or control Goldberg’s actions in the first place: “I will goad / him into 
Tibering and hope all’s for the best,” O’Hara weakly concludes (CP 301).   
The agency O’Hara posits for those objectified by his gossip becomes even 
more explicit in a garrulous passage from “The ‘Unfinished,’” in which, “back in New 
York,” he finds that   
 
                       Gregory is back in New York and we are still missing 
each other in the Cedar and in hotel lobbies where Salvador Dali is 
supposed to sleep and at Anne Truxell’s famous giggling parties 
until one fine day (vedremo) we meet over a duck dinner, good god 
I just remembered what he stuffed it with, you guessed it: oranges! 
and perhaps, too, he is the true narrator of this story, Gregory 
no, I must be, because he’s in Chicago  (CP 318-19)  
Where is Gregory?  I don’t know . . . .  This catalogue of missed connections puts 
forward a number of possible meeting places for O’Hara and Gregory Corso, all 
spaces of gossip—the buzzing city, “the Cedar” bar, “hotel lobbies” where Dali is 
rumored “to sleep,” the painter “Anne Truxell’s famous giggling parties.”  Even when 
the two do finally “meet over a duck dinner,” the odd temporality of this meal frames 
it as another missed connection: “one fine day (vedremo),” an allusion to Giacomo 
Puccini’s opera Madame Butterfly and its aria “Un bel di, vedremo” or “One fine day, 
we’ll see,” superimposes the future tense of “vedremo” onto the lyric present tense of 
“we meet”; for good measure, O’Hara then refers to the meeting in the past tense (“I 
just remembered what he stuffed it with, you guessed it: oranges!”).  Thus just when 
O’Hara and Gregory at last converge in one place it is at seemingly different times, 
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such that they “are still missing / each other” everywhere but within the space of the 
poem’s fantastic “one fine day.”  In this space of gossip Gregory, the object of 
O’Hara’s gossipy monologue, is given authority as “perhaps” its “true narrator.”  
These lines evoke a tricky authorial moment in “5 Participants in a Hearsay Panel,” 
also from 1959, when Elaine de Kooning adds, after reading a poem by “Frank,” 
“Frank has asked me to announce that none of the sentiments expressed in this poem 
are his.  They’re mine” (151).  They also recall O’Hara’s use of metalepsis in “A Party 
Full of Friends,” and how his comic failure to keep Arnie from entering the poem 
connotes a loss of autonomy to the objects of his gossip.  Here, O’Hara generates an 
almost metaleptic effect as he gabs about Gregory so much that he not only appears in 
the poem as a present absence but “perhaps” becomes its “true narrator.”  
Recognizing the strange, unauthorized agency that O’Hara locates in being 
gossiped about helps to clarify the strategies of poetic self-fashioning in poems such as 
“Song [Is it dirty],” where he transforms himself into a “dirty” mind and hence the 
object of his own gossip, or “Homosexuality,” where “with complete candor” he 
discusses himself as a city space, occupying both the subject and object positions of 
the poem’s dish.  This collapsing of subject and object positions and their first and 
third person speech—at issue in “Spleen”—points toward the second and most 
significant way in which O’Hara contravenes not only standard critical assumptions 
about his gossip but also the conventions of gossip itself, which is by definition about 
other people.  In fact, O’Hara’s gossip is at times not about people at all, calling into 
question much more fundamental distinctions between the subjects and objects of 
gossip.  In “Homosexuality” he gossips about “the latrines,” while in “Song [Is it 
dirty]” he dishes the city’s overdetermined “dirt”; in “The Lover,” he baffles the 
common-sense claim that, as one theorist of gossip quips, “we can’t gossip about 
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carburetors or the weather,”51 by gossiping, in a rhetorical move akin both to the 
pathetic fallacy and apostrophe, about nature: “The mean moon is like a nasty / little 
lemon above the ubiquitous / sniveling fir trees,” he writes (CP 46).  These instances 
of gossip about inanimate objects have the effect of animating them, underlining the 
similar but less expected vivifying effects of O’Hara’s objectifying talk about people.  
These quickening effects provide one explanation for why, when O’Hara’s 
poetry does (as is much more common) gossip about another person, it tends to 
disclose as much about O’Hara as anyone else.  Ashbery asserts that O’Hara’s work 
“is almost exclusively autobiographical.  Even at its most abstract, or even when it 
seems to be telling someone else’s story . . . it is emerging out of his life.”52  Even a 
poem that announces itself as “A Party Full of Friends,” we might add, is ultimately 
most full of O’Hara himself.  However knowingly, gossipers perform and reveal 
themselves to an audience; to gossip is always to risk to some degree one’s own 
reputation alongside that of the gossipee.  Andy Warhol remarks in POPism that “One 
thing I’ve always liked to do is hear what people think of each other—you learn just as 
much about the person who’s talking as about the person who’s getting dished,”53 a 
claim neatly illustrated by a stream of gossip in O’Hara’s poem “Day and Night in 
1952”:  
 
John, for instance, thinks I am the child of my own old age; Jimmy is 
cagey with snide remarks while he washes dishes and I pose in the 
bathroom; Jane is rescuing herself at the mercy of her ill temper 
towards me which is expressed only in the riddles of her motival 
phantasies; what am I to say of Larry? who really resents the fact that I 
may be conning him instead of Vice and Art; Grace may secretly 
distrust me but we are both so close to the abyss that we must see a lot 
of each other . . . but the other John catches every one of my innuendi 
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the wrong way or at the very least obliquely and is never mistaken or 
ill-tempered, which is what I worry about the most.  What can I do?  
(CP 93-94) 
Smith cites this passage as an example of O’Hara’s gossip about others, but it is more 
accurate to say that in this instance he takes great pleasure in dishing himself.54  What 
can he do?  Throughout his work, O’Hara self-reflexively deploys the insight 
expressed in Warhol’s remark, using dish to construct and convey (and indeed caress) 
self.  He and Larry Rivers comically adapt this technique in the relentlessly gossipy 
Kenneth Koch, a Tragedy, reserving the drama’s most devastating gossip for its own 
authors:  
 
 KENNETH:  
You wouldn’t talk this way if Larry or Frank were here. 
 
 LEWITIN:  
Those phonies. 
 
 JACKSON POLLOCK:  
Those fags. 
 
 FRANZ KLINE:  
Those dope addicts. 
 
 GEORGE:  
Those cheapskates.55 
“What’ve they got to do with all of this?” a character shortly asks, and the answer, 
clearly, is everything: gossip, here, becomes a form of playful, circuitous self-
disclosure.56  Have you heard what they’re saying about me?    
Thus, although even Warhol admits, “you can’t gossip about yourself,” O’Hara 
often does just this, talking about himself behind his back in front of his face, one 
might say, as an eroticized mode of aesthetic self-making.57  In “Dialogues,” he 
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recirculates dish about himself (“You call me Mr. de Winter / behind my back, 
smiling, not without gentleness”) and takes pride that others are “dining on my image” 
(CP 240, 241), while in one of his many poems entitled “On Rachmaninoff’s 
Birthday” he similarly reports:     
 
 I am so glad that Larry Rivers made a  
statue of me 
 
 and now I hear that my penis is on all  
the statues of all the young sculptors who’ve  
seen it  (CP 190) 
Later, referring to this gossip’s exposure as much as the nude “statue”58 it buzzes 
about, O’Hara happily admits, “I am what people make of me—if they / can and when 
they will”—seemingly claiming to have given the fashioning of his self up to others’ 
authority and “what people make” of him, whether dish or art (CP 190).  But O’Hara, 
not simply resigned to being made by others, proves complicit in this making, eagerly 
taking up the unauthorized agency of being gossiped about in order to make something 
of himself.  More than anyone else, O’Hara here is dining on his image.  
On occasion O’Hara pushes the limits of gossip even further, gossiping not 
only about himself but also disregarding the convention that, since gossip is an 
essentially social activity, “we do not,” as Aaron Ben-Ze’ev reminds us, “gossip to 
ourselves.”59  In the poem “Olive Garden,” for instance, the solitary poet is “too tired 
for companionship,” but not too tired for the dish about himself that he divulges to 
himself: “Some disinfatuated fisherman will say of me ‘He just wanted to go 
somewhere,’ and indeed it will make for the tears of intimacy to hear.  I am truly 
filthy, and not the most bitchy could guess the whimsicality of my retreats, the 
arabesque of my faltering.  Ah! what do I mean of myself?” (CP 92).  As O’Hara 
writes in “Essay on Style,” “I was reflecting the other night meaning / I was being 
                                                
58 The “statue” to which O’Hara refers is in fact Larry Rivers’ 1954 painting O’Hara Nude with Boots. 
59 Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, “The Vindication of Gossip,” Good Gossip, 14.  Emphasis mine. 
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reflected upon” (CP 393).  Such a mode of self-disclosure evokes John Stuart Mill’s 
description of lyric poetry as “feeling, confessing itself to itself,” and more 
immediately invites comparison with mid-century confessional poetics.60  Yet where 
O’Hara’s confessional contemporaries provocatively pursue self-authorized identities, 
his lyric gossip revels, as we have seen, in the possibilities of unauthorized selves (at 
times as if feeling, gossiping about itself to itself ).  In practice, of course, the 
difference between confession and gossip can be difficult to discern: confession might 
be merely the high cultural version of gossip’s low discourse, substituting the model 
of the psychoanalytic session and its talking cure for that of the telephone chat and its 
daily dose of dish.  In theory, however, the ideal of confession seeks to uncover and 
inhabit the putative truth of the self, while gossip thrives on the mutability of truths 
and identities.  As Breslin writes, “Rather than struggling to recover a lost core of 
identity, O’Hara creates a theatricalized self that is never completely disclosed in any 
of its ‘scenes.’”61 
We might better understand these extreme instances of O’Hara’s lyric gossip, 
then, as self-gossip, in the dual sense that O’Hara is talking about himself but also 
dramatically indulging the “truly filthy” social taboo of talking to oneself, or what 
Erving Goffman calls “self-talk”: when, speaking aloud, “we address an absent other 
or address ourselves in the name of some standard-bearing voice” (79).  Goffman 
asserts that to be caught in the “peculiar” performance of self-talk, which involves 
“more roles than persons,” is humiliating: “self-talk might appear to be a kind of 
perversion,” he writes, “a form of linguistic self-abuse” akin to “masturbation” (80).  
What appears perverse, in other words, is not so much to talk to oneself—surely a 
common enough occurrence when one presumes to be alone—but to be found talking 
                                                
60 John Stuart Mill, “Thoughts on Poetry and its Varieties” (1833), in Autobiography and Literary 
Essays, eds. John M. Robson and Jack Stillinger (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1981), 348. 
61 Breslin, From Modern to Contemporary, 231. 
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to oneself and, even worse, to continue doing so.  More than an embarrassment, such 
persistent self-talk presents “a threat to intersubjectivity; it warns others that they 
might be wrong in assuming a jointly maintained base of ready mutual intelligibility 
among all persons present” (85). 
If self-talk, as Goffman writes, “involves lifting a form of interaction from its 
natural place and its employment in a special way,” then O’Hara’s poetic self-gossip, 
in lifting his poetry’s dish from its usual scenario and restaging it as a solitary drama, 
represents a further insetting of the performance of his lyric gossip more generally, 
which already redeploys the social interaction of gossip within the space of lyric 
poetry (83).  Thinking specifically about O’Hara’s self-gossip therefore brings into 
relief the broader investment of his lyric gossip in reimagining, rather than simply 
rejecting, the solitary space of lyric subjectivity.  Goffman’s account of self-talk can 
make it sound oddly like lyric poetry.  In self-talk “we address an absent other or 
address ourselves”; in the lyric, writes Northrop Frye, the “poet normally pretends to 
be talking to himself or to someone else” other than the reader.62  “All poetry is of the 
nature of soliloquy,” claims Mill,63 and although Goffman’s focus is not on literary 
language, he does consider “the soliloquy” in terms of self-talk, claiming it “is not 
really an exception to the application of the rule against public self-talk.  Your 
soliloquizer is really talking to self when no one is around; we members of the 
audience are supernatural, out-of-frame eavesdroppers.  Were a character from the 
dramatized world to approach, our speaker . . . would stop soliloquizing” (83).  
Goffman suggests that the dramatic soliloquy is not “public self-talk” as long as it 
maintains the illusion of its privacy—a formulation that recalls understandings of lyric 
as “preeminently the utterance that is overheard,” or more precisely the utterance that 
                                                
62 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 249. 
63 Mill, “Thoughts on Poetry and its Varieties,” 349. 
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we “out-of-frame eavesdroppers” must be able to read as if overheard in order to 
maintain lyric decorum.64  In self-talk, that is, it is “the witnessing of the deed which 
transforms it into an improper one,” just as proper lyric, as Mill writes, requires that 
“no trace of consciousness that any eyes are upon us must be visible in the work itself” 
(81).65 
Is lyric a form of inviolate self-talk, awaiting only its being caught out to seem 
perverse?  When Goffman differentiates self-talk from “inner speech” on the basis that 
the former is out loud and often wildly animated, the latter silent and meditative, he 
suggests one way that the solitary lyric’s exalted use of language keeps from 
appearing “a form of linguistic self-abuse”: lyric discreetly speaks; self-talk volubly 
talks (80).  Discussing talk, Steven Connor notes how “English maintains a subtle but 
sustained set of distinctions between talking and speaking,” such that to talk implies a 
lack of agency or conscious thought, whereas to speak connotes authority and 
purpose.66  Talking designates the casual, the gratuitous; it is more about the act itself 
than any particular information or aim (as in idle talk, small talk, or girl talk).  Talk 
can drift into the mindless or automatic (think: talking heads, talking through your hat, 
or talking in your sleep) and more generally hints that one is not in control of one’s 
language (as in loose talk, or he’s all talk).  Speaking, on the other hand, suggests 
formality and design, and a desire to convey a particular meaning.  Certainly there are 
exceptions to these differences in usage.  But the nuanced distinction in English 
between talking and speaking points toward one of the reasons forms of talk like 
gossip can seem so far apart from the lyric: gossip is a feminized way of talking; the 
modern lyric ideal imagines a masculine form of speaking (lyrical practice, to be sure, 
                                                
64 Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, 249. 
65 Mill, “Thoughts on Poetry and its Varieties,” 349. 
66 Steven Connor, “Satan and Sybil: Talk, Possession, and Dissociation,” Talk Talk Talk: The Cultural 
Life of Everyday Conversation, ed. S. I. Salamensky (New York: Routledge, 2001), 163. 
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being another matter).  Even William Wordsworth, influentially in pursuit of a poetry 
of ordinary language, maintained that the poet is “a man speaking to men,” and 
tellingly positioned the speech of poets against the feminized gossip he called 
“personal talk.”67  The critical concept of the poetic speaker that quietly emerges out of 
the New Criticism, becoming standard in the 1950s, underlines this distinction.68  The 
idea of the speaker provided principally a term for distinguishing the biographical 
person who writes a text from the person who speaks within it, but also, implicitly, a 
term that could be called on to sort neatly the gossipy talk of biography from the voice 
that speaks poetry—at precisely the historical moment when the seeming distance high 
modernism had imposed between these entities was being newly challenged by 
postwar poetic practices ranging from Beat poetry to confessional verse to the talky 
lyrics of O’Hara. 
O’Hara’s poems perform a torrent of “incessant talk”: within them “I talk, you 
talk, / he talks, she talks, it talks,” “we talk about things” as “we talk all afternoon” 
and then “quietly talk all night,” and when finally “we are alone” we talk about how 
“no one is talking” (CP 329, 192, 308, 421, 345, 441).  Such non-stop talk has earned 
O’Hara a reputation as the quintessential poet of sociality.  Yet so much of this 
performed talk, even when anchored by a particular addressee, feels like self-talk.  
Goffman describes how an invitation to talk “that is openly snubbed or apparently 
undetected . . . can leave us feeling that we have been caught engaging in something 
like talking to ourselves” (87), a scenario O’Hara calls attention to in “Day and Night 
                                                
67 See the preface to Lyrical Ballads (1802), and “Personal Talk,” which begins, “I am not One who 
much or oft delight / To season my fireside with personal talk, / About Friends, who live within an easy 
walk, / Or Neighbours, daily, weekly, in my sight.”  Each in William Wordsworth, The Major Works, 
ed. Stephen Gill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 603, 269.  Emphases mine. 
68 For a brief history of the literary critical term “speaker” see Clara Claiborne Park, “Talking Back to 
the Speaker,” The Hudson Review 42.1 (1989): 21-44.  Park demonstrates how the term “speaker,” 
while tacitly present in many of the foundational texts of the New Criticism, does not unseat the term 
“poet” until the 1950s, most explicitly in Reuben Brower’s influential study The Fields of Light: An 
Experiment in Critical Reading (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951).   
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in 1952” when he interrupts the poem to ask of an ambiguous second-person 
addressee: “I’m talking to you over there, isn’t this damn thing working?” (CP 93).  
Finding ways to get the “damn thing” that is lyric poetry “working” would become the 
basis for O’Hara’s celebrated “I do this I do that” poems (CP 341), whose poetics of 
“Personism” emerged when O’Hara, while writing a poem, “was realizing that if I 
wanted to I could use the telephone instead of writing the poem, and so Personism was 
born.”69  Substituting the poetic approximation of a telephone conversation for the 
actual conversation, or self-talk for talk, O’Hara “lift[s] a form of interaction from its 
natural place,” as Goffman might say, and redeploys it in an unnatural way, posing a 
purposeful “threat” to social and aesthetic norms of “mutual intelligibility.”   
In casting the solitary lyric speaker as a self-talker, and this self-talker as 
engaged in self-gossip, O’Hara reimagines the space of lyric subjectivity in two 
significant ways.  First, he draws out the perversity inherent in the performance of the 
lyric self, which is always talking to itself in public as if in private, at risk of illicit 
exposure.  Like talking behind someone’s back in front of his or her face, perverse 
self-talk carries on in the presence of others it treats as absent, effecting a queer mix of 
intimacy and strangeness that derives its charge from the talker’s exposure.  Second, 
by reframing lyric speech as talk O’Hara undermines the stability of the poet’s claim 
to an autonomous self that authorizes and unifies the poem.  I have suggested how 
O’Hara’s poetic gossip about others valorizes effects of exposure and unstable agency 
as oddly animating; his self-gossip, in casting himself as both subject and object of 
dish, at once amplifies the illicitness of self-talk’s and gossip’s forms of exposure by 
indecorously revealing himself through his own talk and entails a ceding of poetic 
agency that allows for the emergence of unauthorized selves.  
We can see these strategies crystallize in “Dido,” which presents the extended 
                                                
69 Frank O’Hara, “Personism,” Collected Poems, 499. 
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self-gossip of a “queen,” “gloriously ruined,” who is also a faded “starlet” and—as 
this heady mix of classical and Hollywood mythology might suggest—also a 
feminized camp persona for the poet (CP 74, 75).  “Dido” initiates its self-talk with a 
question posed and answered by the Queen of Carthage herself: “Suppose you really 
do, toward the end, fall away into a sunset which is your own self-ignited pyre? is it 
any the less a sunset just because you stopped carrying the torch?  I must pull myself  
together . . . ” (CP 74).  The middle voice implicit in this opening Q & A between a 
“you” that is also “I” (I ask myself ), in the “self-ignited pyre” (I ignite myself ), and in 
the insistence that “I must pull myself together” announces a self both subject and 
object of her actions, not least of which is the gossip—to and about the self—by which 
she attempts to “pull [her]self together.”  Lamenting her “dear heart, gloriously 
ruined,” she proclaims:   
  
 But this is the most heartbreaking of all, for the truly grave is the most 
objective like a joke: you advance unawares while misery surrounds you on the 
lips in the bars, and it accepts you as the characteristic sibilance of its voice, 
hitherto somewhat less divine. 
 I could find some rallying ground like pornography or religious exercise, 
but really, I say to myself, you are too serious a girl for that. . . . If, when my 
cerise muslin sweeps across the agora, I hear no whispers even if they’re really 
echoes, I know they think I’m on my last legs, “She’s just bought a new racing 
car” they say, or “She’s using mercurochrome on her nipples.”  They’d like to 
think so.  I have a stevedore friend who tells everything that goes on in the 
harbor. (CP 74-75) 
“[T]oo serious a girl” for “pornography or religious exercise,” Dido turns instead to 
the divine perversities of self-talk, and particularly self-gossip.  Goffman notes how 
even truly solitary self-talkers “may occasionally find themselves terminating a spate 
of self-talk with a self-directed reproach,” thus “catching themselves out—sometimes 
employing self-talk to do so” (81), and something of this doubly perverse, recursive 
logic inflects the statement “really, I say to myself,” which interpolates its self-talk 
within self-talk.  Rather than “terminating a spate of self-talk,” however, this speech 
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tag—redundant unless directed toward others—accentuates how the poem’s self-talk 
perversely continues within the presence of others it not only excludes but whose roles 
it takes on.  It is in taking on these roles that the poem becomes most explicitly an 
instance of self-gossip.  Dido transforms the humiliation of being gossip “on the lips 
in the bars” by voicing that gossip herself: she becomes the sibilant hiss of gossip, 
providing the “characteristic” tone of “its voice” that now makes its “misery” feel 
“divine.”  She is, to recall “Spleen,” a self “nourished by the / shabbiness” of the dish 
that objectifies her, and just as her self-talk voices the imagined gossip about her on 
“the lips in the bars,” it will provide the missing “whispers” that she feels should trail 
the sweep of her “cerise muslin” as she moves through the marketplace.    
 It is through the queer performance of dish that “Dido” shuttles between 
multiple roles, each suggesting an unauthorized self, “gloriously ruined” by gossip.  
Selling her damaged wares in the “market,” “the bars,” and “the harbor,” and 
“advertising in the Post Office” (or “the office of letters,” as Andrea Brady notes70), 
Dido seems a mythological figure, a fallen starlet, a camp queen, and a poet—and 
each of these figures is and is not O’Hara himself, who, as in “Song [Is it dirty],” 
moves fluidly between and intermingles their spaces of gossip, cruising, and poetry as 
he fantasizes a subjectivity at once objectified and animated by its becoming gossip 
(CP 75).  The poem’s conclusion appropriately places the authority of its “queen” in 
the hands of an anonymous somebody—future lover or reader?—whose uncertain 
arrival promises both her ruin and her triumph: “if this doesn’t cost me the supreme 
purse, my very talent, I’m not the starlet I thought I was. . . . . Somebody’s got to ruin 
the queen, my ship’s just got to come in” (CP 75).  “Or my name isn’t / Frank 
O’Hara,” one can almost imagine this final line continuing.  The extremes of a poem 
                                                
70 Andrea Brady, “The Other Poet: Wieners, O’Hara, Olson,” in Don’t Ever Get Famous: Essays on 
New York Writing after the New York School, ed. Daniel Kane (Champaign, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 
2006), 336. 
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like “Dido” dramatize the strategies at work in lyric gossip less obviously or 
excessively but no less indelibly marked by the desire to engage and transform the 
solitary space of lyric subjectivity.  O’Hara’s “deep gossip” is surely about friendship 
and community, but it is also deeply about the self that inhabits these social 
formations.  Exploring the “ruin” of this self, O’Hara seeks to reconstitute it 
differently—to rethink ruin as possibility, disgust as desire, poetry as perversion, lyric 
as gossip.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
JAMES MERRILL’S “CELESTIAL SALON”: 
THE CHANGING LIGHT AT SANDOVER AND THE AFTERLIFE OF GOSSIP 
 
 
I. “BURIED IN OSTENSIBLE CHITCHAT”  
 
[G]ossip, though it can be exceedingly interesting when the parties are  
alive, is not at all interesting when they’re dead. 
 
—W. H. Auden 
 
[W]ho could ever think—in particular, at this date, what gay man—that  
someone’s death ever stopped the elaboration of someone else’s fantasy  
about him?  
 
—D. A. Miller 
 
Does gossip have an afterlife?  The fresh news promised by hot gossip might 
seem to carry a short expiration date: gossip’s critics and proponents alike often 
remark its occasional, ephemeral, and even disposable qualities—those aspects of 
everyday talk that, depending on one’s perspective, either compare unfavorably to or 
enable a subversion of the literary, understood, in Ezra Pound’s famous formulation, 
as “news that STAYS news.”1  Yet at a time when “Google’s unforgiving memory,” 
Daniel J. Solove argues, “transform[s] forgettable whispers within small local groups 
to a widespread and permanent chronicle of people’s lives,” gossip’s news—if “once 
scattered, forgettable, and localized”—increasingly appears the enduring stuff of 
history.2  Perhaps it always has been.  Ovid’s influential account of gossip imagines 
the house of Fame, classical goddess of gossip and rumor, as an impossibly totalizing, 
eternal archive of “every voice and word” ever uttered, while Fame herself, as 
                                                
1 Ezra Pound, ABC of Reading (New York: New Directions, 1960), 29. 
2 Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2007), 8, 11.  Solove presents a fascinating discussion of Internet gossip and its 
implications for free speech and privacy law, though his insistence that digital era gossip “is being 
reshaped in ways that heighten its negative effects” (“The Internet,” he writes, is “a cruel historian”) 
and his valorization of privacy run counter to the modern proliferation of gossip’s pleasures and the 
aesthetic possibilities of publicity pursued by the poets I consider (12, 11).  
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thoroughly as any search engine’s web crawler, “scours the whole wide world” of 
discourse for “all that goes on in heaven or sea or land.”3  Ovid intimates, pace Auden, 
that although the subjects and occasions of gossip inevitably pass, talk about them 
remains indelibly on record, waiting only for its performance to become “exceedingly 
interesting” again.4  As no less a theorist of modern dish than Oscar Wilde puts it: 
“Gossip is charming!  History is merely gossip.”5  In this view, our gossip outlives us, 
becoming history, or, rather, we become historical by living on as gossip.  Indeed, 
insofar as gossip’s keen, revivifying attention ensures that no one ever really gossips 
about the dead, Auden may be right to claim that good gossip dishes only on the 
living.  More than a shift from the literal to the figurative, reinflecting Auden’s claim 
in this way entails a change of emphasis from gossip’s transience to our own; it 
suggests that, instead of asking if there can be gossip after life, we might better 
inquire: is there life after gossip?  
The sharpest—and strangest—meditation on these questions that I know is 
James Merrill’s The Changing Light at Sandover, a sprawling, 560-page poem that 
takes what can only be called an exceeding interest in (as one reader sees it) “much 
gossip, often licentious, about the famous dead,” to the extent that, for some, the poem 
seems a veritable “all-night talk show of the dead.”6  Sandover—now narrative, now 
dramatic, now lyric in temper—chronicles nearly 30 years of Ouija board 
conversations between Merrill (JM, in the board’s uppercase shorthand), his lover and 
partner David Jackson (DJ), and an eclectic ensemble of voices from the beyond, 
                                                
3 See Book XII of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, trans. A.D. Melville (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 275-276. 
4 W. H. Auden, Lectures on Shakespeare, ed. Arthur Kirsch (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000), 86. 
5 Oscar Wilde, Lady Windermere’s Fan, in the Collins Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (London: 
HarperCollins, 1999), 451. 
6 Judith Moffett, James Merrill: An Introduction to the Poetry (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984), 155; and Robert Mazzocco, “The Right Stuff,” New York Review of Books, June 16, 1983, rptd. 
in Robert Polito, ed., A Reader’s Guide to James Merrill’s The Changing Light at Sandover (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 215. 
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including dead friends, literary forebears, familiar spirits, bat-like angels, and a 
pantheon presided over by God Biology and his sister Mother Nature.  Announcing his 
poem, in its opening pages, as “The Book of a Thousand and One Evenings Spent / 
With David Jackson at the Ouija Board,” Merrill mines the occult qualities of the 
relationship between literary tradition and individual talent as he channels a queer 
fantasia on themes as seemingly disparate as nuclear apocalypse, Cold War politics, 
homosexuality, friendship, reproduction, and poetic self-making.7  These far-flung 
threads are woven together by the gossip that both establishes and sustains Merrill’s 
“celestial salon” and proves vital to his poem’s attempt to create “some kind of 
workable relation / Between the two worlds” (100, 20).  Thriving on gossip with and 
about deceased parties, Sandover at times appears to be crafting a self-affirming 
literary genealogy of the gossip, from Plato to Proust and on; and its pedigree of 
gossip as poetic practice features, somewhat ironically, W. H. Auden (or WHA), who 
plays this divine comedy’s Virgil as a dotty queer uncle guiding his charges in their 
earnest hounding after juicy bits of revelation. 
Though these revelations begin modestly—heavenly anecdotes, the (often 
comic) workings of reincarnation—they soon broach an extravagantly detailed 
cosmology.  But for all the poem’s trappings of cosmic quest, JM and DJ delight most 
in the everyday pleasures of turning to their first and wittiest familiar, Ephraim, along 
with various dearly departed, “for an off-the-record gossip,” vowing early on “never to 
forego, in favor of / Plain dull proof, the marvelous nightly pudding” (124, 32).  Even 
as Sandover’s later volumes seem to move away from Ephraim’s “marvelous,” 
supernatural dish, in favor of the absurdly divine and divinely absurd pedagogy of 
atomic bats and archangels, JM and DJ cling to Ephraim’s camp “tone,” at first 
                                                
7 James Merrill, The Changing Light at Sandover, eds. J. D. McClatchy and Stephen Yenser (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 4.  Further references will appear in the text. 
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“trusted not one bit” (17).  The two quickly recognize “How much we’d come to trust 
him, take as law / His table talk, his backstage gossip,” and they consistently revel in 
its “no-proof rhetoric” (55).  No surprise, then, that Merrill’s readers have remarked, 
with varying degrees of enthusiasm, the “gaily inflected gossip” of his poem’s central 
figures and the chatty tone and subject matter of verse steeped in “gossip from the 
beyond” and “social chitchat,” largely agreeing that “gossip and ritualized information 
form much of the poem’s surface.”8  Yet responses to this gossipy “surface” have 
tended to dismiss it as mere surface, or “more gossip than gospel.”9  Noting gossip’s 
unavoidable presence in Merrill’s project, but only in passing, most critics have 
proceeded as if in tacit agreement not to indulge the poem’s idle talk: as if, in this 
case, what happens in Sandover stays in Sandover.10  
Merrill, too, seemed to sense his poem might become more gossip than gospel.  
                                                
8 From John Shoptaw, “James Merrill and John Ashbery,” in The Columbia History of American 
Poetry, eds. Jay Parini and Brett C. Millier (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 767; Phoebe 
Pettingell, “Voices from the Atom,” New Leader, December 4, 1978, rptd. in A Reader’s Guide, 159; 
Helen Vendler, Part of Nature, Part of Us: Modern American Poets (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1980), 213; and Charles Molesworth, “Scripts for the Pageant,” The New Republic, July 26, 
1980, rptd. in A Reader’s Guide, 174. 
9 Calvin Bedient, “Books Considered,” The New Republic, June 5, 1976, 22. 
10 Those few readers who find Merrill’s dish palatable and substantive enough to address follow Helen 
Vendler in first conceiving the poem’s talk not as gossip but the broader, and ostensibly more benign, 
conversation (see Part of Nature, Part of Us, 217).  For these readers conversation—celebrated, 
however rightly, as a democratic exchange between affectionate equals—lends itself better to ethical 
claims for the poem’s talk as a means of establishing non-violative relationships between self and other 
(see Lee Zimmerman, “Against Apocalypse: Politics and James Merrill’s The Changing Light at 
Sandover,” Contemporary Literature 30.3 [1989]: 383-385; and Nick Halpern, Everyday and 
Prophetic: The Poetry of Lowell, Ammons, Merrill, and Rich [Madison: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2003], 165-166, 183). 
   Such claims in fact resonate with the work of theorists who have attempted to recharacterize gossip’s 
primary function as expressing intimacy and affection, rather than conveying trivial matters or 
maliciously spreading misinformation.  But these claims for conversation in Merrill’s trilogy, even if 
adapted to gossip, represent only part of the story: all gossip is a kind of conversation, but not all 
conversation is gossip.  On the one hand, it would be difficult to argue that gossip establishes a non-
violative relationship to the other, since it is objectifying talk about others that partly fuels gossip’s 
intimacy; similarly, an emphasis on conversation’s mutuality obscures gossip’s potential for enforcing 
normativity: the way in which gossip is always potentially about shaming, about establishing 
hierarchies (however fluid or temporary), about who’s in the know and who is not.  On the other hand 
gossip, unlike conversation, also connotes a potential queerness, and a pleasurable, world-making 
investment in the non-normative.  I seek to show how Sandover’s poetic representations and enactments 
of gossip significantly engage the tension between its potential normativity and its potential queerness.  
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In a draft typescript of Sandover’s third volume, in a passage cut before publication, 
he playfully describes efforts to resist the temptations of “an hour of devilish / Tortes 
of language, sparkling flutes of chat”—a culinary figure for the excess of gossip with 
eager, gabby ghosts that he feared would increase his poem’s girth “each time we 
surrender / (Between meals as it were) to a rich dish. / The work’s already anything 
but slender.”11  Despite these worries, Merrill and Jackson’s Ouija sessions invariably 
succumb to “rich dish,” much of it served up in the first omnibus publication of 
Sandover (1982), which gathers the poem’s three installments, each less “slender” 
than the next—The Book of Ephraim (1976), Mirabell’s Books of Number (1978), and 
Scripts for the Pageant (1980)—and adds a “Coda: The Higher Keys.”12  And 
Sandover was hardly the last word from the other side: Merrill’s archive shows that he 
continued to consult the Ouija for the latest news from this world and the next until as 
late as just months before his death in early 1995.  In addition to these talks, 
transcribed and preserved for posterity, Merrill publicly revisited the Ouija’s world in 
poems appearing in Late Settings (1985) and A Scattering of Salts (1995), and in a 
dramatic adaptation (and eventual film) entitled Voices from Sandover.13  But it is in a 
1992 Paris Review interview entitled “The Plato Club” and conducted, via the Ouija 
board, with a gathering of deceased queer writers, that he presents his most outré 
elaboration of fantasies about the dead.  Referenced briefly in Sandover as an 
“Athenian / Club where you can get a drink and read / The underground newspapers” 
                                                
11 James Merrill Papers, Special Collections, Washington University Libraries. 
12 The Book of Ephraim first appeared in Merrill’s Pulitzer Prize-winning volume Divine Comedies.  
Mirabell’s Books of Number was presented the National Book Award; the complete Sandover won the 
National Book Critics Circle Award. 
13 See “Clearing the Title” and “From the Cutting-Room Floor” in Late Settings, and “Nine Lives” in A 
Scattering of Salts, in James Merrill, Collected Poems, eds. J. D. McClatchy and Stephen Yenser (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 406-410, 463-467, 591-601.  Voices from Sandover, featuring Merrill as 
JM, was performed three times in the years 1988 and 1989, and filmed in 1990.  For the script see The 
Changing Light at Sandover, 563-625.  For the film see Voices from Sandover, videocassette, Films for 
the Humanities, Inc., 1990. 
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(305), the Plato Club, Jean Genet confirms, “is the gayest in the universe.”14  Certainly 
there is something perversely buoyant about the ribald gossip that drives the 
interview’s proceedings, even as the spirits, as Gertrude Stein says, “watch & listen 
with amazement at current political efforts to ‘clean up’ sex” and worry, as Henry 
James does, that “Stigmata long gone have been re-released in fear of disease” (19, 
79).  In the course of what are meant to be Paris Review-style Q & As about, Merrill 
explains, “your life as a writer.  Shoptalk,” Colette insists the emphasis be on 
“Gossip!” (30, 31).  Merrill concludes of her bawdy dish and its emphasis on sex and 
language, “You’re inventing delicious fictions—I hope!—to dramatize their 
interaction” (33).   
This nexus of gossip, sex, and poetic self-making is perhaps most clearly at 
work when Wallace Stevens attempts to allay Merrill’s concerns over the raunchy turn 
the interview has taken by comparing it with a recalled, or reimagined, Life magazine 
photo shoot.  “Think of this assignment as I did when Life magazine insisted on 
photographing me in my living room,” he suggests.  “I cunningly wore a robe over 
shirt & tie, coat & vest, & when the cameras were set up I was asked to stand near a 
wall of books.  I did, but as the shutter clicked I opened my robe to reveal a 
considerable erection” (59).  When this anecdote meets with considerable disbelief, 
Stevens explains that “for all of us here the joining of two hands on a cup leaves us 
quite aroused,” intimating the mechanics of the Ouija board and its chorus of dead 
voices, including his own, “aroused” into chatter by the shared grasp of the living (59).  
But his comment also, and more immediately, gestures toward the sexual excitement 
with which these voices respond to Merrill and Jackson’s touch, and—more to the 
point—implies the palpable erotics of being in touch with, and giving voice to, 
                                                
14 James Merrill and David Jackson, “The Plato Club,” Paris Review 34.122 (1992): 51.  Note that the 
interview eschews Merrill’s standard all-caps presentation of the Ouija’s voices.  Further references will 
appear in the text. 
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gossipy presences from the other world.  Stevens’ unlikely anecdote reworks a 
moment of self-presentation as a poet for the pages of Life into bawdy sexual gossip 
for the pages of his living mediums, slyly engaged in their own games of concealment 
and self-exposure for the Paris Review. 
Nearly all of Merrill and Jackson’s interlocutors in “The Plato Club”—a 
veritable who’s who of queer literature—concoct such “delicious fictions” of sex and 
style, or, as one spirit declares in an unpublished Ouija transcript, “WHAT I’D CALL A 
RICH LOAD OF GOSSIPY MANURE   + ALL TRUE. WE PREDICT A SENSATION (POSSIBLY TINY 
LEGAL ACTION BUT NOT FOR YOU!).”15  This characterization of the interview, like 
Merrill’s favored adjective for the Ouija’s dish—rich—accentuates gossip’s 
ambivalent literary and cultural (not to mention legal) status: both “MATERIAL” and 
“MANURE,” it is at once a source of nourishing abundance and of self-indulgent waste, 
both an object of fascinating complexity and one that inspires bemusement or 
indignation (it’s all a bit rich!).  Staking his own ambivalent relation to gossip, Merrill 
admits that “[a] lot of the talk” in Sandover “sounds like badinage, casual if not 
frivolous,” but emphasizes, “something serious is usually going on under the 
surface.”16  “How many years,” he asks in a draft passage from Sandover, “Before we 
learn to dig out meanings that / Lay buried in ostensible chitchat”?17  Such remarks 
draw attention to the uncertain threshold between gossip and poetry, that tricky space, 
neither fully interior nor exterior to poet or poem, in which we find what Merrill calls 
in Sandover “this net of loose talk tightening to verse” (85). 
This chapter charts the significance in Sandover of the dialectical tension 
                                                
15 Ephraim’s take on “The Plato Club” appears in a Ouija transcript dated September 22, 1991, James 
Merrill Papers. 
16 James Merrill, “An Interview with Fred Bornhauser” (1983), in James Merrill, Collected Prose, eds. 
J. D. McClatchy and Stephen Yenser (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 136. 
17 These lines occur in a draft of the conclusion of the third part of the first lesson in Scripts for the 
Pageant (see Sandover, 332, for the final version, which omits these lines).  From a typescript dated 
October 29, 1977, and taped into Merrill’s notebook of Ouija transcripts, James Merrill Papers. 
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between “gossip” and “gospel,” “loose talk” and “verse.”  In the private Ouija 
transcripts and unofficial codas, like “The Plato Club,” which follow Sandover’s 
completion in 1982 and together make up the poem’s rich afterlife as gossip, Merrill 
reenvisions the fictive world of Sandover and his poetic reputation in the context of 
anxious AIDS era discourses about sexuality and the arts, placing renewed insistence 
on—and faith in—the dense intertwining of gossip, poetry, and sex in the 
otherworldly voices he and Jackson have aroused.  These fantasies about the dead both 
dig in and dish the dirt, finding buried meanings and new life in Sandover’s chitchat.  
Taking my cue from these postmortems of Sandover and the stakes of their sensational 
performance of gossip, in what follows I offer an account of the formative interplay 
between the queer art of gossip and Merrill’s poetic practice.  Doing so entails first a 
discussion of how mid-century attitudes about sexuality inflect the relationship of lyric 
privacy to gossipy publicity in Sandover.  Developing this line of thought, I examine 
the ways the Ouija-poem’s “backstage gossip” and the pleasures of such contingent, 
“no-proof rhetoric” challenge the pervasive menace of the gossip-laden, Cold War 
discourse of the Lavender Scare, which haunts the 1950s origins of Merrill’s poem 
and which would position queerness as a figure for the non-reproductive and anti-
social, in part by blurring nuclear and sexual threat.  In Sandover, I argue, the 
reproduction of lyric gossip establishes affiliations that recast a post-nuclear fear of 
annihilation in terms of the domestic sphere and a queer, post-nuclear family, building 
a utopian vision of the future out of the unstable economy of queer reproduction 
central to America’s Cold War unease.  Sandover’s “celestial salon” and its 
complicated ties, sustained by gossip and poetry, thus invite us to consider both 
gossip’s role in and the relation between queer and poetic self-formation, and to 
encounter the world-making strategies of poetic tradition as a gossip network.  
Merrill’s gossipy retelling of the pervasive cultural narrative which equates 
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homosexuality with the dissolution of the social, I will further suggest, opens onto and 
in part arises from the aesthetic issue of poetic tone.  As Langdon Hammer explains, 
the contemporary question of tone—“a key problem in American poetry since the 
1970s, with both technical and philosophical aspects”—involves not only a formal 
shift from predominantly metrical to predominantly free verse, but also a “historical 
difference in the confidence with which we understand other people’s interiority and 
communicate our own.”18  This crisis in confidence is a motivating dilemma for 
Merrill and Jackson’s tonally ambiguous Ouija dictations and the poem they engender, 
and I explore how the question of tone, both for Merrill and American poetry more 
broadly, is bound up in important ways with the question of gossip, which bears its 
own stylistic and theoretical concerns with both “other people’s interiority” and “our 
own.”  As we will see, gossip and what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick identifies as its tools 
“for making, testing, and using unrationalized and provisional hypotheses about what 
kinds of people there are to be found in one’s world” provide Sandover’s verse with an 
opportunity and a method for its provocative sounding of the problem of tone and the 
queer possibilities, as much as limits, of lyric interiority.19  
 
II. “NOT THE MOMENT QUITE TO GOSSIP”: POETRY AND PUBLICITY  
In thinking about the relationship between lyric poetry and gossip in The 
Changing Light at Sandover, one could do worse than to begin with a formidable 
occasion for both: the poetry reading.  Merrill’s poem ends with a poetry reading; in 
the coda’s final scene, we find JM about to deliver his poem, the making of which has 
been documented by Sandover, to “SOME / FANS OF YOURS IN HEAVEN, A SMALL 
                                                
18 Langdon Hammer, “Frank Bidart and the Tone of Contemporary Poetry,” in On Frank Bidart: 
Fastening the Voice to the Page, eds. Liam Rector and Tree Swenson (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2007), 7, 8. 
19 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1990), 23. 
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CROWD” who, Ephraim shares, “HAD HOPED TO HEAR THE POEM READ ALOUD” (540).20  
The invitation-only reading takes place at the eponymous Sandover—the “noble 
rosebrick manor” in which most of the poem’s virtual action occurs—in the ornate 
ballroom where “26 CHAIRS” arranged for the event accommodate almost an alphabet 
(“SOME DOUBLINGS MAKE FOR GAPS”) of deceased luminaries ranging from Jane 
Austen to W. B. Yeats (319, 547).  In the moments before the reading, as Dante 
switches seats with Proust and Colette swaps looks with Maya Deren, JM stands apart, 
only to have his thoughts interrupted by a young T. S. Eliot.  “I feel,” JM says,   
 
       . . . forgotten.  Friends are letting me 
Compose myself in tactful privacy 
When what I need—ha! a young man in gray 
Three-piece pinstripe suit has veered my way, 
Smiling pleasantly: NOT THE MOMENT QUITE  
TO GOSSIP BUT THERE’S ONE THING YOU SHOULD KNOW. 
THESE WORKS, YOU UNDERSTAND? THAT OTHERS ‘WRITE’ 
(It’s Eliot, he’s thinking of Rimbaud) 
ARE YET ONE’S OWN   (557-558) 
Sandover’s concluding scene positions Merrill’s alter ego, JM, as celestial poet 
laureate, literally “compos[ing]” himself in an act of poetic self-making that is 
certainly brash and seemingly lyric: here this self-composition specifically occupies, at 
least initially, what we might think of as the “tactful privacy” of lyric solitude.  Yet the 
privacy and decorum of such lyric self-creation is interrupted soon enough by gossip’s 
invasion of privacy and delicious breach of tact.  If “Poetry,” as John Stuart Mill 
writes, “is the natural fruit of solitude and meditation; eloquence, of intercourse with 
the world,” in these lines Merrill imagines a liminal encounter between poetry and 
                                                
20 I maintain the distinction between Merrill and his poem’s speaker since, as Stephen Yenser notes, 
Sandover “interlaces the realms of reality and fiction”: the autobiography and voice of what Merrill 
calls the poem’s “semi-fictional ‘JM’” overlaps extensively with, yet also significantly departs from, 
Merrill’s own.  See Stephen Yenser, The Consuming Myth: The Work of James Merrill (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), 222; and James Merrill, A Different Person (1993), in Collected 
Prose, 521.  Where clear, further references to A Different Person will appear within the text.     
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eloquence, solitude and the world—lyric and “GOSSIP.”21  Using the scene of the 
poetry reading, where lyric solitude theatrically enters public circulation, he 
dramatizes—and revalues—tensions Mill finds implicit in poetry itself, which, though 
often “a soliloquy in full dress, and on the stage,” must still perform its privacy for an 
assumed, but unacknowledged, audience’s consumption.22    
This moment indeed almost literalizes Northrop Frye’s version of Mill’s figure 
for the lyric poet, who, “so to speak, turns his back on his listeners.”23  Eliot’s 
interruption of JM’s “tactful privacy” hence may seem, as if tapping on the studiously 
turned shoulder of the poet, tactlessly to disrupt lyric performance.  Eliot commences 
his dish, after all, by announcing that it should not now commence: “NOT THE MOMENT 
QUITE / TO GOSSIP BUT . . . .”  But of course, in depicting Eliot saying what he should 
really not now be saying, Merrill portrays him prefacing his comments with gossip’s 
rhetorical trope par excellence, paralipsis, and seizing quite the right moment for 
gossip, which depends in no small part on the seeming inappropriateness of its 
occasion for effect.  And rather than frustrating the authorial resources of lyric 
privacy, this bit of gossip is, JM seems to be on the verge of asserting, what he in fact 
“need[s]” to compose himself.  Just as its paralipsis manages very well to emphasize 
what it ostensibly passes over, gossip’s talk about others, often too the passing on of 
others’ talk, self-contradictorily serves to perform the authority that it also seems to 
shrug off or efface.  Gossip in this sense becomes a way of telling one’s own story by 
telling someone else’s, and Eliot’s coy gossip—and, even more, JM’s retelling of it—
presents an exemplary instance of how Sandover approaches gossip as such a mode of 
aesthetic self-fashioning.  
                                                
21 John Stuart Mill, “Thoughts on Poetry and its Varieties” (1833), in Autobiography and Literary 
Essays, eds. John M. Robson and Jack Stillinger (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1981), 349. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 249. 
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Throughout the poem, however, Eliot has exemplified rather the opposite of 
self-creation: The Waste Land, we have previously learned, was largely ghostwritten 
by the spirit of Arthur Rimbaud, using an unaware Eliot as a medium.  “WE HAD TO 
APPOINT RIMBAUD    HE WROTE / THE WASTE LAND    WE FED IT INTO THE LIKE-CLONED 
ELIOT,” explains Mirabell, the fallen bat-angel who, as namesake of William 
Congreve’s comic hero, orchestrates with appropriate élan the lessons which fill the 
poem’s second volume (219).  JM’s incredulous response—“Rimbaud ghostwrote 
‘The Waste Land’?  You are something”—betrays recurring doubts about the 
authorship of his own “WORK GUIDED BY HIGHER COLLABORATION,” for which Eliot’s 
multivocal monument has been evoked by the spirits as a reassuring precursor (217, 
162).  In addition to its unhistorical claims about Eliot, Sandover cites as precedent an 
occult tradition including Victor Hugo’s transcribed conversations with the spirit 
world and the experiments in automatic writing conducted by W. B. Yeats and his 
wife George, as well as the visionary poetry of Dante, John Milton, and William 
Blake.  But despite the illustrious company Merrill’s divine dictations keep, JM deems 
the poetry in which they result “maddening—it’s all by someone else!” (261).24  And 
whatever reassurance Eliot’s specific example offers falters when even his minor 
contributions to The Waste Land are pitched as a gag about the uncertain parts of self 
and other, personal and impersonal in poetic production: “TSE / RESISTING THE FOSTER 
CHILD, ADDED TOUCHES OF HIS OWN: / THE SUBJECTIVE CORRELATIVE,” Mirabell jokes 
(219).   
Even worse, the embarrassing spiritual and physical mechanics of Merrill and 
                                                
24 JM often equivocates about his part in what he calls, in Ephraim—referencing the famous nineteenth-
century Russian spiritualist Helena Blavatsky and the early twentieth-century Greek-American mystic 
George Ivanovich Gurdjieff—“This great tradition that has come to grief / In volumes by Blavatsky and 
Gurdjieff” (136).  For discussions of Sandover within an occult literary tradition, see Timothy Materer, 
Modernist Alchemy: Poetry and the Occult (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 157-178; Helen 
Sword, Ghostwriting Modernism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 132-158; and Devin 
Johnston, Precipitations: Contemporary American Poetry as Occult Practice (Middletown, CT: 
Wesleyan University Press, 2002), 99-127. 
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Jackson’s homemade Ouija board and the upside-down teacup which serves as 
planchette make unavoidable both the seeming passivity of its mediums and the 
challenge posed by other voices to the agency of the poet: at least, as JM observes, 
“Eliot thought he thought his poem up; / It wasn’t spelt out for him by a cup” (219).  
As the Ouija’s compositional method foregrounds the collaborative, perhaps even 
determinative forces—ranging from literary tradition to the unconscious to language 
itself—at play in all poetic production, JM finds it difficult to disavow these forces or 
entertain in any simple way the “thought he thought his poem up.”  Having been 
informed, as he recalls in Mirabell, that “THE WEORK FINISHT IS BUT A PROLOGUE,” and 
“3 OF YOUR YEARES MORE WE WANT” (113), he eventually confesses,    
 
I’d set my whole heart, after Ephraim, on returning 
To private life, to my own words.  Instead, 
Here I go again, a vehicle 
In this cosmic carpool.  Mirabell once said 
He taps my word banks.  I’d be happier 
If I were tapping them.  Or thought I were. (261-262) 
Depicting his poem as a collaborative trip in an unhappy “carpool” rather than a 
felicitous, solitary trek into one’s own “private life,” and as a reduction of the 
autonomous poet to a mere lexical “vehicle” for table tapping spirits both literal and 
figurative, JM here both shatters and indulges the ideal of lyric subjectivity implicit in 
a phrase like “my own words.”  It is Sandover’s charged relation to this ideal that is at 
issue when Eliot at last appears, several hundred pages later and “[s]miling 
pleasantly,” to provide the punch line for the poem’s significant running joke about 
the difference between solitary and collaborative authorship, the seeming agency of 
the poet and the seeming passivity of the medium, and the headings of lyric and gossip 
which have quietly organized these concerns, among others, throughout the poem.   
In keeping with a work that takes the Ouija board’s “YES & NO” as motto, and 
adopts as a formal and philosophical principle the notion “[t]hat anything worth 
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having’s had both ways,” Merrill’s final scene represents Eliot’s gossip, interpolated 
into a moment of lyric self-composition, as neither neatly reconciling poetry and idle 
talk nor acceding to the binary thinking which would make of them an either/or 
proposition (174).  Insinuating that Rimbaud’s authorship of The Waste Land is less 
certain than Mirabell’s dish would have it, Eliot declares his lyric authority, but does 
so via gossip.  The rhetoric of gossip allows him paradoxically to assert his own voice 
almost entirely in a voice not his own, disclosing his authorship through unattributed 
talk of “THESE WORKS . . . THAT OTHERS ‘WRITE.’”  By repeating and fleshing out 
Eliot’s counter-gossip about Rimbaud, JM in turn (and, at still another remove, 
Merrill) tacitly affirms that the poem we might variously understand to have been 
written by “OTHERS” is “YET”—nevertheless? still? or at some future point may be?—
his “OWN.”  The audience for JM’s poetry reading has also been promised gossip, 
“SALON / AFTER SALON LEFT BREATHLESS BY . . . SLY / HINTING AT ‘REVELATIONS,’” 
and in this anticipatory moment—not quite yet the moment for the poetry or gossip 
with which it is imbued—JM’s lyric self-composition “need[s]” Eliot’s intruding 
voice and its gossip about “THESE WORKS,” just as Eliot’s particular bid for poetic 
authority depends on the recirculation of gossip and its strategies of innuendo (“YOU 
UNDERSTAND?”) (540).  As Merrill presents them, these are less poetic claims against 
gossip than through gossip.   
Such claims carry a particularly queer resonance, both within the world of 
Merrill’s poem and in the 1950s cultural context in which it originates.  Inhabiting the 
unsettled space between lyric discretion and gossipy disclosure in the exchange 
between JM and Eliot, and in Sandover’s final scene more generally, Merrill 
emphasizes a set of productive tensions that strikingly meet throughout his queer 
Künstlerroman and its quasi-autobiographical account of JM’s self-composition.  The 
poetry reading with which the poem closes pointedly mingles poetic and sexual self-
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fashioning when, in the buildup to it, we learn that Ephraim will “BRING IN . . . OUR 
POET”—appropriately so, JM notes in a flourish of self-gossip, “[h]aving long since 
brought him out” (547).  Sexual and poetic identities are seen here as complementary: 
the poetic achievement of Sandover and the poem’s frank celebration of 
homosexuality and a queer literary tradition, both “brought . . . out” by Ephraim over 
the course of the poem and the postwar decades it chronicles, together enable him now 
to “BRING IN . . . OUR POET.”  Merrill also posits a link between the poetic and the 
sexual through the reading’s setting, as JM recognizes the ballroom at Sandover as a 
version of “the old ballroom of the Broken Home” (557), a reference to Merrill’s well-
known poem about his childhood—and adult—navigation of his famous parents’ 
scandalous “marriage on the rocks.”25  “The Broken Home” ends with lines that 
suggest how its queer and poetic negotiation of the family romance provides one set of 
blueprints for Sandover.  Its final stanza explains that, like the yet-to-be-imagined 
Sandover, the “house became a boarding school,” inspiring Merrill’s hope that “Under 
the ballroom ceiling’s allegory / Someone at last may actually be allowed / To learn 
something”—a wish represented as fulfilled in the fantasy of Sandover, where the 
ballroom poetry reading’s “allegory” of literary tradition revamps a troubled familial 
model of lineage as a sustaining form of queer tutelage, with a very certain “Someone” 
as prize pupil.26   
                                                
25 James Merrill, “The Broken Home,” Collected Poems, 198.  Merrill’s father, Charles, was a founding 
partner of Merrill Lynch, making his parents’ separation one of “certain climactic moments” in his 
childhood and—or, as the following suggests, perhaps even because—fodder for the gossip columns: at 
eleven Merrill “tracked down a story in the kind of New York newspaper ‘we’ never saw; the caption 
beneath my photograph read ‘Pawn in Parents’ Fight.’  I knew my custody was in dispute, but—only a 
pawn?”  See Merrill, A Different Person, 555. 
26 Merrill, “The Broken Home,” 200.  Willard Spiegelman also suggests that “The Broken Home” 
“prepares us for the nursery at Sandover, which becomes the schoolroom in Scripts” (see “Breaking the 
Mirror: Interruption in Merrill’s Trilogy,” in James Merrill: Essays in Criticism, eds. David Lehman 
and Charles Berger [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983], 188), and Materer further points out that 
the name of the pet dog who leads the young Merrill into his mother’s bedroom in the poem—
Michael—anticipates “the name of the compassionate archangel in The Changing Light” (see James 
Merrill’s Apocalypse [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000], 3).  Merrill himself explains that 
Sandover “took on aspects of the house I describe in ‘The Broken Home’ . . . [b]ut actually it is an 
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In connecting sexual and poetic identities, Sandover evinces the Cold War 
influence of the early 1950s, when—as narrated in Ephraim—Merrill and Jackson 
began both their relationship with each other and the Ouija sessions out of which the 
poem would eventually develop.  These were years marked by suspicions that the arts 
were being taken over by a far-reaching homosexual network, an alleged Homintern 
paralleling the Comintern, or Communist International, supposedly running rampant in 
the State Department.  John D’Emilio delineates how in the cultural imagination of the 
era “homosexuality became an epidemic infesting the nation, actively spread by 
Communists to sap the strength of the next generation,” a logic that carried over into 
the arts, where—as Michael S. Sherry writes—“anxious observers depicted gay artists 
as psychologically and creatively inauthentic,” effeminate figures who “undermined 
the nation’s cultural prowess.”27  According to Gavin Butt, “given the widespread 
rumors about the large numbers of gays in the arts,” in the postwar period “artistic 
identity itself becomes phobically charged with queerness.”28  The male artist, 
especially, “though no self-evident figure of homosexuality, as a result of phobic 
suspicions, paranoias, and rumors, becomes a kind of sexually liminal figure.”29  
Merrill similarly indicates this perceived queerness of the artist, and specifically the 
poet, in his 1993 memoir A Different Person, writing that “thirty years ago a gay 
idiom . . . served as a deshabille to be slipped into behind closed doors.  In this it 
resembled shoptalk” (649).  From this perspective queer sexuality, poetry, and the 
gossip which blurs them occasion, as much as the Ouija board, what sometimes seems 
                                                                                                                                       
imagined place” (“An Interview with Jack Stewart” [1982], Collected Prose, 129). 
27 John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the 
United States, 1940-1970 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 44; Michael S. Sherry, 
Gay Artists in Modern American Culture: An Imagined Conspiracy (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2007), 1-2. 
28 Gavin Butt, Between You and Me: Queer Disclosures in the New York Art World, 1948-1963 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 44. 
29 Ibid., 45. 
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in Sandover a crisis of agency—each inviting, in its own way, an alien element into 
the domestic circle, and each courting cultural connotations of passivity, feminized 
weakness, and inauthenticity that ensure JM risks becoming, whether in fact or in a 
prejudicial mid-century point of view, what he calls in Ephraim a “medium / Blankly 
uttering someone else’s threat” (65).   
These risks, however, also engender possibilities in Sandover, perhaps chief 
among them—for a poem in which the lost agency of “[b]lankly uttering” also 
playfully suggests the virtuosity of a normative blank verse and dazzling variations 
from it—the pleasures of a sheer formalism into which selfhood often dissolves (and 
out of which it often emerges).  The poem’s Ouija-board gossip, too, holds out a queer 
promise equal to the threat of taking on “someone else’s” voice, encouraging JM’s 
self-described efforts to become “sufficiently / Imbued with otherness” (89).  Like the 
gossip about “THESE WORKS . . . THAT OTHERS ‘WRITE,’” which facilitates their 
becoming “YET ONE’S OWN,” and like the sexual speculation of being “brought . . . 
out,” which allows the “POET” to be brought in, becoming a “medium” for free-
floating talk provides access to what Merrill calls, in an oft-quoted statement, a “self . . 
. much stranger and freer and more farseeing than the one you thought you knew.”30  If 
to be an artist in mid-century America “was to occupy a subject position criss-crossed 
with sexual ambiguity” and “constantly shadowed by queer meaning,” the reparative 
recirculation of the gossip, innuendo, and sexual suspicion attached to the arts and the 
figure of the artist thus offers a potential form of queer self-fashioning in a hostile 
climate, drawing on the strategies of gossip to intimate, enact, and enjoy queerness 
without ever undeniably disclosing it.31  As Butt explains, “the artistic life, so to speak, 
could be experienced as a specifically queer form of existence and the figure of the 
                                                
30 James Merrill, “An Interview with J. D. McClatchy” (1982), Collected Prose, 107. 
31 Butt, Between You and Me, 45. 
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artist him/herself a specifically queer form of embodiment.”32   
Whether embodied or disavowed, such forms of queerness are only 
accentuated for the postwar male poet, at work in a lyric genre still marked by the high 
male modernist revolt against the supposed effeminacy of Victorian verse and a 
feminized literary culture, and in a genre especially valued at the time for its stylized 
performance of privacy, ambiguity, and paradox—or for its transgressive refusal of 
these New Critical imperatives.  “From the age of nineteen,” Merrill writes in A 
Different Person, “I’ve been made to feel . . . my difference from the rest of the world, 
a difference laudable and literary at noon, shocking and sexual at midnight—though 
surely from the beginning my nights were part of the same vital process as my days” 
(650).  Merrill’s notebooks from the 1950s bear traces of this “vital process” and the 
historical backdrop against which Sandover turns to gossip to reimagine a “laudable” 
lyric privacy as a “shocking” mode of queer publicity.  An obscure poem entitled 
“Publicity,” neatly copied out by Merrill “From Daniel George’s Notebooks” and into 
his own, comically flirts with the fraught association between poetic identity and 
queerness:  
 
 A friend of mine (well, not a friend: 
  I’ve only met him once or twice 
  But he amuses me no end) 
  Has taken up unnatural vice. 
 
  Of course, it doesn’t worry me 
  (I’ve never been with him alone), 
  But since his line is poetry 
  I rather think he wants it known.33 
It is not difficult to see why Merrill, specifically, would be attracted to this poem’s 
                                                
32 Ibid., 73. 
33 Merrill copied this poem into a notebook from the early 1950s, in the James Merrill Papers.  Though 
no year is recorded for this entry (only “7 Jan.”), it appears to date from 1953.  Daniel George is the 
pseudonym of the English writer Daniel George Bunting; “Publicity” first appears in his Alphabetical 
Order: A Gallimaufry (London: Jonathan Cape, 1949), 337, where it is dated 1933.  
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manner and subject—its witty formal elegance, light conversational tone, punning, and 
correcting and qualifying registers of voice take glee in smudging the “line” 
distinguishing privacy and publicity, poetry and perversion.  As the “unnatural vice” 
assumed to be homosexuality is revealed (or is it?) as “poetry” and a presumed wish 
for discretion is revealed as a desire for disclosure, what seems gossip about “a friend” 
advances as well (especially in its parenthetical admissions and denials) as a queer 
performance of the self.  The poem’s “I” speaks about, on behalf of, and as a poet, and 
in each case this figure is indeed “criss-crossed with sexual ambiguity,” his verse a 
vice “constantly shadowed by queer meaning,” and vice versa.  Is the speaker’s 
“friend” queer, or a poet?  The final line’s ambiguous “it” allows for, even invites, 
both interpretations.  Ultimately, however, the poem’s joke—much like that of Eliot’s 
cameo appearance in Sandover—suggests the perversity of publicizing poetry, a 
perversity inherent, and disavowed, in Mill’s ideal of the lyric as a public performance 
of privacy, one which “know[s] that other eyes are upon us,” but must somehow admit 
“no trace of consciousness that any eyes are upon us.”34  Whereas Mill insists that 
“there is nothing absurd in the idea of such a mode of soliloquizing,” “Publicity” 
revels in the queerness of this definitional absurdity, turning to gossip to playfully 
tease out its erotics.  When Merrill carefully transcribed the poem in 1953, its location 
of something delightfully illicit in the paradox of lyric practice must have seemed to 
him both appealing and apt.   
Dated November 14 of that same year—significantly the year Merrill received 
his first Ouija board as a gift, and the year he met Jackson—Merrill and Jackson’s 
earliest surviving and possibly first Ouija transcript also takes up the relationship 
between poetry and publicity.  This brief, initial session in fact introduces many of 
what will become Sandover’s central preoccupations.  Already Merrill and Jackson 
                                                
34 Mill, “Thoughts on Poetry and its Varieties,” 349. 
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begin to construct a queer poetic genealogy, contacting Walt Whitman, “YOUR GREAT 
POET SINGING SONGS,” who urges, “DO NOT O DO NOT O CHILDREN BELIEVE IN SHAME,” 
and Sappho, who declares “WE THAT SING ARE ONE.”  Addressing the uncertain 
authorial agency of the poet and the medium, they ask Sappho, “You are people living 
and writing?”  She confirms, “THERE IS A CHANNEL TO EACH.”  And as if foreseeing 
their taste, in Sandover, for Ephraim’s “marvelous nightly pudding,” Merrill and 
Jackson seek dish, though the spirits admonish them: “THAT IS VERY ODD.  YOU COULD 
BE AS POETS AND YOU WANT SCANDAL.”35  Yet poetry and scandal, as “Publicity” posits 
and as the culture surrounding Merrill would have affirmed, are scarcely distinct 
modes; and when Whitman’s ghost ambiguously refers to a poem “ONCE WRITTEN AND 
THEN BURNED,” this first transcript also introduces one of the motifs—that of the 
incriminating manuscript and the potential gossip it scandalously signifies—around 
which Merrill organizes Sandover’s queer meditation on poetry and publicity.   
One source for this motif, from Merrill’s own life, appears in A Different 
Person, where he writes of the anxiety his sexuality caused his mother, spurring her 
“efforts to make me into a different person.”  These efforts “had led her to open letters 
not addressed to her, to consult lawyers and doctors—behavior that appalled her even 
as she confessed it.  Her latest move, however”—preemptively destroying, under the 
flimsy guise of a misunderstanding, Merrill’s lovers’ letters while he was living in 
Europe in 1950—“I found hard to forgive” (537).  Merrill understood her action as 
motivated by  
 
a single mean-spirited fear.  Publicity would render you unemployable, a 
“security risk.”  Your former partners would come forward, with letters and so 
forth as evidence, to blackmail you.  With so many “mysterious young men” in 
the picture—my mother’s case went—those “awful” letters could vanish 
overnight, and I would live under the “threat of exposure” for the rest of my 
                                                
35 Ouija transcript dated November 14, 1953, James Merrill Papers.  In Mirabell, JM stumbles upon a 
fictional version of this transcript, dated “X.1953” and tucked in a copy of Alexander Gilchrist’s The 
Life of William Blake (178). 
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days. (537) 
This passage presents the Cold War institutional language surrounding a perceived 
homosexual menace—“Publicity,” “security risk,” “blackmail,” “threat of 
exposure”—drifting in and out of direct and free-indirect discourse and confusing the 
private, personal talk of the family sphere and the impersonal public statements of 
those government agencies which would vehemently claim to protect it.  Merrill’s 
“mother’s case” echoes, for example, the argument advanced most notably by Joseph 
McCarthy, who declared in a 1950 article in the New York Times that “perverts were 
officially considered to be security risks because they were ‘subject to blackmail.’”36  
A 1950 Senate report on the Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in 
Government likewise contends, as D’Emilio summarizes it,    
 
“The social stigma attached to sex perversion” was so great that detection 
could ruin an individual for life.  “Gangs of blackmailers,” the report 
continued, took advantage of this vulnerability by making “a regular practice 
of preying upon the homosexual.”  Espionage agents “can use the same type of 
pressure to extort confidential information.” . . . [Homosexuals] would betray 
their country, the committee asserted, rather than live with the consequences of 
exposure.37 
This national “hunt for homosexuals and lesbians extended far beyond a search for 
those in the military and the federal bureaucracy,” as the “obsessive concern with 
national security spurred the growth of an immense system of tests and standards to 
determine the suitability of employees.”38  Thus parroting what Merrill calls postwar 
“arguments . . . against sexual or political irregularity” (537), his mother becomes in 
the memoir a kind of “medium / Blankly uttering someone else’s threat.”  Yet her fear 
                                                
36 New York Times, March 15, 1950, 3, quoted in Gay American History: Lesbians and Gay Men in the 
U.S.A., ed. Jonathan Katz (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1976), 91.  For a representative 
sample of news stories documenting the anti-homosexual and anti-Communist investigations during the 
years 1950-1955, see Gay American History, 91-105. 
37 D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities, 43.  For the full report, see U.S. Senate, 81st 
congress, 2nd session, Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments, Employment of 
Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government (Washington D.C., 1950).     
38 D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities, 46. 
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of this threat was not wholly blank.  Though he does not mention it in his memoir, 
Merrill’s correspondence from the time more fully elaborates the circumstances which 
led to his letters’ destruction, explaining that his New York “apartment was broken 
into and curiously enough, left untouched as far as objects and jewelry are concerned.  
My mother thought up another interpretation, which might well be accurate, and after 
various misunderstandings presumed to go there herself . . . for the purpose of burning 
all the loose papers she could find.”39   
This account of the ominous break-in and subsequently burnt letters 
prefigures—and helps illuminate—the passage in which JM, in the final section of 
Ephraim (Z, in the volume’s abecedarian arrangement), contemplates burning the 
transcripts of his and DJ’s séances, figured as “old love-letters from the other world” 
(87).  In the previous section, the pair has made contact with W. H. Auden’s ghost 
(“Wystan had just died”) for the first time, and though “pleased with his NEW PROLE 
BODY” and comparing “Heaven to A NEW MACHINE,” Auden’s most immediate 
concern could be described as the “threat of exposure,” a threat that, in the memoir’s 
belated light, seems even more clearly bound up with sexuality:  
 
. . . a gust of mortal anxiety 
Blew, his speech guttered, there were papers YES 
A BOX in Oxford that must QUICKLY BE 
QUICKLY BURNED— (87)40   
                                                
39 From an undated typescript (c. 1951) in the James Merrill Papers.  In “a postscript about the letters” 
Merrill again references the break-in, writing to his mother, “I will take whatever blame you like, for 
not having, as you recommend, a steel file or something (though if one can break into an apartment, one 
can break into a file); and while I understand too well to feel any resentment towards you, I must say 
that I’m very distressed by your action.”  Undated typescript of a letter to Hellen Ingram Plummer (c. 
1951), James Merrill Papers. 
40 Peter Edgerly Firchow wonders if “Merrill was aware that Auden had left behind in Oxford the 
journal he kept during the latter part of his stay in Berlin in 1929.  According to Auden’s friend, David 
Luke, who found the journal in the former’s Oxford apartment a few days after his death, much of it is 
‘intimately autobiographical.’”  See Firchow, W. H. Auden: Contexts for Poetry (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 2002), 248 n. 17.  
   The fictional Auden’s anxious impulse toward destruction is repeatedly contrasted with Merrill’s 
inclination to preserve.  In Mirabell, when JM remarks of Auden’s afterlife output, “These posthumous 
ephemera, Lord knows, / Will keep your fans and critics on their toes,” Auden characteristically insists: 
“BURN THESE!” (246).  And with the whole of Sandover nearing publication, Auden, in a 1982 Ouija 
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Auden’s stubborn “mortal anxiety”—in addition to assuming a keen public interest in 
gossip about the dead—provokes JM to recollect his first contact with Ephraim, last 
incarnate as a first-century Greek Jew in the debauched court of Tiberius and 
“throttled / by the imperial guard for having LOVED / THE MONSTERS NEPHEW (sic) 
CALIGULA” (8).  For Ephraim, too, has insisted that    
 
A long incriminating manuscript 
Boxed in bronze lay UNDER PORPHYRY 
Beneath the deepest excavations.  He 
Would help us find it, but we must please make haste 
Because Tiberius wanted it destroyed. (8) 
To this pattern of “incriminating manuscript[s]” that must be “destroyed” (“Wystan 
had merged / Briefly with Tiberius, that first night, / Urging destruction of a 
manuscript”), JM adds his and DJ’s Ouija notebooks: 
 
                                       in the final 
Analysis, who didn’t have at heart 
Both a buried book and a voice that said 
Destroy it?  How sensible had we been 
To dig up this material of ours? (87)   
JM and DJ’s “buried book,” however embarrassing, might appear less 
obviously sexually “incriminating” than Auden’s or Tiberius’ manuscripts.41  Soon 
                                                                                                                                       
transcript, implores: “NOTHING OF A POET’S BUT HIS OWN CONSIDERED BEST EFFORTS SHD SURVIVE HIM.  
SO WE COME TO THE POINT: THE TRANSCRIPTS.  B U R N.”  When Merrill demurs, “We’d felt we were 
meant to preserve them to ‘verify our experience,’” Auden persists: “THEN LEAVE STRICT 
INSTRUCTIONS: NOT A LINE REPRINTED.  WHY?  BECAUSE MISTAKES ENTERED IN + YR EXCELLENT 
JUDGMENT SIFTED THEM OUT.  YET THE AVID GROUPIE WILL TAKE IT ON HIMSELF TO IN EFFECT SOW 
CONFUSION SIMPLY TO BE IN THE RAY OF LIGHT.”  “I see,” says Merrill.  “I quite agree!” (Ouija transcript 
dated July 4, 1982, James Merrill Papers).  Yet, as we will see, this is not the first time Auden’s ghost 
has compelled JM and DJ to consider burning the Ouija transcripts, nor the first time they will refuse: 
despite Auden’s warnings against “THE AVID GROUPIE” in search of fifteen minutes of critical fame, 
Merrill arranged for his and Jackson’s Ouija sessions to be preserved in his archives at Washington 
University (and, just as Merrill himself “REPRINTED” excerpts from these transcripts in post-Sandover 
poems, scholars have drawn on them in print).  
41 The Ouja transcripts are figured as a source of corruption in these lines’ allusion to Prospero’s 
renunciation of his magic in William Shakespeare’s The Tempest (5.1.33-57), an allusion that stresses 
the occult dangers of the Ouija and reiterates JM’s contention, in section Y, “Better to stop / While we 
still can” (89).  But whereas Prospero voluntarily “drown[s]” his “book,” choosing life over art, JM and 
DJ, twenty years on, “dig up” theirs, making art out of life.  
   Though again not in overtly sexual terms, JM also positions the transcripts as incriminating “private” 
documents destined to circulate publicly, and scandalously, if not destroyed when he compares them to 
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though, in a passage that seems both to draw on the incident detailed in Merrill’s 
memoir and to anticipate that account’s language, JM finds the Stonington home he 
shares with DJ broken into and—just like Merrill’s New York apartment in 1950—
“curiously enough left untouched as far as objects and jewelry are concerned” (“We 
had no television, he no taste / For Siamese bronze or Greek embroidery,” quips JM) 
(90).  The mysterious “thief” inexplicably takes nothing, but amplifies JM’s doubts 
about the “threat” posed by “this material of ours”: 
 
The threat remains, though, of there still being 
A presence in our midst, unknown, unseen, 
Unscrupulous to take what he can get. 
Next morning in my study—stranger yet— 
I found a dusty carton out of place. 
Had it been rummaged through?  What could he fancy 
Lay buried here among these—oh my dear, 
Letters scrawled by my own hand unable 
To keep pace with the tempest in the cup— 
These old love-letters from the other world. 
We’ve set them down at last beside the fire. 
Are they for burning, now that the affair  
Has ended?  (Has it ended?)  (91)  
At a mythic level, “this particular thief in the night” is, as Stephen Yenser observes, 
“reminiscent of both the Troubler in the Garden and Hermes, patron of thieves.”42  But 
Merrill’s “burglar here in the Enchanted Village” also manifests historical fears of 
“sexual or political irregularity” that clarify the nature of his overdetermined “threat” 
(90).  Imagining the Ouija transcripts as “old love-letters” that provide evidence of JM 
and DJ’s “affair” with an “other world” that is as much queer demi-monde as au-delà, 
suggesting that the house has been broken into by an “[u]nscrupulous” figure whose 
“threat remains” as long as these letters do—Merrill, here, recasts his mother’s 
burning of his friends’ and lovers’ correspondence as part of Sandover’s occult drama, 
                                                                                                                                       
the Nixon tapes: “Impeachment ripens round the furrowed stone / Face of story-teller who has given / 
Fiction a bad name (I at least thank heaven / For my executive privilege vis-à-vis / Transcripts of 
certain private hours with E)” (41). 
42 Yenser, The Consuming Myth, 236. 
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the resulting palimpsest charged, “at heart,” by the burnt material beneath its surface 
and the “voice that said / Destroy it.” 
In Sandover, JM does not burn the transcripts: “Let that carton be,” he 
concludes.  “Too much / Already, here below, has met its match” (92).  And neither 
has “the affair . . . ended”: by the time these lines appeared in print, Merrill and 
Jackson were well into the intense Ouija sessions documented in Mirabell and the 
spiritual lessons which, as we will see, make Sandover’s most insistent case for a 
privileged relationship between homosexuality and poetry.  Merrill instead rewrites 
personal history, letting the “threat” remain, and allowing the raw “material” of the 
Lavender Scare’s malicious gossip and its “exposure” to become a source for the 
overtly queer poetic gossip of Sandover’s “celestial salon.”  In preserving his “love-
letters from the other world”—and, implicitly, the poem based on them—JM does not 
valorize their privacy, or privatize their erotics, but instead perversely fans the flames 
of their ardent desire in verse.  “To my surprise, all burn / To read more of this poem,” 
JM writes (72).  In heaven’s hierarchy, he has learned, all publicity is good publicity, 
as “Power . . . kicks upstairs those who possess it, / The good and bad alike”: “CALL IT 
THE HELIUM OF PUBLICITY,” Ephraim says (54).  One might “rather think,” recalling 
“Publicity,” that faced with the “threat of exposure” JM “wants it known,” giving the 
spirits’ inaugural words to Jackson and Merrill—“YOU COULD BE AS POETS AND YOU 
WANT SCANDAL”—more ambiguous intonation, and a quality as prophetic as 
admonitory. 
Whatever pleasures Sandover takes in the “Publicity” of gossip’s “no-proof 
rhetoric” rest uneasily next to the lingering menace of the McCarthy era’s version of 
such rhetoric, and the kind of “Publicity” that “would render you . . . a ‘security risk.’”  
As I have been arguing, the naming names of that malevolent use of gossip contributes 
to the poem a disquiet—sometimes campy, often not—still palpable after, as JM says, 
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“those twenty / Years in a cool dark place that Ephraim took / In order to be palatable 
wine” (261).  I would not want to suggest that this disquiet tidily explains “those 
twenty / Years” between Merrill and Jackson’s first contacts with the other world and 
the successful transformation of their experience into poetry.43  But the question of this 
gap—temporal, historical, biographical, affective, political, aesthetic?—and the poem 
that seeks to bridge it remains an important one.  Certainly it is a question posed by 
Sandover itself, and the voices that demand “WHAT HAS IN FACT BEEN / 25 YEARS IN 
PREPARATION    WE FIRST CALLD U THEN    NOW / U ARE READY” (127).  Throughout 
Sandover, and especially in Ephraim, Merrill calls attention to “THEN” and “NOW,” the 
period of the poem’s origins—the 1950s, with its postwar fears of Communists, 
perverts, and what, for the public, often amounted to the same thing, artists—as well 
as that of its composition during the post-Stonewall, liberationist 1970s.  Emerging 
from and intermingling these contexts, Merrill’s poem stages the tension between 
gossip as an exercise of power, fueled by paranoia and normativity, and gossip as a 
more intimately pleasure-driven, queer world-making resource. 
It thus may be tempting to conclude that in Sandover Merrill uses gossip to 
enact a shift from the phobic figuration of homosexuality associated with the poem’s 
originary context, and toward a burgeoning, alternate figuration of homosexuality, 
which we might locate more readily in the context of the poem’s composition in the 
mid- to late-1970s.  Such a story would make of Sandover a personal, poetic, and 
historical coming-out narrative, hinging on a celebrated, if somewhat specious, 
                                                
43 Merrill’s pre-Sandover oeuvre contains a handful of disparate attempts to work with the Ouija 
material.  He first wrote about the Ouija in “Voices from the Other World,” which appeared in 1957 and 
again in The Country of a Thousand Years of Peace (1959); “Words for the Familiar Spirit,” from 1959, 
was later included in the privately-printed The Yellow Pages (1974); and in Merrill’s 1957 family 
roman à clef, The Seraglio, Francis Tanning’s occult experiences with the Ouija resemble Merrill’s 
own. Both Ephraim and “The Will,” also included in Divine Comedies, painstakingly narrate the Ouija 
material’s more substantive false start, in the late 1960s, as an eventually lost novel.  See Collected 
Poems, 112-113, 719-720, 392-398; and The Seraglio, in Collected Novels and Plays, eds. J. D. 
McClatchy and Stephen Yenser (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002). 
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dividing line between pre- and post-Stonewall queer life.  And there is undoubtedly 
something to this story, especially insofar as it resonates with persuasive critical 
accounts of the gradual—and imbricated—stylistic and thematic uncloseting of 
Merrill’s verse.  As Helen Vendler argues, “Secrecy and obliquity were Merrill’s 
worst obstacles in his early verses; though his tone was usually clear, the occasion of 
the tone was impossibly veiled”; more recently, Piotr K. Gwiazda writes that Merrill 
“always made his homosexuality an open secret in his poetry—with the emphasis 
shifting from secret to open in the course of his fifty-year career.”44  Merrill himself 
observes, in concluding the incident of the burnt letters in A Different Person, “It 
never occurred to the alarmists that a person who made no secret of his life was a sorry 
target for blackmail.  The discretion my mother urged was the sine qua non for the 
scandal she dreaded.  But so fine a point eluded me at the time . . . ” (537).  
Twenty-five years on, Sandover grasps this point not by doing away with an 
outmoded “discretion,” or by acceding to a defused “scandal,” but by taking up and 
even exploiting the necessary relation between, in this case, lyric privacy and gossipy 
publicity as a means of recognition and pleasure, rather than disavowal and dread.  
This dynamic suggests that instead of understanding the gap between the Ouija’s first 
revelations and Sandover’s composition as signifying only or even primarily a lack or 
need in Merrill’s past, we should consider also what role the transcripts and the 
experience to which they testify fulfill for him and his poem in the moment of its 
making.  What would it mean to “conceive of the work of historical affirmation not, as 
it is often presented, as a lifeline thrown to those figures drowning in the bad gay past, 
                                                
44 Vendler, Part of Nature, Part of Us, 206; Piotr K. Gwiazda, James Merrill and W. H. Auden: 
Homosexuality and Poetic Influence (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 55.  Vernon Shetley 
usefully complicates this take on Merrill’s work, arguing that “Rather than a progression from closed to 
open, private to public, Merrill’s development is informed by a tension between public and private 
modes of expression.”  Shetley, After the Death of Poetry: Poet and Audience in Contemporary 
America (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 66.  
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but rather,” as Heather Love observes, “as a means of securing a more stable and 
positive identity in the present”?45  What possibilities—aesthetic, philosophical, 
political—does Merrill seek in the pre-Stonewall origins of his poem?  What meanings 
lay buried in the Ouija’s ostensible chitchat?  Such questions recommend a closer look 
at how, within the mid-century gossip buffeting, often disastrously, about the figure of 
the homosexual, Merrill finds viable queer self- and world-making strategies—
strategies that enable him to perform the many and varied texts that others write, while 
making them yet his own.  
 
III. “MEANINGS YOU CANNOT CONCEIVE”: GOSSIP’S QUEER REPRODUCTION 
Of the texts JM and DJ are tasked to perform, none imposes itself more 
thoroughly than the spirits’ extended discourse against the Cold War’s nuclear threat.  
Indeed, in a study of this threat’s treatment in contemporary American poetry, John 
Gery contends that “No better evidence of the extent to which a nuclear awareness has 
permeated American letters exists than The Changing Light at Sandover.”46  Gery’s 
assessment reflects the critical consensus regarding Sandover’s impetus; the poem’s 
installments, as Judith Moffett writes, “all were originally undertaken as a warning 
against nuclear disaster.”47  Ephraim sounds this warning early on: when JM and DJ 
                                                
45 Heather Love, Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 34. 
46 John Gery, Nuclear Annihilation and Contemporary American Poetry: Ways of Nothingness 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1996), 133. 
47 Moffett, James Merrill, 154.  The importance of nuclear anxiety to Merrill’s poem has become 
increasingly axiomatic: among many others, Harold Bloom describes Sandover as “an apocalyptic epic 
whose true starting point is Hiroshima” (“Introduction,” Modern Critical Views: James Merrill [New 
York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1985], 7); Yenser asserts that the final volume’s “central question is 
whether humanity can save itself from destruction” (The Consuming Myth, 288); Shoptaw includes 
Sandover as “part of a growing antinuclear poetry in the seventies” (“James Merrill and John Ashbery,” 
762); and Brian McHale calls the poem “a jeremiad against the threats of nuclear war and destruction of 
the environment” (“Angels in America: James Merrill’s The Changing Light at Sandover, in The 
Obligation toward the Difficult Whole: Postmodernist Long Poems [Tuscaloosa: The University of 
Alabama Press, 2004], 52).  For useful discussions focused specifically on the nuclear theme in 
Sandover, see Charles Berger, “Merrill and Pynchon: Our Apocalyptic Scribes,” in James Merrill: 
Essays in Criticism, 282-297; Zimmerman, “Against Apocalypse”; and, especially, Materer’s James 
Merrill’s Apocalypse, which shows in detail how the poem’s handling of its nuclear subject matter 
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visit New Mexico, he denounces “the nearby nuclear research,” claiming “THE AIR / 
ABOVE LOS ALAMOS IS LIKE A BREATH / SUCKED IN HORROR    TOD MORT MUERTE 
DEATH” (33), and even before the global “HORROR” of his couplet’s suffocating rhyme 
insinuates itself in Sandover, we learn in Merrill’s poem “The Will”—included, like 
Ephraim, in Divine Comedies—that Ephraim impatiently insists JM “SET MY 
TEACHING DOWN” or “YOUR WORLD WILL BE UNDONE / & HEAVEN ITSELF TURN TO ONE 
GRINNING SKULL.”48  Nuclear dread reappears in Ephraim’s section P (on “Power”), 
which pictures “the doomsday clock” of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists edging, 
in 1970, “Minutes nearer midnight.  On which stroke / Powers at the heart of matter,” 
JM imagines, “Will open baleful, sweeping eyes, draw breath / And speak new 
formulae of megadeath” (54, 55).  Confirming these atomic “Powers” and the 
unprecedented finality of their threat, Ephraim informs JM and DJ that  
 
  NO SOULS CAME FROM HIROSHIMA YOU KNOW 
  EARTH WORE A STRANGE NEW ZONE OF ENERGY 
  Caused by?  SMASHED ATOMS OF THE DEAD MY DEARS 
  News that brought into play our deepest fears. (55) 
When Mirabell revisits this “frightful hour” of revelation in the poem’s next volume 
(“YR EPHRAIM 6 YEARS AGO CAME / WEEPING TO US ‘THEY ARE IN ANGUISH’”), he poses 
a question that looms over Sandover: “FACED WITH NUCLEAR DISASTER, HOW / IS MAN 
NOT TO DESPAIR?” (183).     
Merrill’s readers have demonstrated the centrality of the question of nuclear 
despair to his poem, their criticism attesting to the productive array of answers it 
provokes.  Scholarship on Sandover has yet to fully consider, however, how this 
question might be distinctly freighted for a gay man who had come of age during the 
McCarthy era, a time when the nebulous threat of “NUCLEAR DISASTER” often took 
shape in the national imagination in two linked figures: the Communist and the queer.  
                                                                                                                                       
“reflects the central period of the Cold War” (103). 
48 Merrill, “The Will,” 396. 
 173 
Only Peter Coviello addresses sexuality’s part in Sandover’s nuclear anxieties, 
adducing the poem, in an essay on AIDS and the rhetorics of nuclear and sexual 
apocalypse, as a striking example of just “how intimately bonded the nuclear and the 
sexual actually were, before the advent of AIDS gave to such bonding a ghastly 
quality of inevitability.”49  In line with this observation, I want to suggest that it is “NO 
ACCIDENT”—to borrow one of the bat-angels’ basic principles—that in Mirabell, the 
volume most fully articulating atomic threat, we also find Sandover’s most explicit 
theorization (and celebration) of homosexuality.50   
Numerous histories of sexuality in postwar America examine what Elaine 
Tyler May calls “the powerful symbolic force of gender and sexuality in the cold war 
ideology and culture,” showing how “It was not just nuclear energy that had to be 
contained, but the social and sexual fallout of the atomic age itself.”51  According to 
Lee Edelman, during “a time of unprecedented concern about the possibility of 
national—and global—destruction,” the “historical pressure upon the postwar 
American national self-image found displaced articulation in the phobic positioning of 
homosexual activity as the proximate cause of perceived danger to the nation.”52  
Homosexual relationships, characterized as sterile and non-reproductive, left the queer 
with seemingly no investment in a national future.  The “death and anomie associated  
. . . with the modern homosexual resonated with national concerns in the wake of a 
world war and the unleashing of the atomic bomb,” writes Miriam G. Reumann.  “In a 
culture focused on rebuilding a normative society and celebrating fecundity, what 
                                                
49 See Peter Coviello, “Apocalypse from Now On,” in Queer Frontiers: Millennial Geographies, 
Genders, and Generations, ed. Joseph Boone et al. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 
2000), 42. 
50 In a poem rife with contingency, JM and DJ continually stumble over “A BASIC PRECEPT U WILL NEED 
TO TAKE ON FAITH: THERE IS / NO ACCIDENT” (179). 
51 Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic 
Books, 1988), 91. 
52 Lee Edelman, “Tearooms and Sympathy; or, The Epistemology of the Water Closet,” in 
Homographesis: Essays in Gay Literary and Cultural Theory (New York: Routledge, 1994), 168. 
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would be more threatening than sterility?”53  When the concept of queer reproduction 
was entertained, it was in terms of dangerously weak, effeminate artistic output that 
would damage the nation, or, worse, in terms of the queer spy’s gossip, in a kind of 
updating of the World War II slogan equating idle talk, perverse sexuality, and 
national threat: loose lips sink ships.  Thus as “the idealization of domestic security, 
for both the nuclear family and the nuclear state, became an overriding national 
concern,” the homosexual—scapegoated at once as a figure of moribund non-
generativity and deathly fecundity—emerged as a nuclear threat, representing a 
menace both to the nation and normative domesticity.54   
More than simply connecting historical dots—though that too gives us a 
sharper picture of Merrill’s poem—recognizing the line yoking Sandover’s 
engagement with Cold War fears of nuclear destruction to its homosexual thematics 
brings into relief the postwar rhetorics of gossip whose afterlife helps to construct, 
circulate, and mediate among the poem’s competing figurations of queerness.  The 
work of the poem itself is described, as Devin Johnston points out, in “rhetoric 
reminiscent of the Cold War.”55  Within the complicated system of Sandover the term 
“V Work”—used by the spirits “WHEN NAMING WORK GUIDED,” like JM’s poem, “BY 
HIGHER COLLABORATION”—immediately refers to the “THE 5” souls of Akhnaton, 
Homer, Montezuma, Nefertiti, and Plato, reborn throughout history to combat 
apocalypse (162, 143).  It might seem fitting, then, that “V Work” also connotes the 
Second World War’s Victory and its aftermath, and “‘LIFE’ IN OUR SALON TONGUE” 
(the French vie), especially when such work’s goal, as Johnston notes, is continually 
framed as “‘containment’ and ‘resistance’ against encroaching entropy” (340).56  But 
                                                
53 Miriam G. Reumann, American Sexual Character: Sex, Gender, and National Identity in the Kinsey 
Reports (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 189. 
54 Edelman, “Tearooms and Sympathy,” 158. 
55 Johnston, Precipitations, 125.  
56 Ibid.  Stephen Yenser also feels that the term used throughout the poem to describe the necessary 
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of course, JM and DJ’s V work irredeemably complicates any parallel with the Cold 
War containment doctrine, for which “encroaching entropy” was often code for a 
queerness ambiguously positioned within the nation, yet understood as mirroring and 
vulnerable to the foreign threat without.  The V work of Sandover turns inside out the 
premises of the Cold War containment it recalls, first by conceiving of itself as queer 
collaboration, and then by further imagining its queerness not as a non-generative, 
anti-social, or deathly force but instead as a life-affirming social network built through 
poetry and gossip.   
From the beginning—and often with disarming earnestness—Merrill 
considered his queer encounters with the Ouija an ineradicable stay against the perils 
of Cold War destruction.  Writing to his mother in 1955 about his first evenings “at 
the Ouija board with David,” he details “a series of very strange experiences which 
have . . . made a profound change in my life,” concluding, “I cannot calculate how 
much I must have suffered in my mind from the fear of absolute annihilation.  Now it 
seems all kinds of exalted utterance, whether scripture or poetry, point to truth.”57  One 
way Sandover positions the figure of the homosexual as confronting rather than 
contributing to “the fear of absolute annihilation” is by transforming the loosened 
tongue of the queer “security risk” from a liability to an asset.  True, JM, DJ, and their 
grapevine of intimates face recurrent censorship (and surveillance) from unseen 
presences shielding sensitive material: “Censorship. / (It happens now and then.  The 
cup is swept / Clean off the Board.  Someone has overstepped . . . )” (107).  Such 
suppression occurs repeatedly, and as “the cup sweeps—is swept?—clear off the 
Board / Into the wings, a single violent swerve,” inevitably “THE VERY AIR BECOMES A 
NERVOUSNESS” (231, 186).  Ultimately, though, the poem’s V work does not protect 
                                                                                                                                       
response to the universe’s destructive forces—“contained”—is “reminiscent of the cold war” doctrine 
of containment (The Consuming Myth, 295).  
57 James Merrill to Hellen Ingram Plummer, 2 September 1955, James Merrill Papers. 
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against but depends on the relaxed discretion of spirits like Ephraim, described as 
“spilling these top secrets” (543).  Rather than safeguarding confidential information, 
Sandover’s heightened rhetoric of secrecy tends playfully to elevate banal disclosure, 
as when Robert Morse, accidentally revealing he has been allowed to join the lessons, 
is melodramatically cut off by Auden: “ROBERT, A SECRET! TOP SECURITY!” (413).  At 
other moments, such rhetoric stimulates—by threatening to degrade—the value of and 
desire for revelation, as when, in the coda, JM debates disclosing in his poem that 
Ephraim, the first and lowest familiar, has all along been an avatar for the angel 
Michael, the last and highest guide: “Not tell this secret?  God, how to resist— / And 
for what other reason were we born?” (555).  “SECRETS TOO GOOD TO BE KEPT RISK A 
GOSSIPY CHEAPNESS,” Ephraim counsels in the source transcript for this passage, 
immediately adding: “THEY ALSO OF COURSE TICKLE THE HUMAN FANCY.”58  Divulging 
this secret, JM exemplifies the poem’s willingness to “RISK A GOSSIPY CHEAPNESS” in 
order to “TICKLE THE HUMAN FANCY,” and in a key speech addressed to Nature, JM 
and DJ’s friend, muse, and divine mother-figure Maria Mitsotáki (or MM) argues that 
such gossipy disclosure does not contradict but is in keeping with the spirits’ wishes:  
 
WE COME, WE MORTALS, FROM AN AVID WEED 
CALLED CURIOSITY.  IN YOUR GARDEN, MAJESTY, 
I HAVE SEEN & HEARD THE BUSY SECRETS BUZZING 
LEAF TO LEAF: ‘AHA, THAT’S HOW SHE DID IT!’ 
THESE FEED US, YOU FEED THEM.  I THEREFORE CLAIM 
THAT YOU WANT THESE SECRETS OUT.  (455) 
As Maria more simply avows in a transcript, “US WEEDS” relish “THE WINDS OF A 
GOOD GOSSIP.”59 The poem’s Ouija sessions accordingly find motivation in pleasurable 
play with the politically charged power dynamic of protecting, coaxing out, and 
“spilling . . . secrets,” as if, in Sandover, loose lips launch ships.    
                                                
58 Ouija transcript dated August 30, 1978, James Merrill Papers. 
59 Ouija transcript, James Merrill Papers.  See Sandover, 419 for the final version of this scene. 
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We can see such play at work in a notebook entry from 1957 that records a 
particularly camp, cloak-and-dagger Ouija conversation between Ephraim and Merrill 
and Jackson (whose contributions appear in parentheses):  
 
It wd be possible 4 me 2 be completely discredited by a agent.  (Agent?  How 
Kafka! what men?)   
All I can say—there r agents. [ . . . ] (Well now don’t tell us anything you 
shouldn’t after this.)   
Oh I am hopeless abt state secrets.  T Telling is absolutely free, it is telling that 
starts counter-manifestations that turn on us and cd 4 the living as well.  I can 
tell u anything but I must be sure u will not do anything abt it + U can tell me 
anything but we must not set up our own little system.60 
This exchange’s ominous, Kafka-esque “agents” foreshadow the capital-T “They” of 
Mirabell, whose “surliness,” threatening presence, and seemingly malicious, 
disembodied gossip (They say . . . ) will contribute to the board a suddenly darker tone 
and an uncertainty as to whether the other world is ruled by “A BENIGN POLICE FORCE 
KEEPING WATCH ON US” or something more (overtly) sinister (124, 187).  The 
exchange also recalls “those unfortunates who are”—as the New York Times would 
report—“most readily subject to the blackmail by which security secrets are often 
obtained by enemy agents.”61  As Ephraim presents himself as susceptible to 
mysterious “agents” by whom he might be “completely discredited,” and thus liable to 
spill “state secrets,” the rhetoric of “security secrets” contributes to his gossipy 
“[t]elling” an alluring frisson.  Despite its risks, Ephraim valorizes the pleasures of 
idle chatter between himself and his living mediums, who can “tell” each other 
“anything” so long as the end of such talk remains the act of gossip itself; and despite 
his caveat that their “[t]elling” tales out of school “must not set up our own little 
system,” in Sandover gossip manages precisely this.  “U ARE SO QUICK MES CHERS,” 
                                                
60 All errors in the original.  This early transcript, on loose paper, foregoes the typical uppercase 
presentation of the spirits’ voices.  From a journal entry dated “Jan 8, 57.  Jaipur,” James Merrill 
Papers. 
61 Arthur Krock, “The Jenkins Case,” New York Times, October 18, 1964, Section E., 10, qtd. in 
Edelman, “Tearooms and Sympathy,” 149.  
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Ephraim boasts near the end of the first volume: “I FEEL WE HAVE / SKIPPING THE DULL 
CLASSROOM DONE IT ALL / AT THE SALON LEVEL” (72).  Even when, in Mirabell and 
Scripts, “THE DULL CLASSROOM” appears to take precedence over “THE SALON,” the 
gab sessions that bracket these lessons establish their own system of being in and 
apprehending the Ouija’s world, ensuring that the insights of everyday gossip 
continually reshape gospel.  As Auden says in an unpublished transcript, “I HAVE 
LONG THOUGHT WE MUST HAVE SMALL CHATS BEHIND BIG BACKS    DO U NOT AGREE?   
NOT NOT NOT SECRETS    BUT OF WEE HUMAN WONDERS.”62  
Rearticulating a postwar homosexuality often seen, as Edelman writes, “in 
terms of indolence, luxury, and the lack—or worse, the repudiation—of generative 
productivity,” Sandover (unsurprisingly attacked shortly after its publication for 
presenting “the universe as a playground” for just such “an elite, indolent clique of 
white, gay, male poets, dead and alive”) represents “SMALL CHATS BEHIND BIG BACKS” 
as a form of figurative and literal procreation, gossip that both dishes on and itself 
actually produces “WEE HUMAN WONDERS.”63  The episode based on the transcript 
warning of “agents,” for example, relates a madcap sequence of events in which JM, 
DJ and Ephraim conspire to provide Ephraim’s recently deceased earthly charge “a 
running start on life” by having his soul, for which Ephraim is responsible, reborn to 
JM’s pregnant “niece Betsy” (19).64  At the same time they haphazardly arrange for 
another soul (this one under the watch of JM’s dead friend, the poet Hans Lodeizen) to 
be reborn to “Gin—that will be Virginia—West,” the pregnant wife of DJ’s “ex-
roommate” (20).  Blurring loose talk and reproduction, JM and DJ play midwife, a 
figure for which gossip—if we summon its etymology—provides another term.  And 
                                                
62 Ouija transcript, James Merrill Papers. 
63 Edelman, “Tearooms and Sympathy,” 163; Bruce Bawer, “A Summoning of Spirits: James Merrill 
and Sandover,” The New Criterion 2 (June 1984): 39.   
64 As Yenser points out, Merrill had no such niece, providing the poem’s most explicit evidence of how 
poet and persona are not to be neatly conflated.  See The Consuming Myth, 222. 
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as with gossip, which accumulates unforeseeable meanings as it circulates, the second 
soul JM and DJ midwife is accidentally “born to a VIRGINIA WEST IN STATE / ASYLUM,” 
since DJ “too late / Recalls ‘Gin’s’ real name: Jennifer Marie” (29).  Though Betsy, as 
intended, gives birth to a child, Wendell, who “OUTDOES THE WILDEST DREAMS / OF 
PATRONS,” the queer reproduction of JM and DJ’s gossip—like that of the homosexual 
“security risk”—is met with fearful reprisal (29).  “We have MEDDLED,” Ephraim 
confesses, “And the POWERS // ARE FURIOUS,” threatening to intercept and cut off JM 
and DJ’s otherworldly contact: “AGENTS CAN BREAK OUR CODE / TO SMITHEREENS” 
(29). 
When JM sheepishly visits his “ex-shrink,” Tom, “[w]ith the whole story,” 
Merrill situates this affair in the psychohistorical context of the 1950s, framing its 
strangely generative idle talk as a response to cultural conceptions of homosexual 
morbidity (29).  “[W]hat you and David do / We call folie à deux,” Tom declares, 
continuing: 
 
                           “ . . . Now suppose you spell 
   
  It out.  What underlies these odd 
  Inseminations by psycho-roulette?” 
I stared, then saw the light: 
“Somewhere a Father Figure shakes his rod 
    
At sons who have not sired a child? 
Through our own spirit we can both proclaim 
And shuffle off the blame 
For how we live—that good enough?” (30) 
As in his sessions consulting the Ouija, this session on the analyst’s couch provides 
revelation but demands JM himself “spell / It out.”  Acting again as a medium, even 
midwife—now for the high gossip of psychoanalysis—JM speculates that Wendell, 
along with Ephraim himself and the Ouija’s “odd / Inseminations by psycho-roulette” 
more generally, form a shared fantasy through which he and DJ attempt to mitigate the 
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perceived oblivion of their childlessness and its threat to the nuclear family.  Yet while 
this somewhat pat explanation is “good enough” for Tom, JM tacitly rejects its 
normative emphases on childlessness as a problem and on the sexuality that is to 
“blame.”  That very night—in what we might think of as a small chat behind the big 
back of a mid-century psychoanalysis hostile to homosexuality—he and DJ happily 
resume their “folie à deux” and celebrate the co-creativity of their queer reproduction, 
reconnecting with Ephraim (“Our beloved friend / Was back with us!”), who dishes 
that “FREUD . . . DESPAIRS / OF HIS DISCIPLES & SAYS BITTE NIE / ZU AUFGEBEN THE  
KEY / TO YR OWN NATURES”—never surrender the key to your own natures (31, 30).  
Reworking Tom’s revelation, they decide of Ephraim: “He was the revelation / (Or if 
we had created him, then we were)” (32).  
In considering how the idle talk out of which Ephraim emerges potentially 
discloses both other and self, “He” and “we,” JM here posits that the self (or selves) 
parenthetical to the Ouija’s revelations might in fact be the revelation.  Is the medium 
the message?  Is JM simply a midwife or gossip for texts “THAT OTHERS ‘WRITE’”?  Or 
do the voices channeled in his poem provide a means for his own composition?  As 
Sandover takes up such questions, its queer reproduction becomes a trope for JM’s 
(and implicitly Merrill’s) authorship, and vice versa—substitutions at work when, later 
in Ephraim, Wallace Stevens’ ghost responds to the poem in progress by cautioning 
JM: 
 
A SCRIBE SITS BY YOU CONSTANTLY THESE DAYS 
DOING WHAT HE MUST TO INTERWEAVE 
YOUR LINES WITH MEANINGS YOU CANNOT CONCEIVE 
  Parts of this, in other words—a rotten 
  Thing to insinuate—have been ghostwritten? (72) 
Stevens’ immediate implication—as we have seen, a recurring one—is that JM’s 
largely channeled poem forms part of a select body of literally “ghostwritten” work, as 
with Eliot and Rimbaud.  In this sense, the challenge to JM’s poetic autonomy in the 
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idea that he takes divine dictation explains much of what makes this intimation feel 
“rotten.”  “What most scandalizes us about a ‘dictated’ poem,” argues Brian McHale, 
“is the way it undermines common-sense notions of authority.”65  Yet even an 
apparatus as weirdly clunky as the “Ouija’s ventriloquy” can be, as McHale shows, 
abstracted, naturalized and made to conform to such “common-sense notions of 
authority” as the figures of the inspiring muse, of literary tradition, or of language 
itself, suggesting that authorial anxieties alone do not account for the scandal of 
Merrill’s dictated poem.66  Perhaps more intractably scandalous, then, is another 
possible source for JM’s dictations, one closer to hand: DJ.  Stevens’ charge of 
ghostwriting also implicates DJ, deemed by the spirits “HAND” but indeed another 
“SCRIBE” (Jackson was a frustrated novelist) who more obviously “SITS BY” JM 
“CONSTANTLY,” his right hand atop the inverted teacup that skates across the Ouija, 
spelling out, letter by letter, the raw material of Sandover.  Alison Lurie’s notoriously 
gossipy memoir of Merrill and Jackson’s relationship makes the case that although 
critics “have usually written and spoken as if Sandover were the work of James 
Merrill alone,” Jackson “was in an essential sense the co-author of Sandover, so much 
of which flowed through his hand, and none of which could have been written without 
him.”67  Merrill himself muses about his “ghostwritten” poem, “I wonder if the trilogy 
shouldn’t have been signed with both our names—or simply ‘by DJ, as told to JM’?”68   
Though often diminished, or taken for granted, DJ’s ambiguous authorial role 
reminds us that—again like The Waste Land, a shared undertaking (as JM points out) 
between Eliot and “Uncle Ezra” even without Rimbaud’s alleged ghostly intervention 
(219)—Sandover is also the product of human collaboration.  In thinking about this 
                                                
65 McHale, “Angels in America,” 40. 
66 Ibid., 41.  For a useful overview of such naturalizing critical moves, see McHale, 42-44. 
67 Alison Lurie, Familiar Spirits: A Memoir of James Merrill and David Jackson (New York: Viking, 
2001), 136, 106-107.  
68 Merrill, “An Interview with J. D. McClatchy,” 109. 
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earthly partnership, especially, it is useful to consider Wayne Koestenbaum’s insight, 
in his study of male literary collaboration, “that double authorship attacks not 
primarily our dogmas of literary property, but of sexual propriety.”69  If, as 
Koestenbaum theorizes, “men who collaborate engage in a metaphorical sexual 
intercourse,” often figuring “the text they balance between them” as “the child of their 
sexual union,” perhaps what strikes JM as particularly “rotten” in the above passage is 
how Stevens’ pun on “CONCEIVE” links phobic perceptions of homosexuality as sterile 
(“YOU CANNOT CONCEIVE”) with epistemological and imaginative lack (an inability to 
comprehend or envisage the “MEANINGS” of even one’s own “LINES”), and thus a loss 
of poetic authority.70  We can interpret, that is, Stevens as negatively insinuating—like 
JM’s “ex-shrink,” Tom, but “in other words”—that a queer authorial failure to 
“CONCEIVE” is the cause as much as the effect of the poem’s “hav[ing] been 
ghostwritten.”  Sandover’s insistence otherwise—its faith in queer relationality as the 
invention of a way of being whose “MEANINGS YOU CANNOT CONCEIVE,” but whose 
revelatory contours are limned in part by gossip and poetry—scandalously reworks the 
Cold War figure of the threateningly non-generative, anti-social queer. 
                                                
69 Wayne Koestenbaum, Double Talk: The Erotics of Male Literary Collaboration (New York: 
Routledge, 1989), 9. 
70 Ibid., 3.  Of course, unlike the often repressed erotics of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century collaborations Koestenbaum considers, Sandover forefronts the literal and figurative sexual 
relationship between Merrill and Jackson and the spirits they contact.  Merrill and Jackson’s Ouija 
transcripts emphasize even more explicitly how figures of reproduction and authorship, sexual and 
literary politics, are bound up in Sandover.  When Eliot’s shade claims, in a passage that (as we have 
seen) reappears in the poem’s coda in adapted form, “THE DICTATED WORK IS NONETHELESS ONE’S OWN    
OTHERWISE IF THE MOTHERS OF THE WORLD REALIZED THEY’D ONLY PROVIDED THE EGG WD THEY 
CONSENT TO CONCEIVE?” he has in mind both JM’s and his own “DICTATED WORK,” but also, it seems, 
the birth of Wendell and the Ouija’s “Inseminations by psycho-roulette” (Ouija transcript dated 
September 18, 1977, James Merrill Papers).  Eliot’s words further echo—and suggest as one model for 
Sandover’s reproduction trope—Pound’s real-life understanding of The Waste Land as the progeny of 
his and Eliot’s queer collaboration.  In a poem about their work on The Waste Land, entitled “Sage 
Homme” and sent to Eliot, Pound casts Eliot as male “Mother” and (playing on sage-femme, the French 
term for midwife) himself as the eponymous midwife presiding over the difficult birth of Eliot’s 
“printed Infancies,” which have been “Sire[d]” by a “Uranian,” or male homosexual, “Muse”—also, as 
it turns out, Pound.  “Sage Homme” can be found (in edited form) in a 24 December 1921 letter to 
Eliot, in The Selected Letters of Ezra Pound, 1907-1941, ed. D. D. Paige (New York: New Directions, 
1971), 170.  For an excellent reading of the unexpurgated “Sage Homme” and of Pound and Eliot’s 
queer collaboration more generally, see Koestenbaum, Double Talk, 112-140.   
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Merrill portrays childlessness, same-sex erotics, and the indiscrete 
reproductions of gossip as crucial to—rather than disastrous for—Sandover’s anti-
apocalyptic verse.  As the lessons of Mirabell proceed, DJ wonders specifically if his 
and JM’s homosexuality has something to do with their being chosen as poetic 
mediums for the spirits’ instruction:  
 
What part, I’d like to ask Them, does sex play 
In this whole set-up?  Why did They choose us? 
Are we more usable than Yeats or Hugo, 
Doters on women, who then went ahead 
To doctor everything their voices said? 
We haven’t done that.  JM: No indeed. 
Erection of theories, dissemination 
  Of thought—the intellectual’s machismo. 
  We’re more the docile takers-in of seed. 
  No matter what tall tale our friends emit, 
  Lately—you’ve noticed?—we just swallow it. (154)  
The Ouija’s divine gossip—what “They” say—here becomes a form of oral (and 
aural) sex for its “usable” mediums, whose one shared line in this “docile” duet 
appropriately notes and insists upon what has not been done, as if comically to 
underline the daffy passivity of their feminized collaboration and its ostensible failure 
to generate substantive “theories” or “thought.”  In passages like this one, as Gwiazda 
writes, Merrill performs a “queer critique of the masculinist and heterosexist tropes 
that surround the existing notions of authority,” one that “uses the same rhetoric that 
categorizes homosexual men as passive rather than active, immature rather than 
mature, superficial rather than profound.”71  The force of this critique derives largely 
from Merrill’s redeployment of the reproductive rhetorics of both authorship and 
queerness.  JM and DJ’s ironic willingness to “swallow” the Ouija’s “marvelous 
nightly pudding” thus might seem an anti-reproductive mode—a camp travesty of both 
procreation and literary production that refuses to “disseminat[e]” the “machismo” of 
                                                
71 Gwiazda, James Merrill and W. H. Auden, 67, 68. 
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heteronormativity—and in part, it is.  The same biological non-reproduction that 
arouses Cold War suspicions raises homosexuality to a position of privilege in 
Sandover’s celestial hierarchy, where its “CHILDLESSNESS” helps avert the ecologically 
ruinous overpopulation of “FUSED MAN IN HIS CLOSELY / PACKD CITY,” which, like 
“THE FUSED ATOM,” alarms God Biology (216, 194).  In the Ouija’s mirror world it is 
the outsized figure of heterosexual fecundity, not homosexual sterility that signifies 
annihilation. 
Yet JM and DJ’s homoerotic receptiveness to the board’s “odd / Inseminations 
by psycho-roulette” constitutes, as we have seen, less their inability or refusal to 
reproduce than the capacity to reproduce queerly.  In addition to the rebirths for which 
JM and DJ notably play midwives, in Mirabell JM also appears as godparent—another 
role for which gossip once provided a name—to Urania, his Greek-American godchild 
“in the first pride of speech” (111).  Urania’s name suggests the heavenly muse but 
also, as Reena Sastri notes, “uranium, fuel for nuclear weapons, and uranism, a term 
designating homosexuality in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.”72  
Gossip, nuclear threat, homosexuality, and futurity—as “Noné (godfather)” to Urania, 
JM becomes symbolically responsible for a set of concerns which serve as inspiration 
for his poem—a project over which, as Auden later explains, this child “MUSE . . . 
PRESIDES,” “BABBLING” like JM himself “ON THE THRESHOLD OF / OUR NEW ATOMIC 
AGE   THE LITTLE LOVE / AT PLAY WITH WORDS WHOSE SENSE SHE CANNOT YET / FACE 
LEARNING” (111, 261).  JM’s various parental guises—midwife, queer uncle, 
godparent: gossips all—also serve as authorial representations that reflect Merrill’s 
understanding of his collaborative poem as an alternative form of reproduction.  Years 
after Sandover’s completion, Merrill’s memoir describes how “distress” over his 
“childlessness” passed once the home he shared with Jackson “had filled up . . . with 
                                                
72 Reena Sastri, James Merrill: Knowing Innocence (New York: Routledge, 2007), 87. 
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Ephraim and Company, who were prepared, like children, to take up as much of our 
time as we cared to give, but whose conversation outsparkled Ravenna, and who never 
had to be washed or fed or driven to their school basketball games.”73  “I wonder, by 
the way, where they get the idea that homosexuals aren’t breeders,” he wryly 
comments in a 1991 interview.  “I know quite a few who are.”74  
Merrill joins a long and venerable tradition of homosexual “breeders” in 
Sandover.  When Mirabell, picking up DJ’s lingering question about homosexuality’s 
role “[i]n this whole set up,” exalts the homosexual over “ALL SO-CALLD NORMAL 
LOVERS” who “MUST PRODUCE AT LAST / BODIES” and “DO NOT EXIST FOR ANY OTHER 
PURPOSE” (156), his account of same-sex attachments that spawn, in poetic form, 
wisdom and virtue recalls Plato’s Symposium and its metaphorical distinction between 
“Men who are pregnant in body” (“drawn more towards women,” such men “express 
their love in trying to obtain for themselves immortality and remembrance . . . by 
producing children”) and “Men who are pregnant in mind” (whose “relationship with 
beauty” in the form of male bodies gives birth to beautiful ideas, ideal forms).75  Of 
these types, men who are pregnant in mind “have a much closer partnership with each 
other and a stronger bond of friendship than parents have, because the children of their 
partnership are more beautiful and more immortal.”76  Mirabell similarly contends that 
same-sex desire gives birth to art: “LOVE OF ONE MAN FOR ANOTHER OR LOVE BETWEEN 
WOMEN / IS A NEW DEVELOPMENT OF THE PAST 4000 YEARS / ENCOURAGING SUCH MIND 
VALUES AS PRODUCE THE BLOSSOMS / OF POETRY & MUSIC” (156).  Though JM lightly 
                                                
73 Merrill, A Different Person, 626. 
74 James Merrill, “An Interview with Thomas Bolt” (1991), Collected Prose, 159. 
75 Plato, The Symposium, trans. Christopher Gill (New York: Penguin, 1999), 46, 47.  Sandover is 
enamored of symposiums: JM describes the lessons as a “symposium” (377); in the coda we learn from 
MM that JM’s poetry reading will be followed by a “CRITICAL SYMPOSIUM” (540); and JM describes 
himself and DJ at the Ouija as Ephraim’s “symposiasts” (553).  For another discussion and useful 
overview of Sandover’s engagement with Plato, see Gwiazda, James Merrill and  
W. H. Auden, 70-74.  
76 Plato, The Symposium, 47. 
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challenges the elitism of this claim—“Come now, admit that certain very great / Poets 
and musicians have been straight”—his words themselves reclaim the Homintern 
discourse linking queerness to the arts.  And Auden, too, ventures that it is precisely 
because of their biological “CHILDLESSNESS” that he, JM, DJ, and the “insouciantly 
childless” Maria have been chosen for the spirits’ V work (156, 216, 102): 
 
3 OF US IN MM’S EUPHEMISM 
COMME CA & SHE (THOUGH FEMALE) NOT IN LIFE 
MUCH DRAWN TO ROLES OF MOTHER MISTRESS WIFE, 
WHY ARE WE 4 TOGETHER LISTENING? 
A) 3 WRITERS & MM RATHER A MUSE 
B) EXCEPT AS MESSENGERS WE HAVE NO 
COMMITMENT TO A YOUNGER GENERATION (205) 
When JM again poses “Wystan’s question: Why the four of us?” Mirabell maintains, 
in language that directly references the Symposium, “KEEP IN MIND THE CHILDLESSNESS 
WE SHARE     THIS TURNS US / OUTWARD TO THE LESSONS & THE MYSTERIES,” suggesting 
that the board’s “4 TOGETHER” are pregnant not in body but in mind (216).77  That this 
in-group’s lone heterosexual, “FEMALE,” and non-writer, MM, is ultimately revealed 
to be an incarnation of the immortal Plato, and thus very much “COMME CA,” 
retroactively lends further credence to Auden’s Platonic surmise about the nature of 
their collaboration and its attendant bond of friendship.78 
At the same time, Maria’s unveiling as Plato helps to cast Sandover’s treatment 
of his philosophy of desire in a more ambiguous light.  However rightly, 
interpretations of the Symposium often emphasize how Socrates, using Diotima as a 
medium, advocates the sublimation of sexual desire into an attachment to beautiful 
forms themselves, transcending relations with individuals in favor of the 
contemplation of abstract principles—sentiments Mirabell appears to endorse when he 
                                                
77 Diotima declares of the “rites of love” that their “purpose . . . if they are performed correctly, is to 
reach the final vision of the mysteries.”  Plato, The Symposium, 47. 
78 In Scripts, Maria appears “as Plato” and gives “A LIVELY SYMPOSIUM” (496). 
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explains that “MIND IN ITS PURE FORM IS A NONSEXUAL PASSION / OR A UNISEXUAL ONE 
PRODUCING ONLY LIGHT” (156).  But although Sandover’s queer reproduction is 
predicated on the absence of biological reproduction, it is not therefore “NONSEXUAL” 
or “UNISEXUAL,” and not anti-relational.  Mirabell’s Platonic declamations, in fact, are 
occasioned by his transformation from the bat-like creature hitherto known as 741 into 
a “SOMEWHAT ATHENIAN,” or homosexual, peacock who has “COME TO LOVE” his 
earthly interlocutors (157, 155).  Hardly “NONSEXUAL” or anti-relational, Mirabell’s 
metamorphosis from mathematical abstraction into embodied, feeling initiate in “THIS 
WORLD OF COURTESY” is imagined as a coming out (JM asks, “was there from the first 
a Peacock that / Struggled within you to unseat the Bat?”), and it is produced, Auden 
believes, by the imaginative and affective connections of “WE 4 TOGETHER”: “MM & I / 
IMAGINE U, YOU US, & WHERE THE POWERS / CRISSCROSS WE ALL IMAGINE 741 / & 
THEN TRANSFORM HIM!” (155, 158, 159).  Or, as JM later affirms, Mirabell concretizes 
“an impulse only / Here at the crossroads of our four affections” (173).   
After 741’s coming out as Mirabell, the poem’s seductive gossip again revises 
its gospel.  Having advanced his philosophy, Mirabell more ambivalently dishes that 
Plato “CLUNG TO AN IDEAL BOTH LOFTY & STERILE,” at which point Maria—or, as we 
later learn, Plato himself in MM “DRAG”—immediately appears, paralleling her own 
“LAST BLOOMING” with Mirabell’s queer metamorphosis, and implicitly contrasting 
both with the potential sterility of the Platonic ideal (158, 468, 158): “NOW DO U 
UNDERSTAND MY LOVE / OF YOU,” MM asks JM and DJ—“U HAVE THE TOUCH THAT 
TURNS / BATS INTO PEACOCKS & DECREPIT OLD / BAGS FROM THE OTHER HALF OF 
ATHENS INTO / ROSE TREES” (158).  The source transcript for these lines more bluntly 
posits the generative queer affiliations that Plato as MM celebrates—“U HAVE A 
POWER TO TURN WEARY HETEROSEXUAL OLD BAGS INTO ROSES AND THEN GO THAT 
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BLISSFUL STEP FURTHER AND LOVE US,” Maria says79—a point Auden’s later gossip 
about Plato will make again even more bluntly:    
 
IDEAL FORMS ALSO LEAVE HIM COLD    HE KEEPS 
SQUINTING THROUGH KEYHOLES AT SOME LITHE YOUNG BOD  
POOR OLD GAFFER 
        SAY IT: POOR OLD SOD  (147) 
Sandover’s queer imaginings, impulses, and affections most often take shape 
through its gossip, and we would do well to remember that the Symposium’s 
seemingly austere philosophy is also, as Roland Barthes proposes in A Lover’s 
Discourse, “a gossip,” since its dialogue consists of “speaking together about 
others.”80  Gossip structures the text’s nested series of accounts, in which Athenian 
intellectuals gather to celebrate Agathon’s victory, drink, and gossip about eros and 
each other’s relationships; and in which we see that years later, their enticing dish 
circulates unabated—on the road from Phalerum, both Glaucon and an unnamed 
interlocutor breathlessly seek out the dialogue’s frame narrator, Apollodorus, who has 
himself consulted Aristodemus, in order “to get the full story of the party at 
Agathon’s,” a party that took place when they “were still children.”81  “Such is the 
genesis of the theory of love,” Barthes writes: “an accident, boredom, a desire to talk, 
or, if you will, a gossip lasting little over a mile.”82  If Sandover can be said to advance 
a “theory of love,” it too emerges more as the effect of the poem’s seemingly frivolous 
gossip than the distillation of its didactic lessons.  Consider, for example, the 
following characteristic little scene of gossip, sparked by Mirabell’s question, “IS THE 
PEACOCK NOT ALSO SOMEWHAT ATHENIAN?” 
 
  JM: Platonic?  Oh, you mean the peacock 
                                                
79 Ouija transcript dated July 27, 1975, James Merrill Papers. 
80 Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1978), 183. 
81 Plato, The Symposium, 3, 4. 
82 Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse, 183. 
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  I once put in a poem set in Athens? 
  Yes, of course.  DJ: Would he be using 
  “Athenian” in the sense that Marius— 
  3 CHEERS FOR DAVID    HE STANDS UP FOR US! 
  Is that you, Marius?  COME & GONE MY DEAR 
  PLATO SAYS ATHENS WAS AT BEST HALF QUEER 
  What’s Plato like?  O YOU KNOW    TATTLETALE GRAY 
  NIGHTGOWN OFF ONE SHOULDER    DECLASSEE, 
  TO QUOTE MM    A GAS, TO QUOTE CK  (158) 
Quite a lot, and yet very little of consequence, might seem to take place in this 
dizzying bit of talk, which culminates in Auden’s gossip about Plato.  Yet such ripples 
of gossip eddy in and out of the poem’s lyrics, lessons, and more general dialogue so 
consistently as to warrant closer attention.  Though eschewing “machismo,” over the 
course of the poem the form of gossip itself constitutes an “Erection of theories, 
dissemination / Of thought” about loose talk, verse, and queer relationality.  In this 
regard, this passage’s most salient formal features include the intricate mix of voices 
in its eleven lines, shared by five different speakers—Mirabell, JM, DJ, the critic 
Marius Bewley, and Auden, whose gossip adds three additional voices when he quotes 
Plato, MM and CK (Auden’s lover, Chester Kallman)—and the fact that these voices 
are not simply in conversation but, in speaking primarily about absent others (Marius, 
Plato, MM, CK), engaged in gossip.   
Mirabell’s allusion to Merrill’s early poems “The Peacock” and “Transfigured 
Bird”;  DJ’s talk of Marius’ favored term for homosexuality, “Athenian”; Marius’ 
inclusive, queer “US”; Auden’s familiar “O YOU KNOW”; the camp posture and sexual 
subject matter of the gossip more generally—these cozy aspects of the poem’s talk 
both reflect and create the board’s often odd affinities between selves and others 
including the living and dead, male and female, queer and straight, young and old, real 
and fictional, human and non-human.83  In so doing, they might seem to align with the 
                                                
83 “Transfigured Bird” and “The Peacock” each appear in Merrill’s First Poems (1951), in Collected 
Poems, 33-36, 39.  
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arguments of those critics who have categorized the poem’s chatter as “conversation” 
whose interplay between “self and other” speaks to an ethic of dignified “equality” or 
respectful “mutuality.”84  But while these discussions usefully attend to Sandover’s 
poetics of the everyday and its effects of intimacy, their framing of the poem’s talk as 
conversation rather than gossip tames its often unruly affect and grants a stabilizing 
parity to exchanges equally marked by rapid shifts and disparities in agency.  An 
insistence on conversational mutuality, respect, and manners effaces both the 
difficulties and the pleasures of gossip’s reappropriations, exclusions, use of others, 
and interruptions.  In this passage, as elsewhere in the poem, authority obtains in 
speaking of as much as to others: even those present find themselves absented by 
gossip, as when, though JM addresses Mirabell directly, DJ speaks of him in the third 
person; or when Marius, summoned to the board by DJ’s gossip, reciprocates by 
speaking about rather than to DJ.  Conversely, gossip’s objectifying talk also animates 
its objects’ agency, as if to be in Sandover is first to be gossiped about: Mirabell’s nod 
to Merrill’s poetry gives way to JM’s voice, DJ’s talk of Marius enables his brief 
appearance, and the entrance of Maria/Plato in the ensuing passage follows this 
scene’s gossip about Plato.  Throughout the poem, the agency and intimacies of being 
in the know are counterbalanced by and depend on the sense that one is also, 
inevitably, out of the loop.  Thus Auden, part of Sandover’s inmost group, repeatedly 
appears after “overhearing / Some gossip,” surfacing to interject: “CHATTING ABOUT 
ME MY DEARS?” or “DID I HEAR MY NAME?” (175, 181, 419).  Similarly, as soon as he 
complains that it is “TOO UNFAIR” that Maria “NEVER GETS DISCUSSED BEHIND HER 
                                                
84 Vendler argues that the poem’s “espousal of the conversational as the ultimate in linguistic 
achievement is a moral choice, one which locates value in the human and the everyday rather than in 
the transcendent” (217); and Zimmerman emphasizes the “mutuality” of how “in conversation, one 
voice depends upon its counterpart; the interplay requires both self and other—and Sandover locates 
authority or truth precisely in this interplay” (383-384).  Halpern stresses a conversational “equality” in 
the poem and, echoing both Vendler and Zimmerman, asserts the poem’s “moral . . . emphasis on 
conversation and the values of the everyday” (183). 
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BACK,” the inequity of this inequity is remedied by JM and DJ, who invite him to seize 
the first “opportunity / To talk behind Maria’s back” (419, 422).  Maria, who instigates 
much of the poem’s dish (“TIME FOR TALK, CHAPS?”) (309), aptly expresses gossip’s 
irresistible vicissitudes in a transcript exchange with JM: “I MUST SAY AN OLD 
REMNANT OF MANNERS MAKES ME CRINGE TO HAVE THIS SERIES OF IN-GROUPS    OF 
COURSE ANOTHER OLD REMNANT    WELL —is delighted.  ARE WE NOT A W F U L ?  LETS 
TALK ABOUT WHA.”85  In Sandover, conversational manners have nothing on gossip’s 
awful pleasures. 
Of course, Sandover’s gossip is poetic gossip, appearing in verse form, and the 
poetic features of the work’s talk are far from incidental to its network of voices.  In 
the passage above, for instance, Marius does not so much complete DJ’s interrupted 
thought (“Marius—”) as assert affinity by commandeering his rhyme (“STANDS UP FOR 
US”); likewise, it is rhyme more than reason that ensures Auden’s gossipy take on 
Plato (“TATTLETALE GRAY”) accords with MM’s (“DECLASSEE”) and that of “CK.”  
Merrill’s pentameter also engenders connections and breaks among the passage’s 
alternating voices, most apparently in those instances when questioning and answering 
speakers share a single line, but also in accommodating interruptions that, by filling 
out the meter, additionally serve as complements.  Further, by introducing dramatic 
side-text indicating speakers (as in “JM:” or “DJ:”) into lines whose pentameter 
requires its pronunciation, the poet himself—and in turn his reader—form a necessary 
part of the network of voices.  This side-text does not belong to any of the passage’s 
voices, yet formally must be voiced, suggesting that the poet orchestrating the poem’s 
gossip network emerges as part of it: the poet is also a gossip.  
A brief moment in Scripts dramatizes the coordinate circulation of poetry and 
gossip in Sandover.  When the angel Michael concludes the eighth of the volume’s 
                                                
85 Ouija transcript, James Merrill Papers. 
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first lessons with a questionable poetic flourish—“SO NEXT WE DON THE GLAD ARRAY / 
OF ALL OUR SENSES TO MEET THE DAY”—his exit prompts Auden immediately to dish 
on his lackluster verse (“ENTRE NOUS MY DEAR HE’S NOT IMPROVING”) and to offer his 
own improvement on it: “NEXT WE DON OUR SENSES IN GLAD ARRAY / & MEET HERE 
AGAIN ON ANOTHER DAY” (352).  JM decides “That too could stand some work, if I 
may say so,” but before he can propose a revision Michael, who has overheard this 
small chat behind his big back, unexpectedly returns: “MY VERSE NOT METERED?  NOT 
IN RHYME?  THEN PRAY / MAKE SENSE OF IT YOURSELVES ANOTHER DAY!” (352).  Here 
three couplets, each a version of that which precedes it, attempt through gossipy and 
poetic revisions to “MAKE SENSE” of another’s voice.  Throughout Sandover, no single 
voice ever seems to originate or complete its own thought; each utterance, no matter 
how authoritative, is subject to—even subjects itself to—the revisions of “ANOTHER 
DAY.”  In Scripts, especially, JM and DJ’s experience of the lessons, as well as the 
angels’ lessons themselves, must be fleshed out after the fact by WHA and MM’s 
behind-the-scenes gossip: “We yearn for tomorrow’s inside story / From Maria and 
Wystan—what they won’t have seen!” JM writes (285).  The poem’s pattern of 
gossipy supplements to its scenes of instruction illustrates just how much its 
disembodied gospel depends on sensual gossip—“Don’t tease us, tell!” JM at one 
point begs of Maria—and how Sandover approaches gossip’s collaborative 
reproductions as a model for poetic making (302).   
The “ENTRE NOUS” transformations of Michael’s couplet capture, in miniature, 
poetic gossip’s role in the generative, “self-revising” structure that led Merrill to claim 
of Sandover, “It’s not so much a visionary poem as a revisionary one, I often fear.”86  
David Kalstone feels that “What is most honest and most troubling about Merrill’s 
trilogy is that there is no final truth revealed: individual revelations keep changing 
                                                
86 Merrill, “An Interview with Fred Bornhauser,” 136, 138. 
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their shapes, and symbols . . . demand constant reinterpretation”; and McHale could be 
describing gossip when he similarly writes of the poem, “no ultimately reliable version 
of things is ever achieved, and who knows how far the process could go?”87  These 
epistemological problems of truth, interpretation, and reliability are no doubt effects, 
in large part, of Merrill’s use of the Ouija board as a compositional tool, yet I do not 
mean to suggest that gossip’s “no-proof rhetoric” is simply an analogy for Merrill’s 
Ouija board poetics.  (Analogies, at any rate, are never simple in Sandover’s double 
vision.)  In a poem concerned with the historical whispers of sexual and political 
suspicion surrounding the pervert and the poet, it is just as likely the other way 
around: Merrill’s Ouija board is commonly read as, in Vendler’s words, a figure “for 
language itself” or, as David Lehman puts it, “a clear though audacious metaphor for 
language as the source of death-defying poetry,” but insofar as the obstinately literal 
contrivance of the Ouija can be understood as figurative, surely this overdetermined 
figure also represents gossip, another social exchange in which a medium takes in and 
performs a chorus of disembodied voices for a select group of friends, often gathered 
around a table.88   
In E. F. Benson’s series of Lucia novels, from which Sandover borrows much 
of its camp style, the Ouija board represents just such a figure for gossip.  The cover of 
one of Merrill’s Ouija notebooks takes its label—“weedj”—from the term for 
consulting the Ouija coined by characters in Lucia in London, one of the Benson 
novels that, Merrill notes in Sandover, he and friends from Stonington, including 
Robert Morse, “reread— / And reenact—each summer” (257).  Lucia in London 
features a plotline in which Lucia’s neighbors in the village of Riseholme acquire a 
                                                
87 David Kalstone, “Persisting Figures: The Poet’s Story and How We Read It,” in James Merrill: 
Essays in Criticism, 144; McHale, “Angels in America,” 25. 
88 Vendler, Part of Nature, Part of Us, 220-221; David Lehman, “Elemental Bravery: The Unity of 
James Merrill’s Poetry,” in James Merrill: Essays in Criticism, 50. 
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Ouija board and make contact with a familiar spirit named Abfou, who does little 
more than dish on the absent Lucia’s snobbishness; and the opening of Mirabell 
echoes Benson’s use of the Ouija as a figure for village gossip by comically imagining 
the “small town” as a seemingly occult “state of mind, a medium / Wherein 
suspended, microscopic figments / —Boredom, malice, curiosity— / Catch a steadily 
more revealing light” (97).89  Mirabell thus presciently begins by conceiving of the 
“medium” not as an individual person but, like the shared alphabet of the Ouija, or the 
shared tradition of poetry, a communal space occupied by varied affects, perspectives, 
and voices—an atmosphere of potentially world-making gossip.  
Within this space of relationality—“WE 4 TOGETHER”—the social and aesthetic 
reproductions of gossip and poetic making construct a queer, post-nuclear family that 
brings JM and DJ together with literary father-figure Auden and surrogate mother-
figure Maria.  These familial ties are most immediately evident in the group’s 
endearments: JM and DJ call Maria “Maman,” while to her they are “MES ENFANTS” 
(to Auden, “MY BOYS”).  “ENFANTS    MES VRAIS ENFANTS,” Maria intones, “I AM FREE / 
OF ALL OLD BLOOD TIES & CONNECT MY LIFE / WITH YOURS” (246).  In keeping with the 
family dynamic, Auden coyly refers to himself and Maria (or rather Plato) as “A FAIRY 
PAIR,” and in hindsight we can see how this family romance of queer parentage plays 
                                                
89 See E. F. Benson, Lucia in London (1927), in Make Way for Lucia (New York: Harper & Row, 
1986), 179-358.  The intertextual relation between Sandover and the Lucia novels awaits investigation.  
In the poem’s later volumes, Robert Morse (or RM) charms heaven with his “E F BENSON BABYTALK,” 
and Sandover’s chats are frequently punctuated by the mangled French of the Bensonian valediction 
“AU RESERVOIR” (257).  Merrill himself emphasized—with appropriate camp frivolity—the importance 
of the Lucia novels for his work; when asked how much familiarity with his source material he 
expected of his readers, he replied, “Ideally a reader might happen to know, let’s say, about a third of 
these things, might have read Proust but not Dante or E. F. Benson” (“An Interview with Fred 
Bornhauser,” 138).  As this unlikely lineup (has the phrase “Dante or E. F. Benson” ever again been 
uttered?) suggests, Benson’s camp gossip lurks at the fringe of Sandover’s poetic tradition: describing, 
in an unpublished Ouija transcript, the “THRONG” of “AMERICAN ‘GREATS’” gathered “BEYOND THE 
HEDGE” at Sandover—including Wallace Stevens, Robert Frost, and T. S. Eliot—RM notes “OFF AT THE 
EDGE RATHER SHYLY . . . WAS E. F. B.”  Later, Byron’s “GREAT GOSSIP” causes RM to remark of 
Sandover, “IT MIGHT OFTEN BE THE GREEN AT RISEHOLME.”  Transcript dated September 18, 1977, 
James Merrill Papers. 
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out in Auden’s constant dashing off to “JAW WITH PLATO,” intercourse (“LUCKY 
BOYISH ME    OH WELL    COUGH COUGH”) that makes their relationship the stuff of 
gossip (303, 159, 141).  Modulating the Cold War figure of the homosexual as an 
embodiment of perversion, loose talk, and nuclear threat, JM conceives the core group 
of himself, DJ, Auden, and Maria (Mirabell will soon be added, and Ephraim is never 
far from hand) as a little nucleus, or—linking his post-nuclear family to the gossipy 
Verdurin salon in Proust—“What might be seen as her ‘petit noyau’ / By Mme 
Verdurin” (147).  Rather than an anti-social vision of queerness, in Merrill’s poem, 
affective queer kinship instead moves, through the reproduction of its poetic gossip, 
toward unexpected relations.  As JM tells DJ, “Wystan, Maria, you and I, we four / 
Nucleate a kind of psychic atom”: “At the core / We are kept from shattering to bits / 
By the electron hearts, voices and wits / Of our dead friends [ . . . ] In orbit round us” 
(191).  “FACED WITH NUCLEAR DISASTER,” the poem suggests one might find not 
“DESPAIR” but relief in the “celestial salon” of queer “hearts, voices, and wits” 
protectively gathered, as Ephraim affirms, “ROUND U IN A WIDE CHARMED CIRCLE” 
(128). 
Out of the Cold War’s anxious discourse of queer reproduction, Merrill thus 
produces a guardedly utopian vision of poetic gossip as a relational mode.  The term 
gossip originally meant “being a friend of,” and Sandover finds in gossip’s “no-proof 
rhetoric” a form of queer friendship.  In his essay “In Defence of Gossip,” the real-
world Auden asserts that “As a game played under the right rules,” gossip is “an act of 
friendliness . . . and a creative work of art.”90  For Merrill too, art, gossip, and 
friendship are conflated: Edmund White writes that in Sandover, “The sort of love 
expressed all around—decorous, teasing, edifying, at turns witty and grave—this love 
                                                
90 W. H. Auden, “In Defence of Gossip” (1937), in Prose and Travel Books in Prose and Verse, Volume 
1, 1926-1938, ed. Edward Mendelson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 427. 
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seems to me a utopian vision of love, a vision most often glimpsed these days by 
homosexuals, one that draws on the energies of both family love and romantic love but 
transforms that vitality into something new, a sublime sort of friendship.”91  Materer 
concurs that “the value of ideal friendships within the poem . . . points the way to a 
renewed humanity,” but thinks it “doubtful that this is a specifically sexual ideal.”92  
Yet although Merrill does not suggest anything inherently homosexual in this ideal, it 
seems to me doubtful that Sandover’s pursuit of it can be distinguished from the 
poem’s efforts to reshape the historical contours of non-reproductive erotic 
relationships.  Sandover’s friendship ethic in many ways anticipates Michel Foucault’s 
late work and the idea, as expressed in a 1981 interview, that “The development 
towards which the problem of homosexuality tends is the one of friendship”: “not to 
discover in oneself the truth of sex but rather to use sexuality henceforth to arrive at a 
multiplicity of relationships.”93  White’s description, in 1983, of “a sublime sort of 
friendship” that is “most often glimpsed these days by homosexuals” resonates with 
Foucault’s claim that “Homosexuality is an historic occasion to re-open affective and 
relational virtualities, not so much through the intrinsic qualities of the homosexual, 
but due to the biases against the position he occupies” and thus those “diagonal lines 
that he can trace in the social fabric,” which “permit him to make these virtualities 
visible.”94  The “diagonal lines” traced by the poetic gossip of the defiantly childless 
JM and DJ at the Ouija certainly “make . . . virtualities visible”: “Between the lines,” 
Merrill notes in one Ouija transcript, “a hint that none of these souls see each other 
except thru us—that we are a kind of communications satellite for them.”95  In the 
                                                
91 Edmund White, “The Inverted Type: Homosexuality as a Theme in James Merrill’s Prophetic 
Books,” Essays on Gay Literature, ed. Stuart Kellogg (New York: Harrington Park Press, 1983), 48. 
92 Materer, James Merrill’s Apocalypse, 115. 
93 Michel Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life,” trans. John Johnston, in Foucault Live (Interviews, 
1961-1984), ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), 308. 
94 Ibid., 311. 
95 Ouija transcript dated July 27, 1975, James Merrill Papers. 
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same transcript Ephraim declares that “Us homosexuals,” in DJ’s words, “ARE THE 
ONES WHO HOLD THE WORLD TOGETHER.”96   
Foucault contends that “what makes homosexuality ‘disturbing’” is not “the 
sexual act itself” but rather “the homosexual mode of life”: “everything that can be 
uncomfortable in affection, tenderness, friendship, fidelity, camaraderie and 
companionship, things which our rather sanitized society can’t allow a place for 
without fearing the formation of new alliances and the tying together of unforeseen 
lines of force.”97  Merrill seems to have a similar, if more demotic, sense of what 
normative culture might find “disturbing” about homosexuality when, in a published 
notebook fragment recording an anecdote about John Cage, he writes:  
 
  Crowded lecture hall, one of his last appearances. 
 
Member of audience: Mr. Cage, do you and Merce Cunningham have a 
homosexual relationship? 
 
Long pause.  JC (amiably): Well . . . I cook and he eats.98 
The subversive humor of Cage’s answer—perhaps euphemistic, perhaps not—
“amiably” challenges his audience to acknowledge an intimacy between men (who are 
also, notably, artistic collaborators) that is perhaps as unsettling to convention as any 
sexual act.  At the same time, the sexually infused details of this domestic arrangement 
flirtatiously confuse straightforward attempts to distinguish between ways of life and 
sexual acts, or to reinforce categories such as active and passive, masculine and 
feminine, normal and perverse—even literal and figurative, or cohabitation and 
collaboration.   
In Sandover, the seemingly benign recurring image of JM and DJ seated 
together before the Ouija board similarly emblematizes the sly provocation such queer 
                                                
96 Ibid. 
97 Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life,” 309. 
98 Merrill, “The Poet’s Notebook,” Collected Prose, 33. 
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intimacy can represent, as if announcing, “Well . . . I’m the SCRIBE and he’s the 
HAND.”  Over the course of the twentieth century even the Ouija board has been 
conscripted as a figure for the intimate parlor game of heterosexual courtship, with its 
passive, feminine medium instructively taking dictation from a penetrating, masculine 
higher power.  The perhaps surprising legibility of the board’s gendered erotics is 
presumed, for example, in two mainstream depictions of the Ouija, each of which 
portrays what Merrill and Jackson might call “Doters on women, who then went ahead 
/ To doctor everything their voices said.”  The first depiction, Norman Rockwell’s 
1920 painting “The Ouija Board,” created for the cover of the Saturday Evening Post, 
illustrates the charged pause following a question posed by the romantic couple at the 
board (see figure 6).  Her bearing suggests a frivolous credulity and passivity, his 
action and rationality: casting her expectant gaze heavenward, her fingers resting 
lightly on the pointer, she awaits the spirits’ reply, seemingly unaware that it (and she) 
is being manipulated by her partner, whose straightforward stare, erotically intruding 
posture, and firm hold on the planchette insistently pointed toward “YES” imply he 
won’t take no for an answer.  Her head is in the stars, his feet are on the ground; and 
the Ouija perched suggestively upon their laps mediates and stands in for the displaced 
erotics of this encounter—a dynamic still evident in the second depiction, a 1960 
advertisement for a commercially produced Ouija (see figure 7).  “Funny how a boy 
seems to make the best partner!” this ad exclaims.  “Especially,” its copy clarifies, “if 
he’s open-minded and willing to give the OUIJA Talking Board a fair try.”  The 
board’s placement—its alphabet rightside up for the man in Rockwell’s image, for the 
girl in the advertisement—suggests a shift in this partnership’s agency; yet in 
assuming that the girl to whom its pitch is addressed would have no skepticism to 
overcome, and in positioning her as an ideally passive consumer, the ad also echoes 
the conventional gender roles of the first depiction.  Here, the girl’s flurry of questions  
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Figures. 6-7.  Norman Rockwell, “The Ouija Board,” Saturday Evening Post cover, 
May 1, 1920; and Parker Brothers’ Ouija Talking Board, advertisement, December 
1960. 
 
connotes feminine frivolity (“Oh, OUIJA, can we take the car?”), fantasy (“Shall I 
become a model, or a fashion designer?”), gossip (“Who’s Debbie’s date for the 
prom?”), and naiveté (“Are flying saucers for real?”); while the boy’s fewer and more 
restrained inquiries (“What college will accept me?” and “Should we go steady?”) 
imply the desired corrective of a practical, masculine rationality.  
 The lack of such stereotypically masculinist comportment at the board—not to 
mention a female presence—distinguishes JM and DJ’s sessions from both the Ouija’s 
popular iconography and, as DJ jokes, from those literary models of (occult) 
collaboration found in “Yeats or Hugo,” models which doctor, erect, disseminate, and 
emit rather than docilely take in or just swallow.  The poem’s conceptions of poetic 
and queer production often rely on and rework the popular, sexual rhetoric 
surrounding the Ouija itself: as Shoptaw puts it, “Merrill’s receptive cup and 
erogenous-zones board make a refreshing break from the too often dully phallic  
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  Figure 8.  Harris Pemberton, “James Merrill and David Jackson  
  in Stonington, c. 1980s.”  Reproduced in The Changing Light  
  at Sandover (xi) 
 
pen.”99  In a review of Sandover, Thom Gunn invokes “above all” the image of Merrill 
and Jackson “sitting at the Ouija board” as part of his pointed celebration of the 
poem’s depiction of what he calls “a gay marriage” and the “triumph” of this 
relationship’s invention of an improbable world:  
 
The men’s life together is presented to us in detail which is almost casual: we 
see them choosing wallpaper, keeping house, traveling, entertaining, and above 
all sitting at the Ouija board.  It is not a minor triumph and it is not an 
incidental one because, after all, it is the two of them in their closeness who 
have evoked the whole spirit world of [Sandover], or perhaps even created 
it.100  
Sandover’s presentation of this marriage is less acquiescence to desexualized norms of  
domesticity than a strategic deployment, “almost casual,” of the discomfiting effects  
of homosexual “affection, tenderness, friendship, fidelity, camaraderie and 
companionship.”  Photographs of Merrill and Jackson intimately seated at the Ouija in 
their Stonington home frequently appear in the paratextual materials surrounding 
                                                
99 Shoptaw, “James Merrill and John Ashbery,” 759. 
100 Thom Gunn, “A Heroic Enterprise,” San Francisco Review of Books, August 1979, rptd. in A 
Reader’s Guide, 157. 
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Sandover, as if the couple delighted in staging the queer disjunction between their 
impossibly ambitious poem and the unlikely authorial image of two grown men 
holding hands atop a teacup, absorbed by what Merrill calls “this absurd, flimsy 
contraption, creaking along,” the air about them pregnant with “affective and 
relational virtualities,” the gossip of unheard voices, unseen worlds, meanings we 
cannot conceive (see figure 8).101  In Sandover it is funny, indeed, how a boy seems to 
make the best partner. 
            
IV. “ACOUSTICAL CHAMBERS”: GOSSIP AND POETIC TONE  
So far I have treated gossip primarily as something Merrill represents and 
thinks about in Sandover, while suggesting, too, that it is something he thinks with, as 
he finds in loose talk one model for his collaborative, “revisionary” poem.  Implicit in 
my account of how Sandover’s lyric gossip productively takes up and rearticulates the 
terms of a rather anxious mid-century relationship between privacy and publicity, and 
of how it reparatively reinflects the postwar suspicions surrounding homosexuality, 
reproduction, and nuclear threat, has been the problem of poetic tone—a dilemma to 
which I now explicitly turn.  For it is the aesthetic and literary-historical problem of 
tone inherent in Sandover’s method of composition, I propose, that both shapes and 
takes specific shape within the poem’s queer concerns with postwar questions of 
selfhood and agency.  By tone, I mean the common critical metaphor by which we 
refer to a poem’s tone of voice, the emotional stance it appears to adopt in relation to 
its material and auditor.  A key term for the New Criticism, and one of the cornerstone 
pedagogical concepts of Brooks and Warren’s influential textbook Understanding 
Poetry, a poem’s tone, we learn there, “indicates the speaker’s attitude toward his 
subject and toward his audience, and sometimes toward himself”; though poetry lacks 
                                                
101 Merrill, “An Interview with J. D. McClatchy,” 110. 
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the vocal intonation or gestural signals of conversation, nonetheless in a poem, as “[i]n 
ordinary life, a great part of our meaning—our basic attitude toward the what and the 
who of any transaction—is indicated by the tone.”102  As any good gossip knows, how 
a thing is said is as important, if not more, than the statement itself; the same set of 
words with different tones might easily express opposed meanings.  Thus, as any good 
gossip also knows, tonal reproduction is liable to go awry.  It is this liability that 
Sandover exploits in performing its culture’s texts but with different emphasis and 
feeling, a different “basic attitude toward the what and the who” involved, and 
therefore, as we have seen, meaning very different from that originally intended.     
The instability of tone in Sandover begins in the Ouija board’s mute voices, 
manifest only as alphabetical characters, and is duplicated in the hastily scrawled 
source transcripts of these sessions, which give little sense of who is speaking, what is 
being said, and how.  As Merrill describes it, the board’s voices proceed “at a smart 
clip, perhaps six hundred words an hour,” leaving a whir of unbroken text, for the 
most part devoid of even the most rudimentary tonal cues that spacing, shifts in case, 
and punctuation might provide, and lacking clear side-text or formatting that would 
indicate a change in speakers.103  Confronted with these “[d]runken lines of capitals 
lurching across the page, gibberish until they’re divided up into words and sentences,” 
the immediate task facing the Ouija’s mediums, then, is discerning—after the fact, and 
already at second hand—the spirits’ message and its tone.104  In an interview Jackson 
recalls that “practically every time, sure, we talked it over, the whole thing, how it had 
come through.  Sometimes we talked over what we thought the tone was.  Very often 
                                                
102 Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, Understanding Poetry, 4th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1976), 112.  This final edition of the textbook (following previous editions in 1938, 1950, 
and 1960) includes slight (though significant) revisions of its description of tone; nonetheless I quote 
from it because it gives the best sense of the current status of New Critical ideas of tone during the 
composition of Sandover. 
103 James Merrill, “An Interview with Helen Vendler” (1979), Collected Prose, 88.   
104 Merrill, “An Interview with J. D. McClatchy,” 107. 
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Jimmy would get things wrong.”  To the question, “You found that the hardest thing 
to ‘get,’ then, was not the message itself, but its tone?” Jackson answers in the 
affirmative, explaining, “Because the tone’s a voice. . . . the thing that was always one 
of the problems to talk over afterwards was, Did you feel that was said in this voice?  
Or, didn’t Wystan seem surprised?”105  
This compositional problem permeates the poem itself.  Each volume’s 
presiding spirit, for example, is grasped first, if tentatively, in terms of tone.  JM and 
DJ puzzle over, and delight in, the contrast between Ephraim’s “tone / We trusted 
most, a smiling Hellenistic / Lightness from beyond the grave,” and “the tone we 
trusted not one bit. / Must everything be witty?” (15, 17).  Mirabell “Distinguishes 
himself” from among the bat-angels by his use of punctuation, “tinkering symbols 
known / Not in themselves, but through effects on tone” by which he “strikes a note 
we’ve missed, / Clerkly but eager, glad to be with us” (129).  (Auden later admits to 
being “BAFFLED BY THIS CHANGE IN TONE” [175].)  And in Scripts, the litterateurs 
assembled for the angels’ demanding lessons take comfort in the sense that “THE 
TONE” of their instructors’ often “OBSCURE . . . TEXTS” is, Auden finds, “FAR MORE 
SHAKESPEARIAN THAN BIBLICAL” (420).  Merrill and Jackson’s efforts to “get” the 
Ouija’s tone are most closely mirrored in the poem when, following God Biology’s 
song—an eerily looping text rendered by JM in ten lines of ten-syllable syllabics—an 
entire section is devoted to reading the transcript and “talk[ing] over what we thought 
the tone was.”  “PLAINTIVE? AFFIRMATIVE?” asks Auden (362).  “He’s singing to the 
Pantheon,” JM offers.  “OR ALONE / KEEPING UP HIS NERVE ON A LIFERAFT,” Auden 
proposes (362).  This guessing at tone continues at length, focusing, Auden insists,  
 
UPON THE SOUND ITSELF    THOSE TONES WERE EITHER 
THOSE OF AN ETERNAL V WORK OR A MACHINE 
                                                
105 David Jackson, “DJ: A Conversation with David Jackson,” interview by J. D. McClatchy, 
Shenandoah 30.4 (1979): 44. 
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SET TO LAST    UNTIL THE BATTERIES 
RUN DOWN    OR . . . ?  Did the tones heard correspond 
To what you read just now?  EXACT SYLLABICS: 
THERE IS A LANGUAGE    ARE WE ON TO SOMETHING? 
CAN WE MAKE SENSE OF IT?  (363) 
These questions—is the proper tone poetic, mechanical, or something else entirely?—
suggest a radical and absorbing uncertainty (“ARE WE ON TO SOMETHING? / CAN WE 
MAKE SENSE OF IT?”).  For Merrill, given the “unprecedented way in which the 
material came,” such that “DJ and I never knew until it had been spelled out letter by 
letter,” tonal uncertainty itself became a tone as “What I felt about the material became 
a natural part of the poem.”106  In this sense we might say that Sandover is—among 
other things, to be sure—a poem about tone, written at a time when the concept, its 
underlying assumption of a subjective interiority, and the lyric genre as commonly 
defined in terms of this interiority’s expression had in many quarters fallen out of 
favor.  
If by 1988 Merrill could refer in a lecture to “what we used to call tone—the 
shades of mood and manner implied by this or that way of speaking,” when he began 
to consult the Ouija in the early 1950s, tone presented a dominant lens for reading 
lyric poetry.107  I. A. Richards in Practical Criticism identifies tone as one of “four 
kinds of meaning” at work in literary—indeed all—language, asserting that “many of 
the secrets of ‘style’ could, I believe, be shown to be matters of tone, of the perfect 
recognition of the writer’s relation to the reader in view of what is being said and their 
joint feelings about it.”108  Such claims anticipate the prevailing mode of interpreting 
poems during the postwar period, when the tenets of the New Criticism were widely 
implemented in the university classroom.  In The Fields of Light, for example, a 1951 
study that models the methods of reading practiced in his classes at Amherst (and later 
                                                
106 Merrill, “An Interview with Helen Vendler,” 85. 
107 James Merrill, “The Education of the Poet” (1988), Collected Prose, 13. 
108 I. A. Richards, Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgment (New York: Harcourt Brace, 
1929), 175, 198. 
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Harvard), Reuben Brower foregrounds the analysis of tone, drawing on Richards but 
also on Robert Frost’s related poetics of what he sometimes called “sentence sounds,” 
or “the sound of sense.”  Taking as an epigraph for his chapter on “The Speaking 
Voice” Frost’s statement that “Sentences are not different enough to hold the attention 
unless they are dramatic. . . . All that can save them is the speaking tone of voice 
somehow entangled in the words and fastened to the page for the ear of the 
imagination,” Brower avers: “Every poem is ‘dramatic’ in Frost’s sense: someone is 
speaking to someone else.”109  The “analysis of tone,” for Brower, accordingly 
demands that the reader “delineate the exact speaking voice in every poem we 
read.”110  And the poet’s job is to shape the poem so as to fasten this voice definitively 
to the page.  As Frost explains in his correspondence, “A sentence must convey a 
meaning by tone of voice and it must be the particular meaning the writer intended.  
The reader must have no choice in the matter.  The tone of voice and its meaning must 
be in black and white on the page.”111 
Merrill was on intimate terms with these ideas of poetic tone, having studied at 
Amherst with Brower (who in fact cites Merrill’s “honors thesis on Proust” twice in 
The Fields of Light).112  In an interview years later, Merrill fondly recalls “a course at 
Amherst that Reuben Brower gave.  I now see it was chiefly a course in tone, in 
putting meaning and the sound of meaning back into words,” and he concurs when 
asked if “Frost’s idea of ‘sentence sounds’” is “more or less relevant to what you’re 
saying.”113  In A Different Person he further evokes “all I had learned about ‘tone’ 
                                                
109 Reuben Brower, The Fields of Light: An Experiment in Critical Reading (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1951), 19. 
110 Ibid., 29. 
111 Robert Frost to John T. Bartlett, 30 May 1916, Selected Letters of Robert Frost, ed. Lawrance 
Thompson (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 1964), 204. 
112 See Brower, The Fields of Light, 43, 116. 
113 James Merrill, “An Interview with Donald Sheehan” (1968), Collected Prose, 55.  Merrill frequently 
refers to Brower’s teaching; in a 1982 essay he evokes his time “at Amherst, reading . . . Jane Austen 
and Pope with Reuben Brower” (“Acoustical Chambers,” Collected Prose, 7), while in his 1988 lecture 
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from my teachers” at Amherst, as well as from “the presence on campus, twice yearly, 
of Mr. Frost and his campaign for the sound of sense” (461).  Frost’s “campaign” 
emphasizes that although poetic tone, or “the sound of sense,” “is only there for those 
who have heard it previously in conversation,” it is not simply a transcription of 
conversational tones of voice, but instead takes shape as these tones come into tension 
with meter.114  “[S]entence sounds” are captured “fresh from talk, where they grow 
spontaneously,” but these tones “are only lovely when thrown and drawn and 
displayed across spaces of the footed line”: indeed, “if one is to be a poet he must 
learn to get cadences by skillfully breaking the sounds of sense with all their 
irregularity of accent across the regular beat of the metre.”115  JM’s reference to 
Sandover as “this net of loose talk tightening to verse” accurately describes Frost’s 
“sound of sense,” and like Frost’s, Merrill’s formalist verse deploys meter as a grid 
against which to display Sandover’s different voices—humans and ghosts speak in 
iambic pentameter, for example, while the bat-angels use fourteeners (85).  Discussing 
“voice”—“the democratic word for ‘tone’”—in an interview, Merrill contends, “I 
notice voice a good deal more in metrical poetry. . . . If Frost had written free verse, I 
don’t think we’d have heard as much of the voice in it.”116  
“‘Tone,’” Merrill maintains, “always sounds snobbish, but without a sense of it 
how one flounders!”117  Yet by the early 1970s, when Merrill began the project that 
would become Sandover, he was also well aware of how a sense of tone might just as 
                                                                                                                                       
on “The Education of the Poet,” he describes “an hour during my senior year at Amherst,” during which 
“Reuben Brower and I were looking at . . . lines by Pope” (13). 
114 Robert Frost to Sidney Cox, 19 January, 1914, Selected Letters of Robert Frost, 107. 
115 Robert Frost to John T. Bartlett, 22 February 1914; Robert Frost to Walter Prichard Eaton, 18 
September 1915; and Robert Frost to John T. Bartlett, 4 July 1913; in Selected Letters of Robert Frost, 
111, 192, 80. 
116 Merrill, “An Interview with Donald Sheehan,” 51.  
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easily invoke uncertain floundering.118  During these years, an increasing distrust of 
lyric’s fictive “speaking voice” and the subjective interiority this voice was taken to 
presume (misgivings often ascribed by critics to historical and aesthetic shifts of the 
1970s including, but by no means limited to, the wake of Watergate, Vietnam, 
poststructuralist theories of language, and the emergence of Language poetry) 
reflected what Langdon Hammer calls a “historical difference in the confidence with 
which we understand other people’s interiority and communicate our own.”  Hammer 
argues that this “reduction in poetry’s perceived potential to represent complexity of 
feeling, mood, stance—all that Brower and Richards once spoke of under the rubric of 
tone” presents “a key problem in American poetry since the 1970s,” one “which 
comes down to a general uncertainty about how to represent inner, mental and 
emotional experience.”119  Such uncertainty jars against the certain claims that tone 
“must convey . . . the particular meaning the writer intended,” leaving the reader “no 
choice in the matter,” or that one must (emphasis mine) “delineate the exact speaking 
voice in every poem we read.”  It accords however with Merrill’s experience of tone, 
as both a reader and writer, in the composition of Sandover, which brings the problem 
of conveying and apprehending “inner, mental and emotional experience” to the fore, 
but also raises the more fundamental problem—especially for a “ghostwritten” 
poem—of distinguishing interior from exterior emotion.  In a poem in which, as 
Jackson attests, Ephraim’s “tone” was “immediately suspected as our own tone,” how 
does one begin to determine whose voice, meaning, and emotion are being 
conveyed?120  In a discussion of tone as a more general aesthetic concept—“a cultural 
object’s affective bearing, orientation, or ‘set toward’ the world”—Sianne Ngai argues 
                                                
118 In letter to David Kalstone dated 28 November 1972 he writes, “I’m making the oddest stabs—into 
blank verse, or prose memoir, I can’t decide—at some alternative to the Ouija board novel; which serve 
to leave me very bad-tempered in the evening.”  James Merrill Papers. 
119 Hammer, “Frank Bidart and the Tone of Contemporary Poetry,” 13, 7.  
120 Jackson, “DJ: A Conversation with David Jackson,” 25. 
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that the problem of such uncertainty is not an obstacle for but a constitutive part of 
tone, “such that to resolve or eliminate the problem would be to nullify the concept or 
render it useless for theoretical work.”121  Ngai notes that “because tone is never 
entirely reducible to a reader’s emotional response to a text or reducible to the text’s 
internal representations of feeling (though it can amplify and be amplified by both), 
the problem it poses for analysis is strikingly similar to the problem posed by 
uncertainties concerning a feeling’s subjective or objective status” (29-30).  “Tone,” 
she observes, “is the dialectic of objective and subjective feeling that our aesthetic 
encounters inevitably produce” (30). 
Ngai’s assertion that the concept of tone draws on and is “even constructed 
around” the difficulty of distinguishing exterior from interior formulations, objective 
from subjective feeling—what Eliot in Sandover might call texts that others write and 
those that are one’s own—helps clarify Merrill’s formal and philosophical 
engagement with the extreme tonal ambiguities of the Ouija’s voices (30).  These 
voices accentuate what Ngai suggests “we might think of as tone’s greatest adversary 
in the domain of philosophical aesthetics”: the idea, often referred to as “projection,” 
that “what a critic calls ‘tone’ is simply a subject’s emotion-based appraisal of an 
artwork, treated as if it were an intrinsic property of the work itself” (82).  Ngai writes, 
“There is a sense in which tone resembles the concept of collective mood frequently 
invoked by historians (‘Cold War paranoia’ and so forth),” and as she repeatedly turns 
to “certain kinds of ugly feeling,” like paranoia, to illustrate the concept of tone, its 
uncertainties take on the negative contours of this affect (43, 28).  Paranoia, like tone 
and the projection that shadows it, “forefronts the question of how to adequately 
distinguish our own constructions from those which construct us”; and like tone’s 
                                                
121 Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 29, 30.  Further 
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definitive confusions, “[c]onfusion about feeling’s objective or subjective status 
becomes inherent to the feeling” of paranoia, here compelling us to ask, “Is the enemy 
out there or in me? (317, 19).   
We have seen how this question asserts itself in Sandover, a Cold War poem 
that embodies the figure of the nuclear annihilation it sets out to prevent, and in which 
Merrill is, as David Kalstone writes, “bombarded by voices of extinction using his 
words and his pages.”122  These same voices might make of the poet a mere “medium / 
Blankly uttering someone else’s threat” in a “ghostwritten” poem (is the poetry out 
there or in me?).  But for Merrill such multivalent uncertainty, if at first disconcerting, 
quickly becomes a form of pleasure spun out of the threads of postwar paranoia and 
authorial anxiety.  Mirabell in fact includes a sonnet whose subject is projection, or 
“the sentimental fallacy,” in which JM declares, “It’s hopeless, the way people try / To 
avoid the sentimental fallacy— / How can person not personify?” (172).  “Putting it 
into words,” he accepts, “Means also that it puts words into me” (172).  Jackson states, 
“Whether all that dictation came out of our collective subconscious or not finally 
became less and less of real interest,” and when asked, “Could not the ‘they’ who 
move the teacup around the board be considered the authors of the poems?” Merrill 
blithely equivocates, using the idiom of the Ouija: “Well, yes and no.”123  Sandover 
does not seek to resolve so much as fully inhabit the problem of tone. 
This is a stance for which gossip—seemingly autonomous talk that floats in 
and out of the bodies that perform and invariably alter it, thriving on and producing 
ambiguities of agency and interiority—proves instructive.  Sandover’s tone is steeped 
in gossip: the inverted teacup from which the poem’s mediums, as Merrill writes, “sip 
                                                
122 David Kalstone, “Persisting Figures: The Poet’s Story and How We Read It,” in James Merrill: 
Essays in Criticism, 143. 
123 Jackson, “DJ: A Conversation with David Jackson,” 38; Merrill, “An Interview with J. D. 
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. . . this warm, unsweetened tone” is spilling the tea, after all (101).  What Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick calls the “nonce-taxonomic work represented by gossip” pursues, 
like the analysis of poetic tone, nuanced accounts of others, providing, she writes, “the 
refinement of necessary skills for making, testing, and using unrationalized and 
provisional hypotheses about what kinds of people there are to be found in one’s 
world.”124  And, like the tonal uncertainty Ngai argues is produced by “our aesthetic 
encounters,” gossip’s sharp pursuit of particularity is also often imagined as producing 
an indistinct, atonal hum: chatter, buzz, clucking, cackling, murmurs.  From the salon 
(packed “CHOCKFULL OF STARRY GOSSIP & WE ROAR”) to the schoolroom (where we 
“HAVE SEEN & HEARD THE BUSY SECRETS BUZZING”), the ambient, atonal tone of 
gossip’s “provisional hypotheses” characterizes much of Sandover’s soundscape (386, 
455).  More, this tonal uncertainty serves as a positive figure for the poem’s queer 
reproduction: explaining “THE CHILDLESSNESS WE SHARE,” Mirabell proclaims,  
 
                                                                                    THE LOVE 
U EXPERIENCE IS NOT THE STRAIGHTFORWARD FRONTAL LOVE 
MANY READERS INFER & YET OUR V WORK MUST SING OUT 
PAEANS TO THE GREENHOUSE THO WE OURSELVES ARE (M) TONE DEAF 
                                                                                                     (216)  
Announcing his metaphor with his characteristic “(M),” Mirabell here explains 
homosexuality as a propensity toward tonal instability that paradoxically provides the 
basis for Sandover’s queer, life-affirming song.   
Merrill’s turn to gossip as an occasion and method for thinking about the 
formal, historical, and philosophical aspects of the problem of tone thus might seem to 
indicate a break from the more narrowly focused poetics he had learned from teachers 
like Brower or Frost, for whom tone of voice “must be positive, strong, and definitely 
and unmistakably indicated.”125  But it is more an exuberant reimagining of this 
                                                
124 Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, 23. 
125 Robert Frost to John T. Bartlett, 4 July 1913, Selected Letters of Robert Frost, 80. 
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poetics, in line with Merrill’s mischievously placing Frost in queer contexts, as when 
Sandover stages an erotic encounter between a hypnotized DJ, possessed by Ephraim, 
and JM, “In a white farmhouse up a gravel road / Where Frost had visited” (26), or 
when the Ouija transcripts elaborate a ludicrously bawdy fantasy out of the anecdote 
of Frost’s calling on Ezra Pound in his Kensington flat, only to discover him 
exotically perched in a tiny portable bathtub.126  For Frost, too, draws on gossip in 
formulating his poetics of tone.  In the series of letters articulating his efforts to get 
into his poems “the sound of sense,” Frost links these efforts to a love of gossip.  He 
hints at this link in his suggestion that “The best place to get the abstract sound of 
sense is from voices behind a door that cuts off the words,” a scene of overhearing that 
recalls Mill’s influential definition of lyric poetry as, in Frye’s phrasing, 
“preeminently the utterance that is overheard.”127  But whereas for Mill the poet is 
overheard, as if lyric is the stuff of gossip, for Frost the poet overhears, making verse 
out of gossip.  The ear for gossip implied in such poetic overhearing becomes overt in 
a later letter in which, after first claiming that his “conscious interest in people was at 
first no more than an almost technical interest in their speech—in what I used to call 
their sentence sounds—the sound of sense,” Frost admits,  
 
I was interested in neighbors for more than merely their tones of speech—and 
always had been.  I remember about when I began to suspect myself of liking 
their gossip for its own sake.  I justified myself by the example of Napoleon as 
recently I have had to justify myself in seasickness by the example of Nelson. 
 I like the actuality of gossip, the intimacy of it.  Say what you will effects of 
                                                
126 Recalling this incident over the board, Frost complains: “PEOPLE WON’T TALK ABOUT MY PHYSICAL 
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actuality and intimacy are the greatest aim an artist can have.128 
Frost’s discovery of a latent, “suspect” interest in a culturally feminized gossip must 
be “justified,” even in the relatively private space of a personal letter: and so the 
somewhat joking invocation of masculine, military strength that becomes the dead 
serious summoning of the poetic “artist” and his assertive “aim.”  Despite such 
anxious justification, though, the surprising sense remains that for Frost the vernacular 
of gossip—both in its abstract “tones of speech” and its “actuality and intimacy”—
presents a viable paradigm for modern poetic production.  And more than simply 
viable: in a 1956 lecture, Frost not only celebrates “Gossip,” which “may be defined 
as our guessing at each other,” but avows that “Gossip exalts in poetry.  Poetry is the 
top of our guessing at each other. . . . The beauty of gossip is that it is the whole of our 
daily life.  It has flashes of insight.  The height of imagination is there.”129   
The “height of imagination,” the “top of our guessing at each other”—Frost’s 
claim for poetry as exalted gossip returns us to his “sound of sense.”  In this context, 
the “hundreds of old and new categorical imaginings concerning all the kinds it may 
take to make up a world” that Sedgwick ascribes to gossip reverberate with Frost’s 
impossible taxonomic efforts to capture, “fresh from talk,” “boasting tones and 
quizzical tones and shrugging tones . . . and forty eleven other tones” that perhaps 
“could be collected in a book though I don’t at present see on what system they would 
be catalogued.”130  Like his admission of his tangled interest in “tones of speech” and 
“gossip for its own sake,” Frost’s “sound of sense” gleaned “from voices behind a 
door that cuts off the words” suggests tone as a kind of gossip: what we make out of 
                                                
128 Robert Frost to William Stanley Braithwaite, 22 March 1915, Selected Letters of Robert Frost, 159. 
129 See Stanley Burnshaw, Robert Frost Himself (New York: G. Braziller, 1986), 253.  For similar 
remarks by Frost on the topic of gossip, see Robert Frost: A Living Voice, ed. Reginald Cook (Amherst: 
The University of Massachusetts Press, 1974), 108; and Interviews with Robert Frost, ed. Edward 
Connery Lathem (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), 176. 
130 Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, 23; Robert Frost to Walter Pritchard Eaton, 18 September 
1915, Selected Letters of Robert Frost, 191. 
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the little bit we can catch of others’ interior experience behind the closed door of 
private subjectivity.  Cut off from the subjectivities presumed to be behind that door, 
the poet’s gossipy speculation perhaps fastens to the page his or her own tone and the 
interiority it implies as much as that of any supposed other in the adjacent room, and 
this uncertainty of objective and subjective feeling, third- and first- person experience, 
anticipates the reader’s relation to the poem, another interiority accessible only as a 
disembodied voice we can guess at.  Where just a resonant space can be confirmed, we 
imagine the depth of subjectivity; and in concentrating on this slippage between 
spaces and subjectivities, Frost’s figure for the “sound of sense” presents tone as a 
form of gossip that imagines and circulates the unverifiable ideal of lyric interiority.   
Like Frost’s poet making sense—and song—out of voices from which he or 
she is cut off, Sandover’s principal medium absorbs, as Auden sees, “A PLAY OF 
VOICES FOR / U MY BOY IN SOLITUDE TO SCORE” (137).  In its opening lines—
“Admittedly I err by undertaking / This in its present form”—Merrill’s poem begins 
with JM’s confessional, lyric “I,” speaking, after a failed attempt to craft a novel out 
of the Ouija’s “PLAY OF VOICES,” from a conventionally lyrical position of “SOLITUDE” 
(“I alone was left / To tell my story”) (3, 4).  Sandover ends by repeating the same 
lyric note, as JM commences his reading of the completed poem: “I begin: 
‘Admittedly . . .’” (560).  Nonetheless, although critics have emphasized the poem’s 
many embedded lyrics, and argued for Ephraim as a lyric sequence, no one could 
claim that the 557 pages of Sandover that intervene between these two lyrical 
admissions constitute a lyric poem.  Rather, the poem’s framing lyric subjectivity 
takes a stance that not only sets out in error, but knowingly errs, or wanders, through 
the multivoiced, multigeneric trilogy and its coda.  At times in this discussion I all the 
same refer, even when describing passages quite far from lyric, to Sandover’s lyric 
gossip.  In doing so, my contention is not that the poem’s gossip always or even 
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mostly takes lyric form—though it often does—but that as lyric goes astray in 
Sandover, its loose talk consistently gossips about the normative limits and queer 
possibilities of the genre, and especially of its putative interiority.   
Merrill’s gossip about lyric interiority, like Frost’s, recurs to architectural 
metaphors to portray the uncertain effects of tone, calling poetry, for example, a “vast 
chamber full of voices.”131  In an essay entitled “Acoustical Chambers,” published the 
same year Sandover was completed, Merrill writes that “Interior spaces, the shape and 
correlation of rooms in a house, have always appealed to me,” and speculates that 
“[t]his fondness for given arrangements might explain how instinctively I took to 
quatrains, to octaves and sestets, when I began to write poems.  ‘Stanza’ is after all the 
Italian word for ‘room.’”132  Blurring interior spaces and the interiorities with which 
they echo, Merrill describes his endeavors to fasten to the page his world’s complex 
“inflections” and speaking “tones” as requiring “magical places real or invented, like  
. . . Sandover, acoustical chambers so designed as to endow the weariest platitude with 
resonance and depth.”133  Sandover’s inventive design includes the “given 
arrangements” of inset verseforms (couplets, terza rima, sonnets, a villanelle, a 
canzone, and an array of nonce-forms), meters indicating voices of diverse ontologies, 
page layout (the indented left margin of Mirabell’s human and ghostly voices, or the 
dramatic side-text that appears in Scripts), and typography (the shifts between small 
caps and lower-case text, or regular and italicized font, which distinguish voices and 
the particular recesses from which these voices emanate, whether on earth or in the 
board’s virtual world)—an elaborate poetic architecture of interior spaces whose 
“resonance and depth” animate, yet without ever verifying, the presence of its various 
species of disembodied voices.  These “acoustical chambers,” both formally carved 
                                                
131 Merrill, A Different Person, 469. 
132 Merrill, “Acoustical Chambers,” 3. 
133 Ibid., 7-8. 
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out in the poem Sandover and self-reflexively represented as part of the manor house 
Sandover, comprise spaces of poetry in which gossip exalts and spaces of everyday 
gossip about exalted poetry.   
Consider the poem’s well-known “ROSEBRICK MANOR” speech, in which 
Auden rebukes JM’s idyllic wish to return to lyric’s “private life, to my own words”: 
“CAN U STILL BE BENT,” asks an incredulous WHA, “ON DOING YR OWN THING: EACH 
TEENY BIT / MADE PERSONAL (PARDON MME) AS SHIT?” (261, 262).  He continues,  
 
                                                   THINK WHAT A MINOR 
PART THE SELF PLAYS IN A WORK OF ART 
COMPARED TO THOSE GREAT GIVENS    THE ROSEBRICK MANOR 
ALL TOPIARY FORMS & METRICAL MOAT 
RIPPLING UNSOUNDED! FROM ANTHOLOGIZED 
PERENNIALS TO HERB GARDEN OF CLICHES 
FROM LATIN-LABELED HYBRIDS TO THE FAWN 
4 LETTER FUNGI THAT ENRICH THE LAWN, 
IS NOT ARCADIA TO DWELL AMONG 
GREENWOOD PERSPECTIVES OF THE MOTHER TONGUE 
ROOTSYSTEMS UNDERFOOT WHILE OVERHEAD 
THE SUN GOD SANG & SHADES OF MEANING SPREAD 
& FAR SNOWCAPPED ABSTRACTIONS GLITTERED NEAR 
OR FAIRLY MELTED INTO ATMOSPHERE? 
AS FOR THE FAMILY ITSELF MY DEAR 
JUST GAPE UP AT THAT CORONETED FRIEZE: 
SWEET WILLIAMS & FATE-FLAVORED EMILIES 
THE DOUBTING THOMAS & THE DULCET ONE 
(HARDY MY BOY WHO ELSE? & CAMPION) 
MILTON & DRYDEN OUR LONG JOHNS    IN SHORT 
IN BED AT PRAYERS AT MUSIC FLUSHED WITH PORT 
THE DULL THE PRODIGAL THE MEAN THE MAD 
IT WAS THE GREATEST PRIVILEGE TO HAVE HAD 
A BARE LOWCEILINGED MAID’S ROOM AT THE TOP  (262)  
Imagining English poetic tradition as a manor house—“Sandover, that noble rosebrick 
manor” (319)—Auden’s conceit downplays the “SELF” by emphasizing the House of 
Poetry it contingently inhabits, and the “GREAT GIVENS” of form, meter, and varieties 
of diction that together make up the estate’s grounds.  His speech presents a series of 
opposed perspectives and inversions—“OVERHEAD” and “UNDERFOOT,” “FAR” and 
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“NEAR,” “LONG” and “SHORT”—and a voice that similarly contrasts the heightened 
diction and syntax of lyric (“RIPPLING UNSOUNDED,” “IS NOT ARCADIA TO DWELL 
AMONG?”) with the everyday phrasing of idle talk (“MY DEAR,” “JUST GAPE UP,” “MY 
BOY,” “IN SHORT”).  What starts in the elevated, distant tone of a guided tour through 
this allegorical landscape—though Auden is addressing JM, the rhetorical question 
posed in this voice takes into account no particular auditor—gradually shifts into a 
more personal, conversational register (“AS FOR THE FAMILY ITSELF MY DEAR”) which 
we recognize as that of gossip about the goings on (“IN BED AT PRAYERS AT MUSIC 
FLUSHED WITH PORT”) of the estate’s occupants (“THE DULL THE PRODIGAL THE MEAN 
THE MAD”).  This tonal contrast sustains the inversion of the figure at the bottom of the 
manor’s social hierarchy ascending to its very “TOP,” a shift in importance that, 
recalling Ephraim’s unveiling as Michael, or Maria’s as Plato, we might view as the 
figure of the gossip supplanting the lyric “SELF,” now demoted to “A MINOR / PART.”  
Given gossip’s long (and often literary) association with women and servants, 
Auden’s revealing that this passage’s voice and its increasingly relaxed discretion 
figuratively belongs to the inhabitant of the manor’s “MAID’S ROOM” positions his 
speech specifically as servant’s gossip about the House of Poetry.  
This seems to have been a voice and a conceit Merrill was drawn to: we find 
another gossipy tour of poetic tradition in an earlier, occasional poem that serves as 
precursor for Auden’s “ROSEBRICK MANOR” speech.  Appearing in the September 26, 
1963 New York Review of Books under the pseudonym “Raoul Marx,” “Poets at 
Home” ostensibly presents a review in verse of the recent anthology The Modern 
Poets.  Its speaker, host for the at-home suggested by the title, immediately welcomes 
us:  
 
Yoo-hoo!  This way, dear reader, I so hoped 
You’d find us.  We have neither Sward nor Bowers 
Nor imaginary Gardons, yet a peasant Plath 
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Wilburing you through Ciardi perennials of many 
Hughes to our—hardly a Villa, more a Warren. 
For fine old Holmes you’ll have to look elsewhere.134 
Through puns and spoonerisms that anticipate the multiple meanings and inversions of 
the rosebrick manor’s allegorical landscape and its use of proper names, the speaker’s 
tour of this particular House of Poetry doubles as lively gossip about who’s in and 
who’s out of the anthology’s literary circle.  Here, for example, are “neither [Robert] 
Sward nor [Edgar] Bowers,” and no “imaginary Gardons”—a reference to S. S. 
Gardons, a pen name used by W. D. Snodgrass, who (a real toad?) is included in The 
Modern Poets.  When it comes time for the salon’s “tête-à-Tate” this gossip becomes 
plain, the house’s symbolism giving way to sheer dish about the minor parts played by 
assorted selves in the world of art: 
 
                                           Yes, we’re all here. 
Tomlinson?  Ginsberg?  Meredith?  Great Scott, 
How names like that Kinsella line beats me. 
Why, any Lehmann will tell you—Beg your pardon? 
Miles is as good as Amis?  Ha, that’s Rich!  (812) 
Here, poetry and poetic reputation circulate via a network of proper “names” that 
recall highlighted items in a gossip column as much as an anthology’s table of 
contents.  And although this poem is signed with a self-effacing pseudonym, our 
host’s relentless literary dish can be traced, as in WHA’s embodiment of the feminized 
figure of the gossip, to one name and source in particular, “That shallow, Merrilly 
chattering stream” (812). 
Reading Auden’s “ROSEBRICK MANOR” speech with “Poets at Home” in mind 
does more than just bolster the overlooked, gossipy aspect of its tone.  Critics have 
generally understood Auden’s manor house of tradition to be, as Gwiazda writes, 
                                                
134 James Merrill, “Poets at Home,” rptd. in Collected Poems, 812.  Further references will appear 
parenthetically within the text.  See also The Modern Poets: An American-British Anthology, eds. John 
Malcolm Brinnin and Bill Read (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963). 
 218 
“cohabited by the writers of the past.”135  But the presence of these writers is 
ambiguous, and they often seem less inhabitants than parts of the House of Poetry, just 
as the salon of “Poets at Home” more accurately figures its poets as home, 
components of a resounding architecture of gossip and poetry, from the “peasant 
Plath” and “Ciardi perennials” of the landscape to “the simple Hall” in whose mirror 
we see reflected “a door marked / T. ELIOT—that’s where we got our training” (812).  
When Auden compares “THE SELF” to the “GREAT GIVENS” of “THE ROSEBRICK 
MANOR,” the individual’s “MINOR” part morphs, through rhyme, into the autonomous 
features of the “MANOR” itself.  And though “THE FAMILY” seems, at first blush, to 
include “writers of the past”—Shakespeare and Dickinson, Hardy and Campion, 
Milton and Dryden—who live within the manor, these figures appear not as 
individuals but as architectural detail, their names doubling as flowers in the design of 
the space’s “CORONETED FRIEZE.”  Rather than a family tree, this frieze’s notably 
plural “WILLIAMS,” “EMILIES,” Thomases, and “JOHNS” indicate a taxonomy of types 
of poets, much like the taxonomy of rhetorical flowers we find in the estate’s garden.  
Even Auden’s reputed presence in the manor emerges, like his voice, as an effect of 
the “MAID’S ROOM,” that particular “acoustical chamber” he claims to have inhabited.    
The gossip of the “ROSEBRICK MANOR” speech tells JM—and us—that what we 
hear “IN A WORK OF ART” is not a lyric “SELF” but a resonant formal space, a tone.  
Part of an allegorical landscape in which “TOPIARY” equals verseforms, “MOAT” 
equals meter, “PERENNIALS” equal poetic touchstones, the “HERB GARDEN” equals 
clichés, and so on, the “MANOR” itself, I suggest, equals manner, or tone.  Beginning 
with I. A. Richards’ linking of “manners” and “tone,” the analysis of poetic tone has 
involved reference to manners as social behavior, one’s attitude toward others.136  For 
                                                
135 Gwiazda, James Merrill and W. H. Auden, 126. 
136 See, for instance, Richards, Practical Criticism, 198.  In this regard it is worth noting, too, that 
Brower’s The Fields of Light features an analysis of tone and its role in the design of Pope’s Epistle to 
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Merrill, a student of this tradition, “It’s hard to imagine a work of literature that 
doesn’t depend on manners, at least negatively,” and such “manners—whether good or 
bad—are entirely allied with tone or voice in poetry.”137  The manor house of poetry, 
in Auden’s punning speech, is accordingly a House of Tones: “SWEET” tones and 
“FATE-FLAVORED” and “DOUBTING” and “DULCET” and what Frost might call “forty 
eleven other tones.”  The term tone also has visual meaning, as in the general effect of 
color or of light, and The Changing Light at Sandover thus announces itself as a series 
of represented and formal spaces in whose constantly changing light “SHADES”—
ghosts, tones—“OF MEANING SPREAD,” producing “ghostwritten” texts, pregnant with 
gradations of meaning their “TONE DEAF” mediums cannot conceive, and promising 
unforeseeable transformations of tone, of the depth and hue of the poem’s protean 
voices.  Such tones enable “provisional hypotheses” about lyric selves whose 
interiorities are never certain, but no less powerful for that.  As Merrill remarks of 
manners, “One could paraphrase Marianne Moore: using them with a perfect contempt 
for them, one discovers in them after all a place for the genuine.”138  
In Sandover, Merrill uses tone with a perfect contempt for it.  The poem’s lyric 
gossip lays bare the problems of poetic tone, interrogating the uncertain “PART THE 
SELF PLAYS IN A WORK OF ART,” the difficulties of distinguishing between subjective 
and objective feeling, the perhaps illusory nature of lyric interiority.  Yet the 
“ROSEBRICK MANOR” speech, supposedly a rebuke of JM’s wish to return to “my own 
words,” is in fact, Merrill admits, one of “only a few places where I presume to pass 
‘my own words’ off as a message from the other world.  The showiest is Wystan’s 
evocation of the manor house (Mirabell, 9.1).  It came welling up from me one 
                                                                                                                                       
Burlington, a poem which conducts, like Sandover and “Poets at Home,” a satirical tour of an estate, 
during which we hear, Brower writes, “the cultivated voice of a guide speaking.” Merrill certainly 
would have been familiar with Brower’s analysis and Pope’s poem.  Brower, The Fields of Light, 146. 
137 Merrill, “An Interview with Donald Sheehan,” 58. 
138 Ibid. 
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afternoon, instead of from the Board.  I never again felt so ‘possessed.’”139  For all the 
uncertainties of tone and the seemingly irresolvable questions of agency, interiority, 
authorship, and tradition such uncertainty implies, Merrill is “STILL . . . BENT” on the 
“private life” of “my own words”—but as they emerge as gossip from within lyric’s 
“acoustical chambers.”  Here, he seems to echo Eliot in Sandover, whose gossip, in 
asserting that the “WORKS” that “OTHERS ‘WRITE’ . . . ARE YET ONE’S OWN,” evinces a 
desire for a lyric subjectivity that he knows is an impossible desire, and yet pursues all 
the more because of it.  “Freedom to be oneself,” Merrill writes in A Different Person, 
“is all very well; the greater freedom is not to be oneself” (565).  Putting pressure on 
the problem of poetic tone, Merrill’s Ouija poem demystifies lyric’s subjective 
interiority even as its gossip discovers in this interiority a queer space for a “self,” to 
recall Merrill’s words, “much stranger and freer and more farseeing than the one you 
thought you knew.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
139 James Merrill, “The Changing Light at Sandover: A Conversation with James Merrill,” interview by 
Robert Polito, Pequod 31 (1990): 11. 
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